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ABSTRACT 
 
NATHANIEL LEE SMITH: “Cured of the Habit by Force”: The United States and the 
Global Campaign to Punish Drug Consumers, 1898-1970 
(Under the direction of Michael H. Hunt) 
 
This dissertation asks how a punitive response to non-medical drug use came into 
force across the globe in the twentieth century.  It argues that U.S. officials were the authors 
of that punitive approach.  They forged it in response to opium smokers in their Philippine 
colony in the early 1900s as part of what they regarded as a modern and progressive solution 
to a moral and practical problem.  The Philippine experience served in turn as the basis for a 
punitive model abroad.  Washington organized international conferences pushing for ironclad 
clauses in treaties and sought to undercut attempts to keep non-medical drug use legal.  The 
international outcome of these efforts was evident by the interwar years with the rise of a 
global punitive regime prompted by international treaties and effected through national 
legislation and reporting.  The new regime survived an immediate challenge from foreign 
public health bureaucrats who proposed to deal with drug consumers as patients rather than 
prisoners.  American officials overcame this challenge by advancing specialized 
incarceration as a cutting-edge form of addiction treatment.  After the Second World War the 
U.S. government was more active than ever in promoting punishment.  Congress imposed 
mandatory incarceration for illegal drug possession, while an assertive executive branch 
worked to consolidate the punitive approach overseas by pressuring non-compliant countries 
and tightening treaty terms.  A global wave of drug consumerism among youth in the late 
1960s posed the second serious challenge to the regime.  While forcing a moderation in the 
iv
penalties in the United States, drug consumerism did not overwhelm (or even significantly 
alter) the punitive regime.  Most governments reacted by escalating penalties.  The American 
punitive approach remained the international norm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: Prohibitions and Punishment 
When the manager of my hotel in Manila, Philippines heard that I was heading off to 
the archive for historical research, he brightened with interest.  His enthusiasm visibly 
deflated when I described my topic.  Wincing, he asked, “wouldn’t it make things worse to 
legalize drugs?”  The criminalization of drug consumption and the punishment of non-
medical drug users is an undeniably controversial topic—and not just in the United States.1
It is best to address the controversy directly.  I did not research and write this 
dissertation to offer a historically informed claim for or against drug legalization.  Neither 
“legalizers” nor “prohibitionists” (to use the terminology coined by the contending factions) 
would be swayed by one, or perhaps any, academic study.  Rather, I was motivated by the 
desire to unearth some of the history that is taken for granted in the overheated debates.  
“Legalizers” tend to assume that drug prohibition unfairly punishes people who are simply 
following an innate human desire to alter their consciousnesses.  “Prohibitionists” tend to 
view punishment as a necessary tool to keep drug abuse from ruining families, communities, 
and even countries.  A lack of historical consciousness about the laws and policies regarding 
drug use encourages arguments on both sides that are fueled by emotion and imagination. 
I began to develop an interest in the punitive response to drug consumption almost 
twenty years ago.  In at least an initial way, I started to analyze the issue during high school 
 
1 Quotation in the dissertation’s title is from R.C. Round, “The Opium Problem in the Philippine Islands,” 
Philippines Monthly (September 1911): 27, copy in U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland, Records 
of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350, entry 5, file 1023-190. 
 
2in the late 1980s.  I was shocked to hear that a fellow student was sent to a mental ward for 
“treatment” (and then to a private boot camp) on suspicion of cannabis use.  By the time I 
entered graduate school in the fall of 2000, other influences had guided my curiosity.  When I 
was an undergraduate an engaging history professor named Mark Lytle prompted me to 
evaluate the role of the United States in the world.  Working as a legal assistant for the Soros 
Foundation, which advocates drug policy reform, alerted me to the public health inspired 
philosophy of harm reduction (a first-principle commitment to lessening the harm imparted 
by drug use) and exposed me to the culture wars over drug legalization.  Frankly I was more 
interested in questioning and exploring the intellectual realm of drug policy than in 
passionate advocacy.  My detachment tended to leave “legalizers” cold.  Ensconced in 
graduate training, I returned to my curiosity about U.S. international relations and began to 
explore whether U.S. efforts had guided anti-drug policies in other nations.   
I soon found that I needed to disentangle concepts that are often entangled—namely, 
prohibition and the punishment of illicit drug consumers—if I were to explore the most 
interesting questions.  The term “prohibition” seems to explain much more than it actually 
does.  In popular usage it invokes an all-encompassing across-the-board ban.  But 
prohibitions are legal constructions in specific historical circumstances and can vary 
significantly.  For instance, the most famous historical example of “prohibition” in the 
American context came in 1920 with the ban on “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of 
intoxicating liquors.”2 The Eighteenth Amendment did not lead to the criminalization of the 
consumption of alcohol for intoxicating purposes.3 If tipplers had a bottle, they could pour 
 
2 U.S. Const, Amend XVIII, § 1.  
 
3 Volstead Act, U.S. Statutes at Large 41 (1919): 305-23. 
 
3social callers a customary cocktail without breaking the law.  In short, “prohibitions” need to 
be viewed as legal and policy frameworks within particular historical settings in order to 
grasp their actual impact on the production, trade, or consumption of a proscribed 
commodity.  Anyone who reads a newspaper knows that people in the United States and in 
other countries around the world who are caught with illegal drugs face criminal penalties.  I 
wanted to understand how and when a punitive response to non-medical drug use came into 
international application. 
I found that a large body of literature about the history of drug control had not 
adequately answered my question.  There are numerous national studies (cited throughout the 
dissertation).  But most are interested in domestic affairs and leave the important 
international component of the issue largely untouched.  A few examine international drug 
control treaties, but they have predominantly focused on policymakers’ attempts to control 
the drug problem by striking at production and trafficking, and neglect the treatment of 
consumers either in the treaties or in national law implementing the treaties.4 Historian 
William O. Walker III has been exceptional through his examinations of international law 
along with national enforcement, but his contributions have covered specific geographic 
 
4 Notable studies of drug control treaties include Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Opium as an International 
Problem: The Geneva Conferences (1925; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1976); Johns Hopkins Press, 1925); 
S.H. Bailey, The Anti-Drug Campaign: An Experiment in International Control (London: P.S. King and Son, 
LTD., 1937); Bertil A. Renborg, International Drug Control: A Study of International Administration By and 
Through the League of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1947); Peter 
D. Lowes, The Genesis of International Narcotics Control (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1966); Arnold H. Taylor, 
American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, A Study in International Humanitarian Reform (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1969); Kettil Bruun, Lynn Pan, and Ingemar Rexed, The Gentlemen’s Club: International 
Control of Drugs and Alcohol (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); S.K. Chatterjee, Legal Aspects of 
International Drug Control (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981); S. D. Stein, International 
Diplomacy, State Administrators and Narcotics Control: The Origins of a Social Problem (London: Gower, 
1985); David R. Bewley-Taylor, The United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997 (London: 
Pinter, 1999); William B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History 
(New York: Routledge, 2000). 
4regions rather than adopting a global framework and do not focus on consumption.5 Studies 
of international regimes provide conceptual guidance about how national laws fit within the 
firmament of international treaties as well as global norms, but have not examined the issue 
of illegal drug use.6
While the literature did not answer my question it helped me to understand that my 
question was deceptively simple.  Historians have shadowed the sovereignty of their subjects.  
The nation state enjoys pride of place.  International treaties and supranational bureaucracies 
are defined by comparison, which makes them seem weak and toothless.  To answer my 
question I needed to assess the power relationship between diplomatic campaigns (which can 
shape foreign law), international treaties (which can both stipulate and inspire national laws), 
and national cultures (which guide the application of local law).  Further, since I was 
interested in history, not legal theory, I was not satisfied with merely interpreting the vigor or 
weaknesses of international law and the ramifications of national sovereignty.  I wanted to 
find out what actually happened, and I remained committed to a global framework.  My 
question, which had seemed so simple at the outset, began to loom like a big dark cloud.   
 
5 See William O. Walker III, ed., Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict 
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1996); Walker, Drug Control in the Americas (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1981); Walker and Bruce M. Bagley, eds., Drug Trafficking in the Americas 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994); and Walker, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-
American Search for Order in Asia, 1912-1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).    
 
6 On capitalism see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979). On global finance see Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global 
Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). On technology see Daniel 
Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991) and Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science Technology, and 
Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). On human rights see Paul Lauren, 
The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1998). On tourism see Louis Turner and John Ash, The Golden Hordes: International Tourism and the Pleasure 
Periphery (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976). On the drug trade see Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, 
Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006); and Ethan Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in 
International Society,” International Organization 44 (1990): 479-526.  
 
5Sources led me to a solution.  The United States was the most active country in 
international drug control over the twentieth century so I traveled to Manila, to examine the 
records of the federal government’s first attempt at banning drug use.  Next I studied the 
records of U.S. anti-drug diplomacy in the U.S. National Archives.  But, I still faced the most 
difficult challenge: how to build up sufficient data to test my ideas and support global 
characterizations.  I looked carefully at national and international laws dealing with non-
medical drug users, but this piecemeal approach offered little information about enforcement.  
To move ahead, I performed an experiment inspired by social science research.  I surveyed 
the reports about drug control sent by governments to the League of Nations and the United 
Nations.  I sampled the reports—from Afghanistan to Zanzibar—in five-year increments 
from the early 1920s to the mid 1970s (the unedited, original reports are collected in archival 
collections in Geneva and Vienna).   
I found a body of evidence that suggested an answer to my question.  Reflecting on 
the reports as a whole, I began to sense that the punishment of users had become part of a 
shared project during the interwar years.  Rather than a cut and dry issue of state sovereignty, 
this body of evidence suggested a more nuanced power relationship.  Washington urged a 
ban on non-medical drug use and promoted punishment as a progressive approach.  While 
the text of the international treaties responded to Washington’s urging, they did not 
technically compel states to punish users, but they still managed to stimulate that result.  
States began reporting about the punishments imposed on drug consumers to international 
organizations in the interwar years in order to demonstrate their participation in the 
international drug control movement.  
6A survey of reports from more than a hundred different countries and colonial 
possessions would be a poor writing strategy.  Instead, the following chapters set forth my 
argument chronologically and use case studies to exemplify my thesis.  American officials 
forged a punitive response to opium smokers in their Philippine colony in the early 1900s as 
part of what they regarded as a modern and progressive solution to a moral and practical 
problem.  The Philippine experience served in turn as the basis for a punitive model abroad.  
Washington organized international conferences pushing for ironclad clauses in treaties and 
sought to undercut attempts to keep non-medical drug use legal.  The international outcome 
of these efforts was evident by the interwar years with the rise of a global punitive regime 
prompted by international treaties and effected through national legislation and reporting.  
The new regime survived an immediate challenge from foreign public health bureaucrats 
who proposed to deal with drug consumers as patients rather than prisoners.  American 
officials overcame this challenge by advancing specialized incarceration as a cutting-edge 
form of addiction treatment.  After the Second World War the U.S. government was more 
active than ever in promoting punishment.  Congress imposed mandatory incarceration for 
illegal drug possession, while an assertive executive branch worked to consolidate the 
punitive approach overseas by pressuring non-compliant countries and tightening treaty 
terms.  A global wave of drug consumerism among youth in the late 1960s posed the second 
serious challenge to the regime.  While forcing a moderation in the penalties in the United 
States, drug consumerism did not overwhelm (or even significantly alter) the punitive 
regime.  Most governments reacted by escalating penalties.  The American punitive approach 
remained the international norm.  The next chapter examines the genesis of that approach.  
CHAPTER 2 
 
Forging the Punishment Solution in the Philippines, 1898-1909 
 
In 1903 in his third year in Manila, William Howard Taft stepped into a political 
minefield.  At a public forum he defended the right of Chinese people to smoke opium.  He 
complained that it was all too “easy to paint the horrors” of opium smoking to an American 
audience that had little experience with opium smokers and was thus poorly informed and 
impressionable.  Taft explained that “a puff” from an opium pipe was relatively harmless and 
had social value akin to “whiskey in moderation.”  Opium smoking did not deprive Chinese 
of their senses, “steal away their brains,” or make them physical wrecks.  Taft told the 
audience that he wanted to create a policy for selling opium for smoking to licensed buyers.  
He was convinced that an attempt to ban opium smoking would be “absolutely impossible” 
unless the government quarantined thousands of smokers within the walls of a massive 
penitentiary.7
Taft was in a delicate political situation.  He had spent almost two years serving as 
the first Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands and, for almost three years, he had been the 
President of the Philippine Commission, which had been created by President William 
McKinley in 1900 as an executive and legislative body for America’s new Asian colony.  
This commission served many masters.  Its five members tried to craft policies they believed 
 
7 Taft’s comments are in the Minutes of Proceedings of the Philippine Commission, U.S. National Archives, 
College Park, Maryland (hereafter NA), Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350 (hereafter 
RG 350), entry 5, file 1023-58. 
8best for the islands.  However, the executive and legislative branches of the federal 
government in Washington could overrule any decision made in Manila.   
Moreover Taft faced a divide regarding opium smoking that had developed between 
U.S. officials in Washington and Manila.  In 1899 General Elwell Otis, the second U.S. 
Military Governor of the Philippines, banned the opium monopoly that had raised revenue 
for the Spanish by selling licenses to vend the drug to authorized buyers.  Subsequent 
military and then civilian officials enacted policies which allowed opium smoking but raised 
scant revenue.  By 1903 Taft was convinced that a monopoly would best regulate opium use 
and raise funds for the government.  In Washington, the White House and the Congress 
favored a rigorous ban.  Top politicians sided with evangelicals who considered such opium 
sales to be state predation upon helpless people.   
Once back in Washington to serve as secretary of war in 1904, Taft fell under the 
sway of the prohibitionists and abandoned his support for licensed sales.  He guided 
Congress to impose an end to the legal sale of opium for smoking in the colony to take effect 
1 March 1908.  Having betrayed his old colleagues on the Philippine Commission, he left it 
up to them to make the ban work.    
Punishment in increasing doses soon became the solution to non-medical drug use in 
the Philippines.  Civil officials in Manila such as Governor General James F. Smith tried and 
failed to find an effective method to convince opium smokers to quit prior to the deadline.  
Thereafter, a frustrated Philippine Commission fell into a pattern of escalating the 
punishment of people who continued to use drugs for recreation.  By 1909, when Taft moved 
into the White House, employees of the Municipal Police, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
and the Philippine Constabulary were sniffing the air for the aroma of burnt opium and 
9crashing through barricaded doors to arrest the smokers.  Employees of the Bureau of Health 
were judging who among those inside had inhaled the smoke.  And the staff of Bilibid Prison 
had become the premier provider of drug addiction treatment.  Taft’s prediction rang true.  
American officials viewed incarceration as a coercive tool to make drug users into sober 
colonial subjects fit to learn self-government.  The punishment of drug users became part and 
parcel of America’s modern style of colonial governance. 
This story has significance beyond the history of the Philippine archipelago.  The 
outcome of the contest over Philippine opium policy proved to have particularly long legs, 
helping to shape global drug policy over the twentieth century.  The criminalization of non-
medical drug use in America’s Asian colony came before any similarly comprehensive drug 
legislation in the continental United States.  Previously Congress had merely levied import 
duties on psychoactive drugs such as opium.  State and local governments had imposed more 
control, but this consisted of bans upon venues associated with non-medical drug use, of 
which opium dens were the most notorious example.  The Philippine experience shifted the 
American approach from generally seeking to protect the victims of the opium trade toward 
escalating the punishment of non-medical drug users.  The mandatory minimum penalty for 
unauthorized drug use passed by the Philippine Commission in 1909 would reverberate 
widely throughout the twentieth century.  The punishment solution, forged during what 
Bishop Homer C. Stuntz called America’s “great experiment in the Orient,” became the 
model for anti-drug consumption policy in the continental United States and abroad as U.S. 
officials sought to export the approach to nations across the globe.8
8 Stuntz’s quotation is in Minutes of Proceedings of the Philippine Commission, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-
58.  
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Part I. The Initial American Approach 
 
Neither the federal government in Washington nor the incipient American colonial 
government in Manila pressed for a comprehensive drug policy in America’s new colony.  
Rather, the U.S. military and civil leaders based their first opium policy on what was familiar 
from the continental United States.  In so doing they dismissed an opium monopoly approach 
of licensed sales by government agents or private contractors that had been adopted by the 
ousted Spanish state, the soon to be crushed Philippine Republic, and the surrounding Asian 
colonies of the Dutch, British, French, Portuguese, and Japanese.9 The Americans 
encountered disappointing results with their first attempt at opium policy, indicating the 
complexity of the issue.  By 1903 Taft and other American officials in Manila became 
convinced of the need for comprehensive policy reform. 
 
Applying Familiar Policies 
 
Arriving to rule over a foreign land in 1898, General Elwell Otis took the first step 
toward making opium policy in the Philippines more like it was in the homeland.  Drug 
regulations in the continental United States consisted of federal import tariffs and state and 
local laws against venues for opium smoking.  In December of 1898, President McKinley 
extended American military rule from Manila (occupied since that May) to the entire 
archipelago.  The next year Otis dismissed the Spanish monopoly approach that had yielded 
 
9 There are numerous studies on the opium trade and the colonial opium policies of Southeast Asia. Fine 
examples include Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian 
Opium Trade, 1750-1950 (New York: Routledge, 1999); and James R. Rush, Opium To Java: Revenue Farming 
and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). For a 
probing set of essays that witness the complexity of the opium issue see Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi 
Wakabayashi, eds., Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000).  For coverage of the opium policy of the Filipino revolutionaries see John R.M. Taylor, ed., The 
Philippine Insurrection against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, 5
vols. (Pasay City, Philippines: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971), 2:213, 473, 3:570; and Wong Kwok-Chu, The 
Chinese in the Philippine Economy, 1898-1941 (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), 25.  
 
11
the crown annual revenue of around 400,000 or 500,000 pesos (equal to about $250,000) and 
replaced it with an import tariff, which was less profitable but was the approach taken by 
Congress. 10 Opium could be legally imported for any purpose with payment of the proper 
impost.  Due to an earlier treaty between the United States and China, ethnic Chinese in the 
Philippines could not import opium until 1902, when a special customs act granted them the 
right.11 American military and, later, civil officials tried to strike a balance between a tariff 
that was sufficiently high to deter massive opium imports while still low enough to 
 
10 A complex series of currency policies during the American period settled on a roughly two to one exchange 
rate for pesos to U.S. dollars. See Mobley to Smith, 21 January 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-62; John 
Hord, “The Opium Evil In Asia and How America Has Curbed It in the Philippines,” 1 February 1909, NA, RG 
350, entry 5, file 1023-168; House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Year Ended 1900, Report of 
the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands on Civil Affairs, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1900, H. Doc. 2, 32-33; 
Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 32; Anne L. Foster, “Models for Governing: Opium and 
Colonial Policies in Southeast Asia, 1898-1910,” in The American Colonial State in the Philippines, ed. Julian 
Go and Anne L. Foster (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 95; Edgar Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine 
Life, 1850-1898 (1965; repr., with a new preface, Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 115-19. 
Also see House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year 1899, Report of the Major-General 
Commanding the Army, Part 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1899, H. Doc. 2, 297.   
 
11 An 1880 treaty with China banned Chinese merchants from exporting opium to U.S. territory, and vice versa.  
See Opium Acts, U.S. Statutes at Large 24 (1887): 409-10.  The 6 February 1902 Philippines Customs 
Administrative Act removed the Philippine Islands from the 1880 treaty. Thereafter, Philippine-Chinese could 
import opium legally within the tariff provisions. See “Customs Administrative Circular No. 129,” 13 
December 1902, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-4; and Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 
33. Andrew R. Wilson argues that the U.S. opium import policies “opened the market to petty entrepreneurs, 
and encouraged smuggling” within the Philippine-Chinese community, though he does not account for the 
prohibition on Philippine-Chinese importers before February 1902. See his Ambition and Identity: Chinese 
Merchant Elites in Colonial Manila, 1880-1916 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004), 187-88, 191-97. 
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discourage smuggling.12 Accordingly, the tariff rose in 1902 and by 1903 the cost of the duty 
reached about half of the actual value of the opium imported.13 
Drawing further upon practices in the continental United States, U.S. military and 
civil officials granted Philippine municipalities the legal power to ban opium dens.  Such 
bans had been passed by domestic state and local governments to impose social control on 
venues that were popularly associated with Chinese residents.14 In a March 1900 order 
General Otis granted the power to municipal councils to inflict a penalty on people who 
operated or visited opium smoking venues (up to a 125 Spanish peso fine or imprisonment 
for fifteen days).15 In preparation for the shift of the American administration of the islands 
from the military to the civilian Philippine Commission on 4 July 1901, the commission 
 
12 See Gage to Root, 2 April 1900, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-3; House, Annual Reports of the War 
Department for the Year Ended 1900, Report of the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands on Civil Affairs,
56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1900, H. Doc. 2, 102; W. Morgan Shuster, Second Special Report, Covering the Period 
from September 1, 1902, to October 8, 1903 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1903), 156; U.S. Department of War, 
Fifth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904, Part 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1905), 545.  Also see Act 230, An Act to Revise and Amend the Tariff Laws of the Philippine 
Archipelago, included in House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1901, Public Laws Passed by the Philippine Commission, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1901, H. Doc. 2, 658; U.S. 
Department of War, Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1904), 63; and historian Anne Foster’s calculations in “Models for Governing,” 
95-96. 
 
13 See Senate, Report of the Committee Appointed by the Philippine Commission to Investigate the Use of 
Opium and Traffic Therein, 59th Cong., 1st sess., 1906, S. Doc. 265, (hereafter Philippine Opium Report), 160; 
W. Morgan Shuster, Second Special Report, Covering the Period from September 1, 1902, to October 8, 1903 
(Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1903), 156; and U.S. Department of War, Fifth Annual Report of the Philippine 
Commission, 1904, Part 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), 545. 
 
14 See Harry Hubble Kane, Opium Smoking in America and China (1882; repr,. New York: Arno Press, 1976), 
4, 13; John Liggins, Opium: England’s Coercive Opium Policy and It Disastrous Results in China and India; 
The Spread of Opium-Smoking in America, 2nd ed. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1883), 40-41; and David 
Courtwright, Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 61-84. 
 
15 In case of insolvency convicts could serve time in prison instead of paying a fine. One day in prison counted 
for one peso of the fine. See article 33 of the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, General Order 40, 19 
March 1900, in Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines,
57th Cong., 1st sess., 1902, S. Doc 331, pt. 1: 120. A mixture of currencies (mostly Spanish) was used in the 
Philippines until 1903 when it was replaced by the new Philippine peso, which was valued at half of one U.S. 
dollar. See E. W. Kemmerer, “The Establishment of the Gold Exchange Standard in the Philippines,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 19 (August 1905): 585-609. 
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affirmed the ban on dens and increased the penalties for violations in a January 1901 act.  
Thereafter municipal councils (and the incorporated city of Manila) could impose a two-
hundred-peso fine or a six-month prison term or both on people who visited “opium joints.”16 
Somewhat ironically, the Philippine Commission hoped that municipal councils 
would learn democratic governance by wielding this power of social control regarding opium 
dens.  Rather than ordering local politicians to enforce community standards favored by the 
Americans, the commission tried to encourage towns to strike out against disfavored venues 
such as opium dens.  The councils were supposed to decide whether or not to exercise the 
power to ban the smoking venues and, if they did, they were responsible for enforcement of 
the ordinances.  This odd arrangement reflected the commission’s intent to use the municipal 
code to foster democratic behavior at the local level through a “town hall” model.17 
The desire to keep “uncivilized tribes” from using opium was another aspect 
underscoring the initial American approach.  The Philippine Commission made the municipal 
codes more restrictive on opium in predominately “native,” or indigenous, areas.  The 
commission passed a November 1900 act for the mountainous province of Benguet that 
empowered the township governments—if they wished—to control not only opium dens, but 
 
16 See Act No. 82, A General Act for the Organization of the Municipal Governments in the Philippine Islands, 
in House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901, Public Laws Passed 
by the Philippine Commission, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1901, H. Doc. 2, 146-47; and Act No. 183, An Act to 
Incorporate the City of Manila, in House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 1901, Public Laws Passed by the Philippine Commission, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1901, H. Doc. 2, 381-
85. 
 
17 Michael Cullinane discusses the municipal code and the “town hall” model in “Implementing the ‘New 
Order’: The Structure and Supervision of Local Government during the Taft Era” in Compadre Colonialism: 
Philippine American Relations: 1898-1946, ed. Norman G. Owen (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 
1971), 9-34. Also see Glenn Anthony May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and 
Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980), 41-56; Julian Go, “The 
Chains of Empire: State Building and ‘Political Education’ in Puerto Rico and the Philippines,” in The 
American Colonial State in the Philippines, ed. Julian Go and Anne Foster (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2003), 182-216. Stanley Karnow addresses the U.S. drive to shape the Philippines into the American mold in In 
Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 1989). 
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also opium selling and smoking.  The act explained that the inhabitants of the province “were 
almost entirely Igorrotes” and therefore needed “a large amount of control.”18 The Philippine 
Commission also granted the power for increased opium control in the mountainous province 
of Nueva Vizcaya in central Luzon where most inhabitants were “members of Non-Christian 
tribes.”19 The tougher options fit within a pattern of heavier regulation on predominately 
“native” areas that also included increased regulation of agricultural trade and limited liquor 
imports and sales.20 The sense of paternalism for “native” areas could also be detected in the 
initially lower penalties for infractions.  For example, opium violators in the Igorot areas of 
Benguet only faced a maximum fine of fifteen pesos.  Those who were unwilling or unable to 
pay the fine could labor on the public works “provided that females shall not be compelled to 
perform work unsuitable for their sex.”21 The first law to set up local government in Nueva 
 
18 See article 10 of Act No. 48, An Act Providing for the Establishing of Local Civil Governments in the 
Townships of the Province of Benguet; and article 49 of Act No. 49, An Act Providing for the Establishment of 
a Civil Government for the Province of Benguet; both in House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901, Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the Philippine Commission, 57th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1901, H. Doc. 2, 68-78. Paul Barclay examines the political and military efforts to control the 
peoples labeled “Igorot” in “‘They Have for the Coast Dwellers a Traditional Hatred’: Governing Igorots in 
Northern Luzon and Central Taiwan, 1895-1915,” in The American Colonial State in the Philippines, ed. Julian 
Go and Anne Foster (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 217-55.  
 
19 House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902, Acts of the 
Philippine Commission, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., 1902, H. Doc. 2, 294.  
 
20 William Cameron Forbes noted the special liquor and agricultural trade measures for the “tribal people” in 
The Philippine Islands, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), 268-71. Also see Howard T. Fry, 
A History of the Mountain Province (Quezon City, New Day Publishers, 1983). Historians are reinterpreting 
how U.S. officials used “tribalization” to justify U.S. rule. For leading examples see Paul A. Kramer, “Race-
Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine-American War as Race War,” Diplomatic 
History 30 (April 2006): 169-210; his The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the 
Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); and Vicente L. Rafael, White Love, And 
Other Events in Filipino History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000). 
 
21 House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901, Public Laws and 
Resolutions Passed by the Philippine Commission, 71.  
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Vizcaya included the power to ban opium smoking and sales but actually listed no penalty.22 
This lax approach lasted just a few months, however, as a subsequent act set the maximum 
penalties at the level established in general municipal code: a two-hundred-peso fine or six 
months in prison or both.23 
Disappointing Results  
 
Evidence of the opium smoking habit’s popularity—especially among Filipinos—
alarmed U.S. officials who gathered data in the first years of the U.S. occupation.  At the 
request of Governor Taft, the police conducted a two-day survey in 1903 and found 199 
opium shops and smoking venues just in the capital.24 Across the islands, the estimates of 
opium smokers varied widely, but forty thousand was a commonly cited figure.25 Surveys 
conducted by the presidents of the provincial boards of health in 1903 and 1904 offered more 
detailed information about Filipinos who smoked opium.  Of the twenty-three provinces that 
reported opium smokers, eight described opium smoking by Filipinos.  The report tallied a 
total of 5,981 smokers.  Of the 2,943 categorized by race, 31 percent were labeled as “native” 
 
22 See An Act Providing for the Establishment of Local Civil Governments in the Townships and Settlements of 
Nueva Vizcaya in House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902, Acts 
of the Philippine Commission, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., 1902, H. Doc. 2, 278-95.   
 
23 See Act No. 337, An Act Providing for the Organization of a Provincial Government in the Province of 
Nueva Vizcaya; and Act No. 387, An Act Providing for the Establishment of Local Civil Governments in the 
Townships and Settlements of Nueva Vizcaya; both in House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902, Acts of the Philippine Commission, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., 1902, H. Doc. 2, 
138-47, 278-95.  
 
24 See report to Taft by Sergeant F.M. Drumm, 11 July 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-84.  
 
25 For varied estimates of opium smokers see [forty thousand total] Memorandum by Ellis Cromwell, 14 March 
1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-165; [twenty thousand Philippine-Chinese and twenty thousand of all 
others] Hord, “The Opium Evil In Asia,” 6, 10; [more than twenty-thousand Philippine-Chinese] Nolting, 
“Memorandum Showing Results Obtained,” 25 September 1913, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-199; [twenty 
thousand Philippine-Chinese opium users and forty thousand others] Round, “The Opium Problem in the 
Philippine Islands,” 22. Also see U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1906, 
Part 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1907), 25; and Philippine Opium Committee, 47.  
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or “Filipino”; the rest were Philippine-Chinese [see Table 1].  These reports were hardly 
exhaustive.  For example, the reply from the province of Zambales cited a “great liking of the 
people for opium smoking,” but did not assign a number.26 Manila, the major venue of 
opium smoking by most accounts, was absent from the survey.  A U.S. Customs employee 
named Hubert C. Anderson suggested one reason why opium smoking was widespread when 
he recalled his 1900 arrival in Manila.  “There was no such thing as cinemas, dance halls, 
cabarets and automobiles,” he commented.  Gambling and opium smoking provided the 
“only recreation” for many of Manila’s residents.27 
26 Philippine Opium Report, 160.  
 
27 Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, “Interview of Hubert C. Anderson,” 4 
February 1930, League of Nations Archive, Geneva, Switzerland (hereafter LONA), Opium Section, S.199, file: 
Philippine Islands, Evidence, 4. 
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Province Filipino/Native Chinese Unspecified Notes 
Antique 76 80
Bataan   1 4
Batangas 13 13
Bohol 94 47
Bulacan     74
Cagayan 122 248
Capiz     65
Cebu 224 613
Ilocos Norte     28
Ilocos Sur     18
Iloilo 174 658 Noted “numerous” other consumers of opium pills. 
Isabela     315
Laguna     20
Masbate     10 Users cited medical basis for consumption 
Misamis     1849 Report listed number per thousand; I rounded down.
Nueva Ecija     35
Negros 
Occidental 233 256
Thirteen of listed Filipino/Natives noted as  
“Spanish” 
Pangasinan     481 Noted that actual total was much higher 
Paragua   75
Sorsogon     34
Surigao     105
Union 16
Total  952 1991 3038
Grand Total  5981 Excluding Manila, which was a center of opium use. 
Table 1: Non-Medical Opium Users Reported by Provincial Boards of Health, 1903-4 
 
These rough estimates suggest that a significant portion of the opium smoking population was 
Filipino.   
 
Source: Tabulated from U.S. Senate, Report of the Committee Appointed by the Philippine 
Commission to Investigate the Use of Opium and Traffic Therein, 59th Cong., 1st sess., 1906, S. Doc. 
265, 147-60. 
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Taft and the Philippine Commission mistakenly believed that the Spanish system had 
kept Filipinos from smoking opium.  Thus U.S. officials incorrectly assumed that their 
policies had started Filipinos on the pipe.  The Spanish rules only granted ethnic Chinese a 
legal right to use opium for non-medical purposes.  Actually, the Spanish had begun the 
nineteenth century with a strict approach and found that it was impossible to enforce, so they 
had settled by the 1840s on a policy that secured limited control by harnessing market 
forces.28 Private contractors bid for monopoly rights to sell opium within each province.  
Contractors were not supposed to sell opium to Filipinos, but Spanish enforcement was lax, 
often corrupt, and the contractor had an economic incentive to get Filipinos to smoke.29 As 
William T. Nolting, the Collector of Internal Revenue in the Philippines, later put it, “Under 
such circumstances, it was perhaps hardly to be expected that the Government itself would 
inquire too closely into the disposition of the opium sold; that is, whether the opium was 
disposed of to Chinese or Filipinos.”30 
The racial categorization inherent in the Spanish monopoly approach also led Taft 
and the commissioners to overemphasize the division between the Chinese and the Filipinos.  
Taft incorrectly assumed that the Chinese had not intermarried and had remained isolated 
socially.31 Distinct “Filipino” and “Philippine-Chinese” identities had developed by the late 
nineteenth century and grew antagonistic in the last decades of that century as the financial 
 
28 Historian Greg Bankoff describes a wider trend toward lax controls on opium, alcohol, prostitution, 
gambling, and tobacco smuggling in the late nineteenth century Spanish Philippines.  See his Crime, Society, 
and the State in the Nineteenth Century Philippines (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1996), 20, 34-
58, 189. Also see the classic account by Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, 49-50, 114-19. 
 
29 Wickberg describes corruption in The Chinese in Philippine Life, 114-19. 
 
30 William T. Nolting, “Memorandum Showing Results Obtained in Enforcement of Laws Aimed at the Total 
Suppression of the Opium Habit in the Philippine Islands,” 25 September 1913, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-
199. 
 
31 Minutes of Proceedings of the Philippine Commission, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-58.  Also see Edgar 
Wickberg, The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History (Manila: Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, 2001).  
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success of the Philippine-Chinese merchants coupled with an economic downturn spurred 
anti-Chinese sentiment on the part of the Filipinos.32 Nonetheless, the two groups interacted 
socially.  Vincente Aldanese, a Philippine Collector of Customs, recalled one way that opium 
smoking crossed into Filipino communities during Spanish rule.  Filipino women had taken 
Chinese husbands and then introduced their relatives to the pipe.33 
Unforeseen consequences of the initial American approach added further 
misunderstanding.  Many local governments overreached their legal authority granted by the 
Philippine Commission and abused the rights of opium smokers by imposing unauthorized 
fines and taxes.  The need for revenue and the anti-Chinese sentiment of Filipino officials in 
municipal governments spurred this abuse.  Abuses had occurred under the Spanish system, 
but as long as the high bid for the monopoly license was paid, the government granted the 
contractor leeway while helping to prosecute smugglers.34 The Americans proved more 
receptive than the Spanish to complaints coming from the Philippine-Chinese.  In 1901 the 
Philippine Commission heard from a leading Philippine-Chinese merchant from Manila 
named Chen Qianshan who reported that officials in the Panay city of Iloilo, including the 
 
32 For more on this complex subject see Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, 146-67; Wilson, Ambition 
and Identity, 227; and Bankoff, Crime, Society, and the State, 21-45. 
 
33 League of Nations Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, “Interview of 
Vincente Aldanese,” 5 February 1930, LONA, Opium Section, S.199, file: Philippine Islands, Evidence, 6. 
 
34 A Philippine-Chinese named Tan Yangco was accused of smuggling opium and spent years in prison waiting 
for a judicial hearing.  See his plaintive 1885 letters in the Anfion records in the Philippine National Archives, 
Manila, exp. 14, folders: 1-8b (5753-7, 5770-2).  The people prosecuted for opium contract violations such as 
smuggling were predominately Philippine-Chinese who lived in Manila’s commercial and entertainment 
district, Binondo, but also included Spanish and Filipino, as well as mixtures of all three. These comments are 
based on my survey of court cases against opium contract violations in the provinces of Bataan (1852-1897), 
Binondo (1849-1897), Bulacan (1862-1898), Cavite (1814-1900), Cebu and Bohol (1837-1898), Davao (1887-
1898), Isabela (1869-1896), Misamis (1872-1897), and Tondo (1852-1888) in the Anfion records.  For a cogent 
description of the colonial judicial system see Manuel T. Chan, The Audencia and the Legal System in the 
Philippines, 1583-1900 (Manila: Progressive Printing Palace, 1998). Also see Bankoff, Crime, Society, and the 
State, 41; Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, 49-50, 114-19; and Ricardo M. Zarco, “A Short History of 
Narcotic Drug Addiction in the Philippines, 1521-1959,” Historical Bulletin of the Philippine Historical 
Association 3 (December 1959): 87-100.  
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Provincial Governor, had illegally prohibited opium sales and were fining Philippine-Chinese 
who were caught smoking opium.  In a later complaint Chen claimed that six Philippine-
Chinese had died and twelve had been stricken with illness due their abusive treatment.35 
The Chinese Consul General, Jin Jiong, also protested against the unlawful “abuse, arrest, 
and confinement” of Philippine-Chinese opium smokers.  In a letter to Taft, the Consul 
General noted that local authorities in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Cebu, and 
Iloilo had overstepped the anti-opium den powers granted in the municipal code by searching 
private homes, arresting people with opium or opium pipes, and imposing fines.  The Consul 
General wanted immediate relief from these “atrocities” and blamed “the animosity of the 
native police toward the Chinese” whom the police considered worthy only for “taxation and 
abuse.”36 
Once begun the municipal abuses were not easy for the Philippine Commission to 
stop.  The commission passed a strange piece of legislation in 1901—ostensibly as a 
reminder to the municipalities—banning the imposition of taxes on opium smokers (they 
were already illegal!).  The Commission also ordered the municipal governments that had 
collected such taxes illegally to offer refunds to the victims.37 However, two years later, in 
 
35 Chen recommended a return to the Spanish contract system, under which he had been the successful bidder of 
the contract in Iloilo and Manila. Chen is a central character in Wilson’s study. See Ambition and Identity, 110-
39. Historian Wong Kwok-Chu noted Chen’s loss of the opium contract with the onset of the American 
occupation in Chinese in the Philippine Economy, 32. Seth P. Mobley noted Chen’s exclusive control of the sale 
of opium at Manila and Iloilo under the Spanish in a 21 January 1903 letter to James F. Smith, Secretary of 
Education, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-62. Chen’s complaints are in his 26 June 1901 letter to the Philippine 
Commission, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-65. 
 
36 “Chin Yi Chiong” to Taft, 17 August 1901, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-91.  
 
37 See Act No. 132, An Act to Amend the Municipal Code, in House, Annual Reports of the War Department 
for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901, Public Laws Passed by the Philippine Commission, 57th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1901, H. Doc. 2, 279-81.  
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1903, Taft received a letter from nine members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of the 
city of Iloilo alleging that the abuse had continued unabated.38 
Though they were frustrated by these local abuses, American officials had made them 
possible.  The initial American approach did not aim to punish opium smokers, but spurred 
that outcome through a confusing set of policies.  For example, anyone could import opium 
legally and smoke the drug legally at home or in a smoking venue, unless the latter was 
banned by the local municipality.  Members of the Philippine Commission also 
unintentionally promoted local abuse by offering contradictory statements about the law.  For 
example in April 1901, about two months after the Philippine Commission passed the general 
municipal code with its provision to ban opium dens, commissioners instructed leaders in the 
town of Cagayan (in the Mindanao province of Misamis) that they could prohibit the opium 
traffic if they wanted.39 In another case about a year later, Captain William H. Johnston, the 
Provincial Governor of Isabela who was installed by the Philippine Commission, badly 
misread the law and personally arrested opium smokers because he found the municipal 
police to be too lax.40 The anti-Chinese sentiments of the Americans also strengthened those 
feelings in Filipino officials.41 Despite the many protests from the Chinese government and 
Chinese merchants in the Philippines, the extension of Chinese exclusion from the 
continental United States to the Philippines, promoted first by General Otis, became law in 
1902.  Ethnic Chinese in the Philippines had now to secure a permit proving that they were 
 
38 See H.C. Huang and others to Taft, 19 February 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-66. 
 
39 House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901, Report of the 
Philippine Commission, Part 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1901, H. Doc. 2, 120. 
 
40 Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines, Part 2, 57th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1902, S. Doc. 331, 1512-26.  
 
41 Clark L. Alejandrino, A History of the 1902 Chinese Exclusion Act: American Colonial Transmission and 
Deterioration of Filipino-Chinese Relations (Manila: Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, 2003). 
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already residents, or of the exempted merchant class, or face deportation.42 Historian Paul D. 
Hutchcroft’s general argument that “American-inspired structures of governance” fostered 
much of the corruption and patronage in the Philippine municipal governments applies nicely 
to the initial U.S. approach to opium on the islands.43 
Part II. Divided Views on Reform 
 
The municipal abuses and the existence of Filipino opium smokers prompted Taft and 
the Philippine Commission to seek a more comprehensive approach to the opium issue in 
1903.  Above all, they wanted to find a practical way to organize the business of opium 
provision without fostering the spread of the habit to Filipinos and “natives.”  They doubted 
that the opium pipe was harmful to Philippine-Chinese smokers.  Their response was to push 
for a return to the Spanish system hoping that a licensing scheme for Philippine-Chinese 
would protect Filipinos from smoking opium and raise revenue.  The plan drew protests from 
constituents in the Philippines and the United States, sparking a controversy that quickly 
reached the highest levels of the American government.  As it happened, Taft soon traded 
sides.  From his new posting in Washington as secretary of war, Taft joined with other top 
Republicans and set a deadline when non-medical sale of opium would become illegal in the 
colony.  American officials in Manila faced the puzzle of how to shrink opium use across the 
islands in preparation for the total ban.  
 
42 Rubin Francis Weston, Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American 
Foreign Policy, 1893-1946 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), 22-30, 100. The protests can 
be followed in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1901), 207-17; and Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1901 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902), 213-14.   
 
43 Paul D. Hutchcroft “Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local 
Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913,” Journal of Asian Studies 59 (May 2000): 298.  
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An Attempt at Comprehensive Reform  
 
As the Philippine commissioners moved to consider a comprehensive drug policy, 
they enjoyed a uniquely broad range of powers within the U.S. government and the freedom 
to move in new directions.  Unlike the federal government in Washington , which was 
restrained by the constitutional limits on its policing powers, the Philippine Commission 
could decide which people under its jurisdiction could use drugs.  To help create a 
specialized approach to opium for the Philippines, the commission appointed a committee in 
October 1902 to study the policy options.  The committee’s members, Commissioners Henry 
Clay Ide and Bernard Moses, and a Filipino who supported U.S. rule named Trinidad H. 
Pardo de Tavera, embraced a system of opium sales by contract, much like the Spanish 
approach.44 
The following January Brigadier-General James F. Smith joined the Philippine 
Commission, adding his experience with an opium monopoly and drafting a new opium bill 
that reinforced the recommendations of the special committee.  While serving as Military 
Governor in Negros, Smith had ignored General Otis’s orders and had sanctioned the 
continued existence of the opium monopoly, which raised twelve thousand dollars.45 
Commissioner Smith’s bill detailed a similar system with licensed opium vendors, and 
profits—estimated to reach several hundred thousand dollars a year—channeled to 
educational programs (a nice fit to the prerogatives of Smith’s other role as secretary of 
 
44 The text of the resolution is in NA, RG 350, entry 53-92, file 1023-92. May provides a biographical sketch of 
Pardo de Tavera in Social Engineering in the Philippines, 24-32.  
 
45 House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Year Ended 1900, Report of the Military Governor of 
the Philippine Islands on Civil Affairs, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1900, H. Doc. 2, 279. American Lieutenant Colonel 
O.J. Sweet also oversaw an opium monopoly in the isolated Sulu Archipelago. See Sweet to Taft, 24 April 
1901, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-83. 
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public instruction).46 Only Chinese “of the full blood” who were at least twenty-one years 
old were to be allowed to “smoke, chew, swallow, inject, or otherwise consume” opium for 
non-medical purposes, and only in their own homes.  In order to enforce these rules Smith’s 
bill included an extreme penalty of a five thousand dollar fine or a five-year prison sentence 
or both, for any non-Chinese who consumed opium without a medical prescription.47 
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce actively opposed Smith’s bill.  The chamber 
included many opium dealers who would be forced from the business by a monopoly.  They 
also supposed that an outright ban would be easier to evade than a contract system.  The 
chamber thus argued that a monopoly would increase the number of opium smokers and 
hired an American attorney, Major W. H. Bishop, to agitate against the bill.  Bishop sent a 
series of telegrams to clergy in the United States and to the White House.  The telegrams 
often read like a jumbled haiku but still managed to touch upon the deepest concerns of the 
American colonial project especially regarding the stewardship of the Filipino people: 
“Opium bill […] passage means licensing fixing frightful vice Islands.  Filipinos imitative.  
any.  Many now use.  example America chartering concession sale opium bad.  strong feeling 
Americans and employing Chinese here adverse.”48 
Philippine-Chinese more generally objected to Smith’s bill because a return to the 
monopoly system would raise prices and ban their widespread social use of opium.  A 
 
46 Henry C. Ide, “Informal Expression of Opinion Relative to the Attitude of the Commission Regarding 
Opium,” 15 May 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-5, 2. 
 
47 See “Proposed Law: An Act to Suppress the Sale of Opium to the Filipino People, to Confine its Use to 
People of the Chinese Race, and to Restrict and Reduce its Consumption by Chinese within the Philippine 
Islands,” NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-13.   
 
48 See the petition to Chinese Consul General Manila sent on behalf of Chinese merchants of Manila, 4 May 
1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-86; the petition by opium merchants, 6 May 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, 
file 1023-69; and Chinese Legation to Hay, 22 April 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-6. Also see Taylor, 
American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 37. 
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Philippine-Chinese opium merchant named Cheak Kee, for example, asked the Commission 
to remove the limitation on legal opium smoking to “full-blooded Chinese.”  He suggested 
instead a social definition that would include mixed race Chinese who followed “the habit 
and the mode of life of the father.”  Cheak also protested the clause banning Chinese from 
smoking in each other’s homes because that practice was a “mere act of courtesy.”  Cheak 
warned that a ban on opium smoking would steer people to more dangerous substances such 
as tobacco (which he considered to be a “virulent poison”), morphine, and cocaine.  
Sounding like Taft, Cheak concluded, “A Chinaman is just as entitled to his opium as a 
German to his beer, a Scotchman to his whiskey, and American to his rum, a Frenchman to 
his claret, and Indian to his toddy, a Philippino to his cigar and a Siamese to his betel leaves.  
The habit is national and cannot be eradicated.”49 
American Protestant missionaries in Manila also opposed the measure.  They 
followed a missionary logic casting opium smokers as victims of the opium trade plied by 
self-interested colonial regimes in Asia.  Protecting opium smokers from the predations of 
the trade was thus a Christian duty.  Salvation on an individual level would come as opium 
smokers gave up the pipe, and colonial governments could demonstrate their righteousness 
by opposing the opium trade.  Methodist presiding elder Bishop Homer C. Stuntz led the 
clergy’s protest against the draft contract bill.  Stuntz organized a petition by an association 
of missionaries titled the Committee of the Evangelical Union of the Philippine Islands, of 
which Stuntz was chairman.  They called for a “strict quarantine” of opium imports and sales 
 
49 See Cheak Kee to Philippine Commission, 19 March 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-67; his statement 
in the Manila Times, 25 May 1903, clipping in NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-70; and Minutes of Proceedings 
of the Philippine Commission, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-58. 
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on health and economic grounds.50 Though Stuntz was against legal opium sales for non-
medical use, he did not want a ban on the use of the drug, which he considered “an 
impossible type of prohibition.”  Stuntz asked Taft, “Who will invade the privacy of men’s 
homes and detect violation of this section?”51 
In a brilliant move that would include the White House in the debate about the 
monopoly bill, Stuntz—using funds from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce—cabled his 
“fellow-worker,” the Reverend Wilbur F. Crafts, for help.  Crafts presided over the 
influential Washington-based International Reform Bureau.52 Since its incorporation in 1896 
the bureau had advocated “Christian reforms” through moral legislation on issues such as 
alcohol and opium sales, divorce, gambling, and the defense of the Sabbath.53 Crafts set to 
work lobbying against Smith’s bill and got bureau members from all over the country to send 
protests to the White House.  This mailing campaign, according to Crafts, gave an “electric 
treatment of the political spine.”54 The White House responded, but hardly in an electric 
fashion.  Roosevelt ordered that no action be taken on the opium bill without his approval.55 
50 Committee of the Evangelical Union of the Philippine Islands to Taft, 16 March 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, 
file 1023-80. 
 
51 Minutes of Proceedings of the Philippine Commission, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-58. Also see Stuntz to 
Taft, 29 May 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-81. 
 
52 Stuntz to Crafts, 2 May 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-17. Also see Crafts’ address to the British 
branch of the International Reform Bureau, 16 September 1909, NA, RG 43, entry 37, box 2, 3.   
 
53 For an overview of the International Reform Bureau’s agenda see Senate, Moral Legislation in Congress, 
Passed and Pending, 58th Cong., 2nd sess., 1904, S. Doc., 150, 1.  
 
54 Crafts’ address to the British branch of the International Reform Bureau, 16 September 1909, NA, RG 43, 
entry 37, box 2, 4b. Also see Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 34-46; and David F. 
Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
26. 
 
55 Edwards to Taft, 9 June 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-10. 
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And Secretary of War Elihu Root warned Taft that the administration was wary of any 
measure that appeared “to sanction the [opium] traffic rather than to plainly reduce it.”56 
The White House’s interest in the bill caught Taft in a bind.  Now he had to address 
the objections of constituents in Manila and the continental United States.  The task was 
daunting because, as Taft knew, American public opinion associated opium use, “however 
moderated, with those awful pictures of the horrible opium dens in which its victims are 
stretched out in helpless stupor and drunkenness.”57 Taft’s challenge was to convince his 
bosses in Washington and the U.S. public at large to chasten their Sino-phobia and accept 
that the Philippine-Chinese were “hard-working, generally law-abiding, peaceful, and in all 
observable respects a temperate people, who have for centuries used opium for the purpose 
of smoking it and among whom an opium sot is much rarer than a liquor drunkard among 
Americans.”58 Along with the other commissioners, Taft feared that U.S. domestic politics 
would force him to impose an untenable ban on the opium habit.  He felt that government 
action against opium smoking would flounder because a “large element in the community” 
did not consider opium smoking to be an “immoral offense or one that ought to be 
punished.”59 Nonetheless Taft took the precaution of instructing Smith to draft another bill 
that would ban the importation and sale of opium for non-medical purposes.  Smith adjusted 
 
56 Root to Taft, 5 June 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-10. Also see Root to Taft, 17 June, 10 July, 22 July 
1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, files 1023-10, 1023-25, 1023-49; Root to Roosevelt, 18 July 1903, NA, RG 350, 
entry 5, file 1023-49; and Edwards to Strong, 15 June 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-31.  
 
57 Minutes of Proceedings of the Philippine Commission, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-58.  
 
58 Minutes of Proceedings of the Philippine Commission, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-58. Taft cabled the 
views of the commission to Root, 13 July 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-25. 
 
59 See Minutes of Proceedings of the Philippine Commission, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-58.  Also see Taft 
to Root, 13 July 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-25; Henry C. Ide, “Informal Expression of Opinion 
Relative to the Attitude of the Commission Regarding Opium,” 15 May 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-
5; and unsigned cablegram to Roosevelt, 7 July 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-47. 
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the penalties for illicit use downward by more than half (to a maximum fine of two thousand 
dollars or imprisonment for up to two years or both), likely in anticipation of widespread 
violations of this stricter approach.60 
In the summer of 1903 Taft gained Roosevelt’s approval to create an expert 
Committee of Enquiry to study the opium issue and to offer suggestions that would be 
ostensibly impartial.  Taft hoped that the committee’s findings would help to sway his bosses 
about the issue and allow him to proceed with the monopoly approach.  The White House 
approved the committee because it demonstrated government action to constituents upset by 
the monopoly bill and the committee’s recommendations would not be binding.  Taft 
carefully selected the committee’s members to represent the medical and moral aspects of the 
opium issue and to downplay the revenue considerations that had incensed the missionaries.  
He chose Edward C. Carter, the Philippine Commissioner of Health, who served as chair, 
Charles Henry Brent, the Episcopal Bishop of the Philippines, and a Filipino physician 
named Jose Albert who practiced at the hospital that Brent had founded.61 Brent dominated 
the committee.  He was the most famous missionary in Manila, and he was personally close 
to Roosevelt.  The Philippine-Chinese were central to the issue, but were not deemed worthy 
of representation on the committee.62 Taft instructed the committee to study the way that 
surrounding countries were handling the opium issue and to recommend the best kind of law 
 
60 The bill is in NA, RG 350, entry 5, box 158, file 1023-75. Taft described his position in a long cable to Root, 
13 July 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-25. Also see Root to Taft, 14 July 1903, in the same file.  
 
61 Taft to Root, 23 July 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1028-51.   
 
62 There were qualified candidates such as Tee Han Kee, a Chinese physician who moved to Manila in 1902 and 
worked for the Board of Health under Carter’s direction. For a sketch of Tee’s life see Wilson, Ambition and 
Identity, 164; and Tee’s 4 February 1930 interview in LONA, Opium Section, S.199, file: Philippine Islands, 
Evidence. 
29
to “reduce and restrain” opium use in the Philippines.63 The fact that the committee was to 
study surrounding countries demonstrated Taft’s success in convincing the White House that 
the conditions of opium use were different in Southeast Asia than in the continental United 
States. 
The committee members worked hard and made an impressive effort to be fair-
minded.  They traveled from August 1903 to January 1904 interviewing officials and 
collecting reports in Japan, Taiwan, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon, Singapore, Burma, and 
Java.  They found that prohibition of non-medical opium use had failed everywhere it was 
attempted to stop opium use.  The British prohibition of smoking had failed in both upper 
and lower Burma.  The Dutch also encountered failure with absolute prohibition where they 
attempted it in Java.  The Committee of Enquiry also received reports that an 1897 opium 
ban had been abandoned in the Territory of Hawaii in 1903 because it had promoted 
blackmail.  A bar against non-medical opium use in Japan was the exception.  The 
Committee of Enquiry attributed its success to the lack of pre-existing opium consumers.  As 
the committee’s report phrased it, the ban in Japan was “not applied as cure but as 
preventative.”64 In Taiwan, where many thousands smoked opium, the Japanese government 
selected a “progressive prohibition” that registered and rationed existing smokers, who were 
given access to voluntary treatment in government hospitals. 
Ultimately the Committee of Enquiry recommended a monopoly system like 
Taiwan’s, which allowed opium smokers to continue smoking after receiving a license.  The 
committee considered an immediate ban on non-medical opium use as “likely to produce 
 
63 Philippine Opium Report, 59. 
 
64 Philippine Opium Report, 23.  
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extreme suffering,” due to the “physiology of the inveterate habitué.”65 Instead the 
committee embraced a plan that was, in Brent’s words, “prohibitive in Character but merciful 
to the Opium Smoker.”66 Thus, men of all ethnic backgrounds, not just Chinese, who already 
used opium and were over the age of twenty-one would be able to register and to purchase 
opium from a government-run monopoly.67 Brent deemed it unjust to exclude people from 
the licensing plan on the basis of race or nationality.  However, women would not gain the 
right to register for opium access within the planned “progressive prohibition.” 
Whereas the officials in Taiwan anticipated full eradication of the opium smoking 
habit in thirty or forty years (after the current generation of registered smokers had died), the 
Committee of Enquiry hoped that their approach, aided by the lower number of smokers in 
the Philippines, would eliminate opium smoking after about three years.  At that point the 
government could assess what was “wisest and best to be done.”68 In order to reduce opium 
smoking, the Committee of Enquiry embraced the strategies taken in Taiwan such as free 
medical treatment for smokers who wanted to quit, anti-opium propaganda in schools, and a 
ban on opium dens.  The Chinese exclusion law was also supposed to help reduce the number 
of potential smokers.  The Committee of Enquiry also suggested unspecified fines and prison 
terms for non-registered opium users.  People caught a third time using opium without a 
license were to face deportation (for at least five years) if they were Philippine-Chinese or 
loss of the right to hold public office or vote if they were Filipino.69 
65 Philippine Opium Report, 29, 49-53. See Chapter Four for a discussion of the opium policy in Taiwan. 
 
66 Brent, diary entry, 12 December 1903, Brent Papers, box 1. Also see Philippine Opium Report, 102. 
 
67 Philippine Opium Report, 37-46, 54.  
 
68 Philippine Opium Report, 53.    
 
69 Philippine Opium Report, 47, 54.  
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Brent’s experience with the Committee of Enquiry radically shifted his views, which 
deserves some attention because he would become a major force in American anti-drug 
diplomacy.  When Brent first evaluated Smith’s monopoly bill in early 1903, he had drawn 
upon the moral calculation applied to every action in his life: “First comes moral principle, 
then the application to a question in its entirety, finally the working out in detail.”70 Brent 
concluded that non-medical opium use was “a social vice, i.e. a crime,” and he suggested that 
a prison term could help a “victim” of opium to improve his health by depriving him of the 
drug, even if “some” death might result.  He adopted an uncharacteristically ruthless tone, 
writing to Smith, “Every step in progress means the sacrifice of some, frequently of worthy 
people: witness the introduction of machinery.  In the case in point no worthy elements of 
society would pay any penalty.”71 Brent’s experience serving on the Committee of Enquiry, 
however, had forced him to reconsider.  After returning from the committee’s tour of 
surrounding countries in early 1904, Brent endorsed the registration of opium smokers, legal 
opium provision, and voluntary medical treatment as the approach most likely to reduce 
opium smoking.  He described his new attitude: “Prohibition is a principle: what we want is 
such a legislative setting of prohibition as will be practicable.”72 
Congressional Intervention  
The Committee of Enquiry had changed Brent’s mind, but its 283-page report with its 
wealth of information and considered proposals to reduce opium use did not convince key 
officials.  While the report generally endorsed Taft’s plans for an opium monopoly, Taft was 
 
70 Brent’s diary, especially the excised passages about his ex-fiancée and his alcohol consumption, documents a 
life lived within the constant constraint of self-assessment. See the entry, 26 August 1903, Brent Papers, box 1.  
 
71 Brent to Smith, 6 July 1903, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-68.   
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no longer interested in pushing that approach.  He had shifted his views about opium policy 
when he moved from Manila to Washington and realized how unpopular the monopoly 
approach was in the colonial metropole. Now, instead of calling for the Philippine 
Commission to direct policy, Taft wanted Washington to take control and order an end to 
opium sales.  He watched for his opportunity to make the decisive move. 
Taft’s departure from Manila left Brent and Commissioner Luke E. Wright, who had 
replaced Taft as Civil Governor in late 1903, wrangling over the future opium policy.  
Wright wanted to follow Smith’s bill, which had private contractors selling the opium, 
thereby saving the government administrative expenses.73 Brent, having invested months of 
effort on the Committee of Enquiry, insisted that only a government monopoly would 
remove the profit motive and effectively reduce use.  Hung up on the shoals of disagreement, 
the project to revise the colonial drug policy entered a period of stalemate.   
Both Wright and Brent appealed to Washington for support of their views.  In January 
1905, almost a year after the Committee of Enquiry returned from its investigation and some 
seven months after Wright had received the committee’s report, Wright urged Root to 
convince Brent to accept the private contract system.74 Brent, however, was a tenacious 
advocate and appealed to Roosevelt to oppose any deviation from the committee’s 
recommendations.  He traveled to Washington in mid-January and met with Roosevelt, who, 
according Brent, “came bounding out in thermal shirt and leggins from a boxing bout [and] 
endorsed [the] delay of [the] opium bill.”75 
73 Wright’s title changed to “Governor-General” in 1905. See House, Fifth Annual Report of the Philippine 
Commission, 1904, 58th Cong., 3rd sess., 1904, H. Doc. 232, 11.   
 
74 See Root to Wright, 8 January 1905, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-111; Wright to Root, 8 January 1905, 
NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-111; and Root to Wright, 8 January 1905, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-110. 
 
75 Brent, diary entries, 14-15 January 1905, Brent Papers, box 1. 
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In the meanwhile, Taft struck a fatal blow to Brent’s vision of a “progressive 
prohibition” that would be race-blind and adjusted annually.  The powerful Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge (R-MA) had been one of Taft’s political foes because Lodge often impinged on 
the authority of the Philippine Commission.  Now, that tendency served Taft nicely.  Taft 
testified at the Senate and convinced Lodge, who was Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
the Philippines, that Congress should remove the issue from “hands of the [Philippine] 
commission” and impose a strict deadline to “shut off Chinaman” from a legal opium 
supply.76 Lodge had introduced a 1901 Senate resolution to protect “native races [,] 
aboriginal tribes and uncivilized races” from opium and alcohol.77 In response to Taft, he 
included “natives of the Philippine Islands” [meaning Filipinos] in this line of thinking.  On 3 
March 1905 Congress included a clause in a tariff revision ordering an immediate ban on 
non-medical opium sales to “any native of the Philippine Islands” and setting a deadline of 1 
March 1908 (roughly three years later) when the importation of opium for non-medical use 
and all sales of opium for non-medical purposes would become illegal.78 
Taft’s actions were decisive, but hardly radical.  Congressmen knew little about the 
opium issue and considered Taft to be an expert.  Taft’s testimony affirmed their assumptions 
about race in the colony.  He also took a stance that included at least a part of the major 
 
76 Taft’s influence over the measure is evident in Congressional Record, 58th Cong., 3rd sess., 1905, 39, pt. 3: 
2994-3001, 3528-29, 3714-18, 3786, quotations on 3715. Also see Brent to Taft, 11 January 1905, NA, RG 350, 
entry 5, file 1023-112; and Taft to Wright, 16 January 1905, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-111. 
 
77 The United States had joined international treaties in 1890 and 1899 to limit alcohol sales to African natives. 
See Senate, Resolution, Adopted by the Senate January 4, 1901, Relative to the Protection of Uncivilized 
Peoples Against the Destructive Traffic in Intoxicants, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1901, S. Doc. 159; and Taylor, 
American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 20-27. In 1902 Congress banned U.S. citizens from selling 
opium to aboriginal natives of the Pacific Islands not yet claimed by a “civilized power.” See To Prevent the 
Sale of Firearms, Opium, and Intoxicating Liquors in Certain Islands of the Pacific, U.S. Statutes at Large 32 
(1902): 33. 
78 See To Revise and Amend the Tariff Laws of the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes, U.S. Statutes at 
Large 33 (1905): 944. 
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contending viewpoints.  The three years of continuing opium sales to Chinese generally 
comported with Brent’s views and the Committee of Enquiry’s plan.  The immediate ban on 
sales to Filipinos spoke to the missionaries’ concerns.  The tariff also set the import duty on 
opium at four dollars a kilo for crude opium and five dollars a kilo for prepared opium, 
which, at least partially, addressed the need for revenue.  Wright remained free to push for 
private contractors to sell opium to licensed Chinese prior to the deadline.  Congress had 
imposed limits on the opium trade in the colony, but had not banned opium smoking.  The 
idea of punishing opium smokers had not played a role in the legislative debate.  It remained 
to be decided how the Philippine Commission would manage the end of legal opium sales.  
Part III.  Black Sunday and the Punishment Solution 
The Philippine Commission now had a new task—to reduce the number of opium 
users before the congressionally imposed 1 March 1908 deadline.  The initial plan was to 
provide free medical assistance to help smokers quit the habit so that when the deadline 
arrived the number of opium consumers would not, as Hord put it, “over tax the holding 
capacity of the insular jails and hospitals.”79 However, with the arrival of the deadline—soon 
deemed “Black Sunday” by medical experts—fines and payments by opium smokers to avoid 
prosecution went into effect and became new sources of revenue.  Jails and prisons became 
the centerpiece of the medical treatment program.  And U.S. officials took to blaming opium 
users for the total ban’s failure to impose abstinence.  A mandatory minimum punishment for 
non-medical drug use passed into law in 1909, marking the full transition to the punishment 
solution.  
 
79 Hord, “The Opium Evil In Asia,” 7. 
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The Transition to Punishment 
 
The Philippine Commission proved to be lackadaisical and bereft of new ideas in 
preparation for the ban on sales of opium for non-medical use.  After Congress passed the 
tariff revision in March of 1905, the Philippine Commission did nothing regarding opium 
until the following September.  Then the passive resistance continued as the commission 
followed the initial American approach by approving two measures that extended provincial 
authority to ban opium sales and opium smoking and authorized new townships of certain 
“non-Christian tribes” to do the same.80 By January 1906, nine months after Congress passed 
the tariff revision, Taft ordered the commission to proceed with a comprehensive bill in line 
with the rules set by Congress.81 Smith produced another bill by February of 1906 and soon 
added the revisions that Taft requested to make the bill more appealing to Washington.82 
The resulting law passed in March 1906 reflected a mixture of goals.  Only ethnic 
Chinese would be allowed to use opium for non-medical purposes.  They would have to 
register and pay a five-peso licensing fee.  Anyone caught consuming opium without a 
medical prescription or a license faced a two-hundred-peso fine or up to six months in prison 
or both (the standard penalty for opium den patrons in the general municipal code).  The law 
was also a revenue measure in that the registration fee for the user’s license was to be paid to 
municipal governments, while new import license fees and duties were to provide funds to 
 
80 See Act 1396, An Act Providing for the Organization of Provincial Governments…; and Act 1397, An Act 
Providing for the Establishment of Local Civil Government…; both in House, Annual Reports of the War 
Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1905, Vol. 14, Acts of the Philippine Commission, 59th Cong., 
1st sess., 1905, H. Doc. 2, 165-209.  
 
81 According to the Secretary of Finance and Justice Henry C. Ide the commission had asked Smith to draft 
another bill in the spring of 1905 but Smith had been too busy to do so. See Edwards to Ide, 24 January 1906, 
NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-136; and Ide to Taft, 26 January 1906, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-137. 
 
82 See Ide to Taft, 24 February 1906; and Taft to Ide, 28 February 1906; both in NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-
139. 
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the colonial administration to publish anti-opium propaganda, cover hospital costs for 
voluntary opium patients, send Filipino students to the United States for education, provide 
teacher’s salaries, build school houses, and reward informants whose information led to a 
conviction.83 
The new policy went into effect in April 1906 and immediately proved troublesome.  
Bureau of Internal Revenue agents joined with provincial treasurers to catalog the amount of 
opium on the islands and to count the number of opium dens, dealers, and smokers.84 Opium 
sales to Philippine-Chinese began immediately, initially on the basis of an immigration 
registration certificate and later on the presentation of a confirmed user’s license.  Arrests of 
non-licensed smokers also began.  Many people who were arrested claimed to be too poor to 
pay the five-peso license fee and too habituated to stop smoking opium.  The law stipulated 
free medical treatment for voluntary opium patients, but the government had done nothing to 
provide this.  Thus, Secretary of Justice Henry Clay Ide ordered that such arrests cease until 
treatment facilities became available.  The Commission also yielded a bit by allowing 
physicians to prescribe drugs for non-medical use to some Filipinos and foreigners who were 
addicted.85 Still, Collector of Internal Revenue John Hord predicted that “strict enforcement 
of the law” was going to cause “great hardship and physical suffering” to the “unfortunates,” 
 
83 See Act 1461, An Act for the Purpose of Restricting the Sale and Suppressing the Evil Resulting from the 
Sale and Use of Opium, in House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1906, Vol. 10, Acts of the Philippine Commission, 59th Cong., 2nd sess., 1906, H. Doc. 2, 188-96. 
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who used opium.86 Brent was also pessimistic, calling the policy neither the 
recommendation of the Committee of Enquiry nor a substitute.  He predicted failure.87 
Faced with these new regulations, many smokers turned to the black market.  The 
estimates of opium smokers in the islands varied wildly, though the most common number 
cited was forty thousand.88 However, the number of Philippine-Chinese who applied for a 
license totaled less than thirteen thousand.89 According to Hord, “a large number of Filipinos 
and some few Americans and foreigners” unsuccessfully applied for the smokers’ license.  
He believed that the black market supplied a “large portion of the opium actually smoked or 
otherwise consumed.” 90 Ellis Cromwell, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, agreed, 
noting that “many thousand native opium users” obtained the drug illegally.91 
The law’s voluntary medical treatment component also produced poor results.  The 
law provided for the patients’ traveling expenses (if needed) to the government-funded 
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centers in Manila and Iloilo and for a treatment lasting up to sixty days.92 Though the arrests 
of unlicensed smokers began again in June 1906, proper funding for the program was not 
available until the following August.93 Victor G. Heiser, the Director of Health, anticipated 
hundreds of applicants and thus signed contracts with San Juan de Dios Hospital in Manila 
and the Mission Hospital in Iloilo.  But, as the months passed, hardly any opium users 
volunteered.  By July of 1907 only ten people had arrived for treatment: three American men 
and three Filipino men in Manila and four Filipino women in Iloilo.  Two of the Americans 
left the day they arrived.  The third was only “improved” after more than a month beyond the 
sixty-day limit.  Two of the Filipino men were “cured” in less than two weeks and the third 
“improved,” after four days.  None of the Filipino women were considered cured.  One 
languished as “unimproved,” another as “improved,” and the other two escaped.  Heiser 
surmised: “the victims of the habit continue to get the drug without great difficulty.”94 
The poor results of the efforts to reduce the number of users prompted Brent and the 
commissioners to call for an extension of the 1 March 1908 deadline to avoid what they 
feared would be a legal crisis and a possible health disaster.  The commission’s reports 
complained that the Committee of Enquiry’s recommendation of a three-year deadline had 
been “purely tentative” and that the committee had endorsed constant re-assessment until 
 
92 See Act 1527, An Act Making Appropriations for the Sundry Expenses of the Insular Government; in House, 
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“the time will arrive when a prohibition of any sale by the government may wisely be put in 
force.”  Further the commission asserted that the Congress had passed the revised tariff rules 
“probably in pursuance” of the committee’s suggestions.95 Brent appealed again to 
Roosevelt, writing that the commissioners regretted that Congress did not “give more lee-
way” to allow the commission to implement “progressive prohibition.”96 
Roosevelt also heard from Wilbur Crafts, of the International Reform Bureau, who 
strongly opposed any extension of the deadline.  Crafts had traveled to Manila in June of 
1907 and conducted a series of interviews with internal revenue officials.  He complained to 
Roosevelt that “absolutely no effort to reduce the business of opium selling had been made.”  
Crafts also downplayed the health threat, doubting that “tapering off” was necessary.97 
Rather dishonestly, Crafts also suggested that Brent opposed an extension.98 
Roosevelt left the issue to Taft, who ordered the Philippine Commission to abandon 
any hope of an extension.  He reminded Smith, who was then serving as Governor-General, 
that Taft himself had suggested the firm deadline to Congress because of his fear that the 
Commission would want to “put off the day for radical action.”  To delay now was “entirely 
out of the question.”  Taft instructed the Commission to issue a public warning about the 
deadline and to “enforce it rigorously.”  He conceded that the deadline would “subject many 
 
95 Ide, who had supported Smith’s first monopoly bill, was now President of the Commission. Smith was also 
serving on the Commission. See U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1906, 
Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1907), 62. 
 
96 Brent to Roosevelt, 20 August 1906, NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 
1906-1910, roll 104, 774/5-6. 
 
97 Crafts to Roosevelt, 2 June 1907, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-148. 
 
98 Crafts and Brent had been feuding for years. Taft sparked laughter when he told the Senate Committee on the 
Philippines in 1905 that “as far as ecclesiastical gentleman can come to an issue, they did come to an issue 
which was certainly—abrupt.” See Congressional Record, 58th Cong., 3rd sess., 1905, 39, pt. 4: 3715. 
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people to hardship” and grasped at straws with hopes that a cure for opiate addiction would 
be discovered.99 
With no hope of an extension, the Philippine Commission passed another law in 
October 1907 that made it more difficult for licensed users to get opium and more dangerous 
for others to use the drug.  The law was a significant step by the commission toward wielding 
increasing levels of punishment on people who ignored the rules about drug use.  Initially, 
the goal was still to reduce the number of opium users.  The twelve thousand licensed 
Philippine-Chinese users would now have to reapply every month until the deadline of 1 
March 1908.  The fee was to be initially lowered to one peso instead of five (to induce 
participation), but would increase each month reaching ten pesos by February of 1908.  
Those who continued to register until the end would face fees totaling twenty-six pesos, 
which was equivalent to thirteen dollars and a sizable amount.100 While the fee increased, 
the amount of opium sold was to decrease by 15 percent each month after November of 
1907.  Anyone caught using opium without a license or a prescription before the deadline 
faced the standard penalty (a fine up to two hundred pesos or six months in prison or both) 
and a new threat of deportation for second offenders who were not Filipino or U.S. citizens.  
Those caught after the deadline faced a much larger penalty: a fine of up to ten thousand 
pesos or a prison term of five years or both.  Second offenders who were not American or 
Filipino citizens could be deported.  The law also banned non-medical cocaine use.  The 
 
99 Taft sent his orders, along with Crafts’ letter to Roosevelt, through Edwards, 16 July 1907, NA, RG 350, 
entry 5, file 1023-149. Edwards had been mistaken when had warned Taft that Craft’s letter might “be proven a 
stinker,” Crafts to Roosevelt, 2 June 1907, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-148.  
 
100 The commission’s bill passed 10 October 1907 and went into effect seven days later. See Philippine 
Commission, Journal of the Philippine Commission, vol. 1 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 151; Hord, “The 
Opium Evil In Asia,” 8; and Ellis Cromwell, Fourth Annual Report of the Collector of Internal Revenue, 1908 
(Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 31. 
 
41
commission included cocaine in the bill because of a fear that “unscrupulous persons” were 
introducing opium smokers to cocaine, which had been freely sold by druggists to 
recreational users.101 A related piece of legislation provided that people who “habitually” 
used opium were to be barred from holding public office.102 While not as stiff as five years 
in prison, this penalty signaled that drug users were not welcome in America’s colonial 
project. 
 The Philippine Commission also endorsed more positive efforts to convince opium 
users to quit, including an anti-opium propaganda campaign.  The Bureau of Internal 
Revenue ran notices in local newspapers about the new law and the approaching ban on non-
medical opium use.103 The bureau also called upon the Chinese Consul-General and the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce to inform the Philippine-Chinese community and asked 
missionaries to help inform the public at large.104 The Bureau of Printing duplicated an 
article by Catholic Archbishop Jeremiah Harty, which warned that an estimated forty 
thousand Filipinos had been ensnared by the “evil” of opium.105 As a printed flyer, the 
 
101 See U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 26; and Philippine Commission, Journal of the Philippine 
Commission, vol. 1 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 151.  
 
102 The Philippine Commission removed at least one provincial governor from office for smoking opium. See 
Hord, “The Opium Evil In Asia,” 12; Act 1761, An Act Gradually to Restrict and Regulate the Sale and Use of 
Opium Pending…; and Act 1768, An Act to Amend Act Numbered Fifteen Hundred and Eighty-two…; both in 
House, War Department, Annual Reports, 1907, Vol. 10, Acts of the Philippine Commission, 60th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1907, H. Doc. 2, 447-58, 465-66.  
 
103 Hord, “Warning to Possessors of Opium,” 25 October 1907, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-158. 
 
104 Hord, “The Opium Evil In Asia,” 12.  Also see Reverend Charles E. Rath’s letter from the Province of Leyte 
to Hord, 25 November 1907, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-157; and U.S. Department of War, Annual Report 
of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 757.   
 
105 The Manila Times also published Harty’s article with an approving editorial comment. The Bureau of 
Printing distributed a similar article by Heiser. See U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine 
Commission, 1908, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 757; and Hord, “The 
Opium Evil In Asia,” 13-15. 
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article contained photographs intended to scare people away from the drug.  A Filipino who 
smoked opium looked malnourished and vacant.  A Filipina who ate and smoked opium 
looked out with an intense (possibly deranged) facial expression.  An emaciated Philippine-
Chinese man who injected morphine had scarification across his torso and arms that 
suggested the physical harm the addiction did [see Figure 1].106 The article stressed the 
weight of the penalties that would come after the deadline and was printed in Spanish, 
Tagalog, Visayan [likely Cebuano], and Ilokano and thus was primarily aimed at Filipinos.   
106 Dr. Luis A. Diaz, faculty member of the University of North Carolina School of Dermatology, theorized that 
the three subjects were likely malnourished and possibly suffered from pellagra, an inflammatory skin condition 
exacerbated by sun exposure. The scarification on the Philippine-Chinese man’s torso was most likely 
secondary to injections and recurrent local infections.  Hepatitis developed from infected needles might also 
have fostered pruritus, which induces scratching of the skin and worsened the lesions. Correspondence with Dr. 
Diaz of 4 July 2005 in author’s possession. 
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Figure 1: “Evils Resulting From the Use of Opium.” 
Source: “Males Resultantes del Uso del Opio,” (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1907), copy in 
NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-161. 
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The voluntary medical treatment plan, intended to reduce the number of opium users, 
continued to produce poor results.  Very few volunteered despite the urging of the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Health.  A running total of the voluntary submissions to 
the government programs in Manila and Iloilo included: six patients in October 1907, sixteen 
in November, fourteen in December, and sixty-six by the end of January 1908.107 By the first 
week of January 1908, one American, seventeen Chinese, and twenty-three Filipinos had 
submitted to treatment.108 By the last month before the 1 March 1908 deadline, the Manila 
program had accepted a grand total of only 259 opium patients.  The Iloilo program had 
treated just three opium patients (all Philippine-Chinese) in the fiscal year 1908.109 
Compared to the estimates of many thousands of opium users, the total number of people 
who volunteered for treatment before the deadline was low: 562 in Manila and three in 
Iloilo.110 
Even if all of the opium users entered a hospital, there was no effective cure for 
opium addiction.  Optimism flowered in the spring of 1907 when the U.S. Consulate in 
Singapore reported that the plant Combretum sundaicum (known as jungle weed) was a 
possible cure.111 However, as Brent learned when he visited Singapore that August, mental 
 
107 Memorandum by Cromwell, 28 January 1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-164.  
 
108 Hord to the secretary of finance and justice, 7 January 1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-160. 
 
109 U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 110.     
 
110 These totals are from the Heiser’s chart, correcting his mistake with the transferred patients and subtracting 
the sixty-five patients admitted after the deadline in Cebu. See Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of 
Health for the Philippine Islands, 1908 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 75. 
 
111 David S. Wilbur, Consul-General, sent a sample to the Department of State, 6 March 1907, NA, RG 59, 
Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 1906-1910, roll 104, 774/165. Also see the discussion in 
Daily Consular and Trade Reports, 25 May 1907, copy in RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-147; the secretary of 
commerce and labor to Root, 4 November 1907; and Wilson to Chamberlin, 8 November 1907, both in RG 59, 
Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 1906-1910, roll 104, 774/124a, 125. 
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“suggestion” was the plant’s only contribution.112 Without a specific cure for opium 
addiction, the treatment methodology was to apply cathartics such as prickly ash bark, 
hyoscyamus, and belladonna while reducing the amount of opium consumed by patients, 
immediately for people with weaker habits (generally opium smokers) and more gradually 
for stronger cases (mostly opium eaters and morphine injectors).  A patient was considered 
cured when the physical symptoms of opiate withdrawal ended, usually after about ten 
days.113 
Director of Health Heiser strained to describe the failing treatment program in 
positive terms.  None of the opium patients admitted had died, a possibility made all too real 
by earlier experiences of U.S. physicians on the islands.114 Heiser labeled all of the patients 
as “recovered” or “improved,” even including one Philippine-Chinese who had escaped.  
Still, Heiser had to concede, “just how many relapsed after being discharged from the 
hospital is, of course, not known.”115 There was no follow-up to confirm lasting abstinence 
and there were seizures of opium in the hospitals.116 
112 Brent, diary entry, 5 August 1907, in Brent Papers, box 68, file: Diary, 1907.   
 
113 For a more detailed discussion of the medical treatment of drug addiction see Chapter Five. Also see Victor 
G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1908 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 
1908), 76; and his Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1913 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing, 1913), 163. Musto provides an analysis of the cathartic approach in American Disease, 79-82. 
 
114 See the cases noted in U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903, Part 2 
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904), 267; and Annual Report of the Philippine 
Commission, 1904, Part 3 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), 334.  
 
115 Heiser’s accounts continued in An American Doctor’s Odyssey: Adventures in Forty-five Countries (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1936), 168. Also see Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of 
Health for the Philippine Islands, 1908 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 75; and his Annual Report of the 
Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1913 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1913), 163. 
 
116 U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 110. 
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Even with such obvious setbacks the commissioners had some reason to believe that 
the number of smokers was shrinking.  The new licensing policy was draining the pool of 
legal users.  Over twelve thousand Philippine-Chinese had held personal licenses, but the 
increased fees and decreased amounts of opium drove the number down.  Only 3,147 
renewed in October, 2,533 in November, 1,321 in December, 1,039 in January 1908, and just 
739 that February.117 Many Philippine-Chinese also prepared for the coming ban by leaving 
the islands.  According to Cromwell, “a large number” of wealthy Philippine-Chinese 
returned to China because they felt that “it would lower them in the eyes of their fellow 
countrymen and of their customers” to enter a hospital in Manila.  If treatment was their aim, 
a trip to China made sense because, according to Heiser, many Philippine-Chinese preferred 
to recover from illness on the mainland so that they could be buried in China if recovery 
failed.118 Another motivation was that opium smoking was not banned in China and access 
to the drug was easy.  Thus wealthy Philippine-Chinese in Iloilo gathered a collection to send 
twenty-five opium smokers “who were unable to quit” to China.119 
Black Sunday 
When the deadline for the total ban arrived, the Philippine Commission adopted a 
more coercive approach to opium treatment.  Jails and prisons replaced hospitals in the 
government treatment program.  For example, an “opium hospital” opened inside the 
 
117 The number of licensed dealers also fell from 255 before Act 1761 passed in October 1907 to thirty-seven in 
February of 1908. See Ellis Cromwell, Fourth Annual Report of the Collector of Internal Revenue, 1908 
(Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 30-32; his “Comments on Enforcement of The New Opium Law,” 28 
January 1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-164; and Nolting, “Memorandum Showing Results Obtained,” 2-
4. 
 
118 Heiser to Cobb, 25 June 1903, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, PA, Papers of Victor G. 
Heiser, Letter book, 1905-1913, Private Correspondence.  
 
119 Memorandum by Ellis Cromwell, 14 March 1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-165. 
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provincial jail in the city of Cebu following the deadline.120 Authorities first spent two weeks 
attempting to convince opium smokers to voluntarily enter the jail.  Protestant missionary 
Reverend Hobart E. Studley volunteered his Chinese language abilities to induce more 
Philippine-Chinese to submit.121 Soon tired of asking for volunteers, authorities captured “all 
the smokers possible and forced them” into the jail.122 
Coercion did not seem to improve the results.  Cromwell noted that almost half of the 
first fifty-four prisoners were “cured,” (meaning that opiates were no longer in their bodies 
and that they were not suffering symptoms from opiate withdrawal), although a corrupt guard 
had been smuggling opium into the jail from the outset.123 Dr. Arlington Pond, District 
Health Officer, who was responsible for the prisoner’s health, was more critical.  He recalled 
that all but three of the total sixty-five prisoners “walked out and took it again.”  Pond 
described his treatment method: “I took it [opium] away from them and they suffered 
tortures, but none died.”124 Thereafter, opium smokers in Cebu, were, in Heiser’s words, 
“vigorously prosecuted” and incarcerated, which Heiser interpreted as “compulsory treatment 
in the hospital of the prison.”125 
120 Evans to U.S. Commission to the International Opium Commission at Shanghai, 14 December 1908, Brent 
Papers, box 8, file: Dec. 1908.   
 
121 Studley to Hord, 1 January 1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-160. 
 
122 Evans to U.S. Commission to the International Opium Commission at Shanghai, 14 December 1908, Brent 
Papers, box 8, file: Dec. 1908, 3. 
 
123 From 15 April to 26 May there were twenty-seven male Philippine-Chinese, sixteen male Filipinos, twenty-
one female Filipinos, and one male East Indian in the provincial jail. See U.S. Department of War, Annual 
Report of Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 1 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 
293; and Ellis Cromwell, “Report on Enforcement in Cebu,” 4 May 1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-167.  
 
124 Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, “Interview of Dr. Arlington Pond,” 10 
February 1930, LONA, Opium Section, S.199, file: Philippine Islands, Evidence, 19-20.   
 
125 Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1908 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing, 1908), 74-75. 
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Though a failure, the treatment program helped U.S. officials to justify the increased 
penalties that came into force after the 1 March 1908 total ban.  An internal revenue agent 
suggested that the result of the medical program was less important than the “indirect 
benefits” of the program.  They “freed the government from censure in the vigorous 
execution of the opium law which followed.”  He added that “all were given opportunity to 
be cured and if they refused to do so they had no excuse for condemning or criticising the 
punishment meted out to them when they were caught.”126 
One form of punishment was fines.  From the March 1908 deadline to the end of June 
1909 the courts imposed a total of 190,592 pesos in fines.  Of this total, the Bureau of 
Revenue collected 102,263 pesos.  The average fine imposed was 121 pesos, and the average 
fine paid was ninety-eight pesos.127 People convicted of opium violations who could not pay 
the fines received a prison sentence.  The average fine, 121 pesos, was steep, which was a 
major reason why many opium offenders failed to pay.  By way of comparison, members of 
the Municipal Police force earned a monthly salary of ten pesos in 1909, manual laborers 
could earn one or one-and-half pesos a day, and Filipino teachers got around eighteen pesos a 
month.128 The average fine, then, represented months of labor even for the educated classes.  
Nonetheless the secretary of finance and justice described these amounts as “nominal.”129 
And R.C. Round, Chief of the Law Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, complained 
 
126 Evans to U.S. Commission to the International Opium Commission at Shanghai, 14 December 1908, Brent 
Papers, box 8, file: Dec. 1908, 4. 
 
127 U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1909, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), 178. 
 
128 U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1909, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), 179; House, War Department, Annual Reports, 1908, Vol. 8, Report of 
the Philippine Commission, Part 2, 60th Cong, 2nd sess., 1909, H. Doc. 1042, 390, 772.  
 
129 U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1909, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), 179. 
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that the fines were often so small that they imposed “an extremely low license on the 
continued use of the drug.”130 
A variant on punishment by fine was what Cromwell labeled the “Manila method.”  
Opium users who were arrested could pay a sum of money to avoid prosecution, if they also 
entered a hospital for treatment.131 Cromwell associated this system of compromising 
prosecutions with Manila because he believed that opium users in the capital could better 
afford to pay than people arrested in the provinces.  In fiscal 1909 this policy allowed 106 
people to pay their way out of the courts and into San Lazaro Hospital for opium treatment.  
No follow-up was conducted to monitor the patients after their release.132 
Together the fines and compromise payments amassed a sizable amount of revenue, 
calling into question the U.S. claims to have abandoned funds raised from opium.  They 
brought in 34,927 pesos in the first four months following the deadline and 102,263 pesos by 
the end of June 1909.133 Round’s sarcastic statement that the fines were really a “low 
license” on continued opium use seems partially correct.  Fines and compromise payments 
created about the same amount of revenue in fiscal 1908 as the fees collected for the user’s 
certificates.  That year the Bureau of Internal Revenue collected 34,429 pesos for the user’s 
certificates and 34,927 pesos for fines and “sums accepted as compromises.”134 American 
 
130 Round, “The Opium Problem in the Philippine Islands,” 25.  
 
131 Ellis Cromwell, “Report on Enforcement in Cebu,” 4 May 1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-167. 
 
132 Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1909 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing, 1909), 81. 
 
133 An exact accounting of how many people were fined is impossible with the reported figures because judges 
could impose a prison term or a fine or both.  Of 2,217 arrests during this period there were 1,715 convictions 
and compromises. See U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 757; and U.S. Department of War, Annual Report 
of the Philippine Commission, 1909, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), 178.  
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officials never seriously described these funds as government revenue because of the 
domestic clamor against selling drugs for non-medical uses.135 
Aside from fines, imprisonment was the other major form of punishment.  American 
officials endorsed incarceration for its supposed deterrent effect and for its removal of drug 
users from their communities.  In Round’s estimation, incarceration eliminated the “centers 
of infection and menace.”136 The Spanish-built Bilibid Prison remained the major detention 
center.  The prison was overcrowded and prone to flooding.  It had a dreadfully high 
mortality rate.  C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of the Secret Service of the Bureau of Customs, aptly 
described it as “baleful.”137 Once convicted by the courts, opium users were sent directly to 
the prison and, if necessary, to the prison hospital for medical supervision [see Figures 2-4].  
The prison began to specialize in handling opium users in the months following the deadline 
and became the primary government treatment center after July 1908.  There were 282 
prisoners treated for opium addiction in fiscal 1909.138 The prison’s utility as a repository for 
drug users expanded in 1909 when construction was completed on a new reinforced concrete 
 
134 U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 757.  
 
135 To date historians have accepted the claims of U.S. officials. For an in-depth example see Harry Luton, 
“American Internal Revenue Policy in the Philippines to 1916,” in Compadre Colonialism: Philippine 
American Relations: 1898-1946, ed. Norman G. Owen (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971), 65-80.  
 
136 Round, “The Opium Problem in the Philippine Islands,” 26. 
 
137 See U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), 201; U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine 
Commission, 1903, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904), 14, 102-103; Victor G. 
Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1907 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 
1907), 52-53; and Forbes, Philippine Islands, 221-33. 
 
138 Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health of the Philippine Islands, 1909 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing, 1909), 81. 
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hospital that could house 376 prisoners.139 In 1910 Governor General William Cameron 
Forbes ordered that all drug violators sentenced to prison throughout the islands serve their 
term in Bilibid Prison because of the prison’s “special facilities” for the treatment of the 
opium habit.140 That year the hospital in Bilibid Prison treated 370 opium users, and 458 in 
fiscal year 1911.141 
The change of venue to the country’s premier prison did not improve the results of 
opium addiction treatment.  Heiser admitted that it was “impossible to estimate with any 
degree of accuracy the percentage of permanent cures.”142 Later accounts described rampant 
smuggling of opium into the prison and no rehabilitative benefit from incarceration.  One 
prison official recalled during the 1920s that, because the prison was in the heart of the city, 
people could toss “bundles of morphine and cans of opium” over the walls.  Inside, corrupt 
hospital attendants provided syringes for morphine injections [see Figure 3].143 According to 
Philippine-Chinese physician Tee Han Kee, who had worked for the Bureau of Health after 
 
139 The Americans had already added the first hospital to Bilibid Prison in 1904. See “Works Accomplished and 
Activities,” and “Hospitals Under the Direction and Supervision of the Philippine National Health Service” in 
Philippine National Library, Filipiniana Collection, Manuel Quezon Papers, folder Bureau of Health, 1921-
1922. 
 
140 See Nolting, “Memorandum Showing Results Obtained,” 5; and Round, “The Opium Problem in the 
Philippine Islands,” 26. For a description of Bilibid Prison see John Lewis Gillin, Taming the Criminal: 
Adventures in Penology (New York: Macmillan: 1931), 36-48. 
 
141 Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1909 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing, 1909), 81; his Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1910 (Manila: Bureau 
of Printing, 1910), 152; his Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1911 (Manila: 
Bureau of Printing, 1911), 86; and his Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1912 
(Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1913), 166. 
 
142 Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health of the Philippine Islands, 1909 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing, 1909), 81.   
 
143 Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, “Interview of Ramon Pablo Metra,” 5 
February 1930, LONA, Opium Section, S.199, file: Philippine Islands, Evidence.  
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1902 and became superintendent of the Chinese General Hospital, most of the opium users 
imprisoned in Bilibid returned to the habit after release.144 
144 Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, 1930, “Interview of Dr. Tee Han Kee,” 
4 February 1930, LONA, Opium Section, S.199, file: Philippine Islands, Evidence. A brief biographical sketch 
is in Wilson, Ambition and Identity, 164-65. 
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Figure 2: A View of American Soldiers at the Gate of Bilibid Prison.   
 
The prison had first served the U.S. government as a repository for Filipino rebels.  The staff 
of the prison would come to specialize in handling drug offenders.   
 
Source: American Historical Collection, Rizal Library, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon 
City (hereafter AHC), photo 1031-0606. 
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Figure 3: Bilibid Prison in 1926. 
 
An aerial shot shows the prison’s proximity to the city.  The wheel-like design followed from Jeremy 
Bentham’s inspiration in the eighteenth century.  Because wardens in the hub could peer into every 
cell and remain unseen, the prisoners would supposedly feel like they were under surveillance and act 
accordingly.  The central watchtower in Bilibid Prison served a more mundane task.  Armed guards 
watched for escape attempts.   
 
Source: AHC, photo 5004-0842. 
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Figure 4: Bilibid Prison’s Hospital Ward.  
 
People with cases of “opiumism,” “morphinism,” and even “cocainism” endured a regime of 
purging usually lasting around two weeks.145 Once “cured,” the patients returned to the general 
prison population and set to work on many forms of prison labor.   
 
Source: Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 
1906 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1906), 138. 
145 For examples of “cocainism” see Board of Health of the Philippine Islands and Manila, Monthly Reports, for 
November 1900 to May 1904 and June 1904 to July 1905 (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing 1904-5). 
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Arrests for drug violations following the total ban on non-medical opium use after 1 
March 1908 were concentrated in the city of Manila.  For example, Manila’s Municipal 
Police arrested 653 people for violating the opium law in fiscal 1908 [see Table 2].  The total 
number of arrests reported in the country that year was 777.146 The Philippine Constabulary, 
which had jurisdiction across the islands, also conducted raids and arrested suspected opium 
violators, but caught many fewer offenders.  In 1908, for example, the constabulary secured 
the conviction of ten Filipinos and eight Chinese for possession of an accumulated total of 
three grams of opium (they were fined an average of 195 pesos).147 In these arrests offenses 
involving consumption of opium were far more common than offenses involving illicit trade 
in the drug.  The line graph in Table 2 sets the numerical information into a visual format.  
Though imprecise, the data suggest that more offenses were related to drug consumption than 
transactions for profit.  
 
146 See U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 116; and Ellis Cromwell, Fourth Annual Report of the Collector of 
Internal Revenue, 1908 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 32.  
 
147 Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, “Statistical Records of Opium Raids 
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Table 2: Arrests for Violation of the Opium Law by Manila’s Municipal Police, 1907-1925   
 
The distinction between “possession,” “consumption,” and “trade” categories is not exact, as 
some possession offenses involved illicit sales.  However, the numbers indicate that the majority of 
offenders arrested were consumers.   
 
Source: Herbert L. May, Survey of Smoking Opium Conditions in the Far East: A Report to 
the Executive Board of the Foreign Policy Association (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 
1927), 45. 
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Opium consumers coped with the ban in a number of ways.  An unknown number 
simply quit using opium, vindicating a hope that was expressed in the Philippine 
Commission’s reports.  Hundreds sought medical assistance from private hospitals or the two 
government treatment centers.  Official reports estimated around six hundred to seven 
hundred patients in government hospitals and around two hundred to three hundred patients 
in private hospitals.148 Some users turned to medicines purported to be “cures” for the opium 
habit.  Smith reported that 350 kilograms of a “cure” (with 1/2 percent opium) was imported 
in the six months leading up to the deadline, probably the discredited Combretum sundaicum 
from the Straits Settlements with opium added.149 After the deadline, Brent found that opium 
smokers in the provinces of Cebu, Zamboanga, and the town of Dumaguete in the province 
of Negros Oriental had switched to pills and “cures” which contained opium and chloral.150 
Undoubtedly, the black market for opium was a popular choice.  John Green, the Manila 
Chief of Police, recalled that after the deadline “the clandestine use of opium increased [and] 
opium joints [came] into existence all over the city.”  To reduce the risk of arrest, these 
venues became veritable fortresses barricaded with “heavy lattice work, barbed wire, ice box 
doors, and iron bars.”151 According to an internal revenue agent in Cebu, smokers in that city 
avoided detection by changing the smoking venue “from place to place daily” and by 
appointing “spies and sentries.”  The smokers would ignite paper to “deaden the smell” of 
 
148 U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 27, 110, 757.   
 
149 Smith to the secretary of war, 20 March 1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-163.  
 
150 Brent to Smith, 29 December 1908, NA, RG 43, entry 34, box 1, 3-4. 
 
151 League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (hereafter OAC), 
“Report for the Philippine Islands forwarded by the War Department,” 2 March 1927, LONA, O.C. 573, Annex 
I, 5. Nolting also described barricaded doors in “Memorandum Showing Results Obtained,” 5.    
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burning opium and hide behind false doors.  They also kept their supply of opium buried, 
exhuming only a bit at a time for use.152 Morphine use, which was easier to conceal than 
opium smoking, also become more prevalent.  After July 1908 most opium offenders 
incarcerated in Bilibid Prison used morphine.  For example, there were 256 cases of 
“morphinism” and twenty-six cases of “opiumism” in fiscal 1909.153 
The authorities responded to the smokers’ efforts to avoid detection with more 
vigorous interdiction.  More persistence was needed because, as an agent put it, the “capture 
of opium smokers” was no longer an “easy matter.”154 The police asked Dr. A.P. Goff of 
San Lazaro Hospital to accompany their raids to help decide whether a suspect was under the 
influence of opium.155 They also went to impressive lengths to discover people in the act of 
smoking opium.  For example, in order to glimpse inside a smoking venue beside one of 
Manila’s many canals, an internal revenue agent carried a ladder through the tidewater during 
the middle of the night.  Another strategy had agents spying from underneath houses.  One 
was mistakenly doused with carbolic acid spread by a Bureau of Health employee to fight 
cholera.  Chief of the Law Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue Round reported that 
 
152 Evans to U.S. Commission to the International Opium Commission at Shanghai, 14 December 1908, Brent 
Papers, box 8, file: Dec. 1908, 5.     
 
153 Victor Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1909 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing, 1909), 81, 169. Dr. Tee Han Kee also described the prevalence of morphine injection over opium 
smoking during this period. See Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, 
“Interview of Dr. Tee Han Kee,” 4 February 1930, LONA, Opium Section, S.199, file: Philippine Islands, 
Evidence. 
 
154 Evans to U.S. Commission to the International Opium Commission at Shanghai, 14 December 1908, Brent 
Papers, box 8, file: Dec. 1908, 5.     
 
155 Round, “The Opium Problem in the Philippine Islands,” 26-27. 
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the unfortunate agent returned to duty “minus considerable skin, but with several opium 
fiends safely confined to await trial.”156 
The continued use after the deadline also prompted U.S. officials to harden their 
views of opium smokers.  Heiser provided the explanation that became the standard in the 
Philippine Commission’s reports: opium users “had sinned away their two years of grace” 
rather than accept the government’s efforts “to save them by legal force.”  No longer 
deserving sympathy, the opium smokers were now “fiends” who “fought, screamed, 
threatened, and sulked until they realized that the Government meant business.”157 The 
secretary of the interior agreed, noting that opium users had created their “deplorable” 
conditions after the deadline by not taking the free treatment in larger numbers.  Such 
inaction justified the harsher penalties for opium offenses after the deadline because “a very 
large majority of these individuals continued to indulge themselves up to the last moment 
when they could legally do so.”158 
American officials soon embraced increasing levels of punishment as the best 
response to unauthorized drug use.  They saw the routine incarceration of drug users (a 
physical and symbolic quarantine) as an ameliorative, even progressive, measure.  Round 
offered a succinct formulation: drug users who failed to “make desperate efforts to free 
themselves of the vice” would “either undergo voluntary hospital treatment or be 
apprehended and sentenced to imprisonment, where they [would] be cured of the habit by 
 
156 Round, “The Opium Problem in the Philippine Islands,” 7. 
 
157 See Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine Islands, 1908 (Manila: 
Bureau of Printing, 1908), 74. 
 
158 U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909), 26. 
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force.”159 A new opium law, passed less than a year after Black Sunday, guaranteed that 
opium offenders would face a mandatory minimum penalty.  The law stipulated that people 
convicted of illicit possession or use of opium, cocaine, or derivatives of either, had to pay a 
minimum fine of three hundred pesos or serve at least three months in prison or both.  The 
maximum penalty reached a ten thousand peso fine or five years in prison or both.160 
Judges proved to be wary of the more extreme penalties, but the mandatory minimum 
sentences had a noticeable effect.  The Philippine Commission urged judges to “impose jail 
sentences rather than fines.”161 Attorney General Ignacio Villamor called for a stiffer 
response from the bench while insisting that his prosecutors seek the maximum penalty for 
all opium convictions.162 Nonetheless the average sentence for illicit drug use settled near 
the bottom (three months in prison or a fine of three hundred pesos or both).163 Judges 
reserved the upper range of the penalties for people who profited from the black market.164 
159 Round, “The Opium Problem in the Philippine Islands,” 27. 
 
160 The Philippine Commission introduced the bill. The Philippine Assembly approved it on 19 May 1909.  See 
Act 1910, An Act Amending Sections Twenty-two; copy in NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-183; U.S. 
Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1909, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1910), 179; and Philippine Commission, Journal of the Philippine Commission,
vol. 3 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1910), 394-95, 401, 404-405, 469-70, 627. 
 
161 Nolting, “Memorandum Showing Results Obtained,” 5.  
 
162 Ignacio Villamor, “Circular No. 157,” 26 November 1912, NA, RG 350, entry 5, box 160, file 1023-193 1/2.  
 
163 The average prison term served during the years following the imposition of Act 1910 lasted between three-
and-a-half and four months. See U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1909, 
Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), 178; Ellis Cromwell, Sixth Annual Report 
of the Collector of Internal Revenue, 1910 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1910), 33; his Seventh Annual Report of 
the Collector of Internal Revenue, 1911 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1911), 35; and his Eighth Annual Report 
of the Collector of Internal Revenue, 1912 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1912), 41. 
 
164 The higher courts also had a conservative effect, striking down lengthy prison terms and overruling 
municipal laws that overstepped the penalties imposed by the commission’s act. For an example see the 
complaints of Judge P.M. Moir of the Court of First Instance in the Eighth District (Province of Albay) sent to 
Brent (with enclosures), 4 October 1911, Brent Papers, box 9, file: Oct. 1911. The Court of First Instance 
reduced the penalties in Manila’s Municipal Act of 1911. See Round, “The Opium Problem in the Philippine 
Islands,” 27. Also see Ellis Cromwell, Seventh Annual Report of the Collector of Internal Revenue, 1911 
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Still, the percentage of opium offenders sent to prison increased under the new law.  From 
Black Sunday to the end of June 1909—prior to the mandatory minimum penalties—only 
307 out of 1,715 convictions, about 18 percent, were sentenced to a prison term.  After the 
new law, the percentage of convictions receiving prison sentences increased to around 61 
percent in fiscal 1910, to around 64 percent in fiscal 1911, and reached 65 percent in fiscal 
1912.  The amount of time actually spent in prison by drug offenders also exceeded the 
prison terms imposed by judges because a failure to pay fines resulted in subsidiary 
imprisonment.165 
While the amount of punishment imposed demonstrated that people continued to use 
drugs despite the risks, U.S. officials viewed the punishment as evidence of a policy solution 
at work.  Round announced that the stiffer penalties filled the jails of the Philippine 
Islands.166 A more detailed accounting found that authorities had arrested 6,575 people for 
drug violations (mostly for illicit possession or consumption) and secured 5,062 convictions 
(including compromised cases) from Black Sunday to the end of June 1912.  Fines totaled 
725,680 pesos, of which the Bureau of Internal Revenue collected 456,347 pesos.  The courts 
imposed 2,042 prison sentences comprising a cumulative total of almost 168 years and 
deported 132 alien drug offenders.  The average fine paid was 221 pesos and the average 
prison term imposed was three months and twenty-three days.167 Nolting described as 
 
(Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1911), 35; and William T. Nolting, Eighth Annual Report of the Collector of 
Internal Revenue, 1912 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1912), 40.  
 
165 For an example of penal servitude in lieu of payment see the case of Poh Chi, which made it to the Philippine 
Supreme Court and is described in the Attorney General of the Philippine Islands, Annual Report of the 
Attorney General of the Philippine Islands, 1912 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1912), 23-24. 
 
166 Round, “The Opium Problem in the Philippine Islands,” 26. 
 
167 Ellis Cromwell, Eighth Annual Report of the Collector of Internal Revenue, 1912 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing, 1912), 41. 
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positive the “almost daily occurrence” of arrests of opium users.  He admitted that “total 
suppression has not yet been obtained,” but remained optimistic that people who had refused 
“to be permanently cured” would change their habits in Bilibid Prison.168 
Conclusion 
The clarity with which U.S. officials such as Nolting described the punishment 
solution gave no indication that it had arrived as the last stage of a messy process.  Those 
who first arrived to rule the Philippines applied ad-hoc policies replicating the varied local, 
state, and federal laws in the continental United States and quickly encountered disappointing 
results.  Corrupt enforcement of the new opium policies, smuggling to avoid import duties, 
and opium use by Filipinos and “natives” concerned U.S. administrators.  Washington 
blocked a move to return to the Spanish monopoly approach, leaving the Philippine 
Commission scrambling to effect a “progressive prohibition” that would avoid a crisis.  
Black Sunday finally focused the governments’ attention directly on the drug users who now 
faced a bleak future, as harsh punishment became a “cure.” 
There is reason to believe that this process needlessly increased peoples’ suffering on 
the islands.  First, the punishment solution encouraged the people who did not wish to stop 
consuming opium to switch to injecting morphine, which was more dangerous than opium 
smoking because it was more addictive.  Second, American officials claimed that they had 
successfully reduced the number of opium users in the Philippines, but any reduction in the 
level of opium use was more likely a result of better health care and changing attitudes 
 
168 Nolting, “Memorandum Showing Results Obtained,” 7. 
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among the younger generation than the infliction of penalties.169 In interviews with League 
of Nations’ staff in 1930, eyewitnesses such as Hubert C. Anderson argued that increases in 
the standard of living and in public amusements had deterred younger people from using 
opium more than the “system of prohibition.”  Vincente Aldanese agreed that only the “old 
type” of Filipinos and Chinese smoked opium and had done so since “boyhood.”  Aldanese 
credited education and the growing popularity of sports for turning the younger generation 
away from the habit.  (He did “not believe in prohibition” and called for a return of legal 
opium sales to license holders.)  Finally, Doctors Arlington Pond and Tee Han Kee noted a 
medical or quasi-medical basis for much of the use of the older generation and, as Tee 
suggested, the “new generation” was “better educated” and less likely to embrace opium 
smoking.170 These views regarding a shift in opium use in the Philippines correspond with 
historian David Courtwright’s convincing argument that shifting attitudes in the medical 
community and the public at large changed the drug using population in the United States 
more than restrictive legislation.171 
More to the point for this study, the punishment solution in the Philippines also 
prompted the U.S. federal government to reconsider drug policy at home and abroad.  
Collector of Internal Revenue Nolting warned in 1911 that it was easier to buy opium in U.S. 
 
169 See Nolting, “Memorandum Showing Results Obtained,” 6; Round, “The Opium Problem in the Philippine 
Islands,” 27-28; Studley to Round, 2 June 1913, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-197; Round to Edwards, 31 
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in Senate, The Opium Traffic, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., 1911, S. Doc. 736, 3. 
 
170 See League of Nations Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, “Interview of 
Hubert C. Anderson,” 4 February, 1930; “Interview of Vincente Aldanese,” 5 February 1931; “Interview of Dr. 
Arlington Pond,” 10 February 1930; and “Interview of Tee Han Kee,” 4 February 1930, all in LONA, Opium 
Section, S.199, file: Philippine Islands, Evidence. 
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cities with Chinese residents than in Manila.172 Reformers pointed out that America’s Asian 
colony had far tougher drug policies than the homeland.  Crafts wanted a “black Sunday” in 
“Honolulu and San Francisco and throughout the whole jurisdiction of the United States.”173 
(Chapter Four explains how the Philippine model spread to federal law in the continental 
United States.)  American officials also realized that their Philippine drug policy could hardly 
succeed while opium was legally grown, sold, and smoked in the surrounding countries.  The 
next chapter follows the efforts of U.S. officials to gather an international consensus against 
non-medical drug use.  As we shall see, when American diplomats proposed the best way to 
quash use in other countries they relied on what “had been done in the Philippines.”174 
172 Nolting, “Memorandum Showing Results Obtained,” 6. 
 
173 Crafts to Taft, 8 January 1908, NA, RG 350, entry 5, file 1023-154. 
 
174 Instructions noted in Beaupre to van Swinderen, 7 October 1908, NA, RG 43 entry 39, box 2. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Exporting Punishment, 1909-1936 
 
Nine months after Black Sunday, in December of 1908, two Americans embarked 
from Manila on a tour in the Philippines to assess the progress of opium control.  An 
American physician named Hamilton Wright, whose presence was due to patronage 
following his marriage to Senator William Drew Washburn’s [R-MN] daughter Elizabeth, 
had joined Bishop Brent, a leading missionary drawn into public service on the opium issue 
by top Republicans.  As Brent and Wright gazed upon the Sibuyan Sea, the Visayan Sea, the 
Mindanao Sea, and many islands in the Philippine archipelago, they grasped the practical 
difficulty of proscribing non-medical drug use in the Philippines while opium production, 
sales, and use remained legal in nearby countries.  They were also preparing for the next 
stage of their journey.  Brent and Wright would represent the United States at the first 
international conference on drug control to meet that February in Shanghai under U.S. 
sponsorship.175 
Colonial rule had changed Washington’s traditional diplomatic agenda regarding 
drugs.  The prevalence of opium smoking in the Philippines had spurred the executive branch 
to address the issue of non-medical drug consumption.  The islands’ extra-constitutionality 
 
175 Confidential report by the American delegation to the International Opium Commission at Shanghai to the 
Department of State, 1 March 1909, (hereafter U.S. Report on Shanghai Commission), U.S. National Archives, 
College Park, Maryland (hereafter NA), Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG 
59), Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 1906-1910, roll 107, 774/607-8, 27-28. Also see 
Brent to Edith Brent, 6 December 1908, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Charles Henry 
Brent, (hereafter Brent Papers), box 68, file: Brent, Edith S. 1908-1912.  
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provided freedom to experiment and ultimately the power to create a punitive ban on non-
medical drug use.  Prior to Black Sunday, Washington had merely limited U.S. involvement 
in the international drug trade.  Thereafter Washington embraced the Philippine approach as 
modern and progressive, and began to frame a universal goal: a ban backed by punishment 
on all types of non-medical drug use across the globe. 
To achieve this new goal American diplomats pushed for tough international laws.  
The diplomatic campaign paid rich dividends.  Though the actual language of the treaties 
would never go as far as Washington wanted, the international conferences gave the 
Americans a venue to call for punitive bans, and the treaties themselves would spur nations 
to criminalize certain types of drug use.  In this way, the treaty movement became an 
essential component to the rise of the global punitive regime. 
 In 1906 Brent and President Theodore Roosevelt had wanted a ban backed by 
punishment on all types of non-medical drug use across the globe, and they began a 
diplomatic campaign to achieve the universalistic goal in the near term.  The challenge 
before them was great.  First, millions of people used drugs for non-medical purposes, both 
manufactured drugs like morphine and cocaine as well as “traditional” types of consumption 
such as opium smoking and eating.  In addition, many governments, especially those with 
colonies in East Asia, were deeply involved in the opium business, including, for example, 
poppy agriculture, oceanic transport, retail sales, and the licensing of smoking parlors.  While 
opium smoking and opium eating (and the opium poppy itself) had not originated in Asia, by 
the end of the nineteenth century these habits had become hugely popular (particularly 
smoking in East Asia and eating in India).  Despite the likely resistance that many nations 
would put up to criminalizing all non-medical drug use, Roosevelt accepted Brent’s 1906 
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proposal for an international drug control conference.  The State Department initially 
proposed a discussion about opium smoking in Asia, but quickly broadened the scope of the 
talks to include all types of non-medical drug use both in colonies and metropoles.  This 
included manufactured drugs such as morphine and cocaine along with “traditional” drugs 
such as raw opium and opium prepared for smoking.  Brent urged that all of these drugs be 
placed in the same category: as substances illegal outside of medical channels.  At Shanghai 
in 1909, Brent and Wright, backed by Roosevelt, not only pushed for international laws to 
make drugs illegal substances, but also denounced non-medical drug use.  As Brent later 
phrased it, they sought to “array the sentiment and the legislation of the world” against the 
“abuse” of drugs.176 This first conference produced a series of non-binding resolutions that 
rhetorically endorsed the American goal and began to transform the discussion of drugs.  But 
the final resolutions lacked the power to change laws. 
Subsequent U.S. administrations carried the campaign forward and enjoyed a major 
breakthrough in criminalizing the non-medical use of manufactured drugs.  A conference at 
The Hague (1911-1912), also organized by the State Department, this time under President 
Taft’s orders, gave Brent and Wright a venue to continue their efforts.  They were rewarded.  
Representatives with plenipotentiary powers from thirteen countries framed an international 
treaty that would require governments to implement domestic rules banning the non-medical 
use of manufactured drugs such as morphine and cocaine.  This law became universal when 
the victors of the First World War included it in the peace treaties. 
176 Charles Henry Brent, “The International Opium Conference: A Retrospect,” 12 February 1912, NA, Records 
of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43 (hereafter RG 43), entry 41, box 
1, folder: Second International Opium Conference: Netherlands.   
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The U.S. diplomatic campaign continued in the interwar years, but proved unable to 
include a punitive ban on “traditional” drug use in the treaties.  Presidents Warren G. 
Harding and Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a new generation of Americans to work with the 
League in order to extend the ban on non-medical use to traditional drugs and to enshrine in 
international law a requirement of punitive sanctions for all drug offenders.  Despite 
concerted efforts to inject the issue into every international convention, resistance to 
criminalizing “traditional” drug use remained until after the Second World War, as outlined 
in Chapter Six.   
 
Part I. Gathering Nations 
 
At Washington’s invitation, representatives from thirteen countries assembled in 
Shanghai in 1909 to consider drug control.  Expecting to talk about opium smoking in East 
Asia, the non-U.S. delegates were surprised to find before them a broad, vigorously 
supported American proposal to ban all types of non-medical drug use in all countries as 
soon as possible.  Delegates reacted by praising the sweeping U.S. goal as admirable, but 
they did not share the Americans’ sense of urgency.  Further, the sweep of the goal cut across 
a variety of established colonial practices and preferences and thus encountered resistance. 
 
American Goals and Global Realities 
 
Prior to U.S. rule in the Philippines, the U.S. diplomatic approach focused on limiting 
American involvement with the opium trade.  Beginning in the nineteenth century, the U.S. 
government had signed agreements to limit American participation in the flourishing Asian 
opium trade.  A series of bilateral treaties stopped the American merchants who bought 
opium (primarily from Turkey or the Native Indian States) and delivered the drug to markets 
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in East Asia.  An 1833 a treaty ended U.S. opium trading to Siam.  In 1844 the United States 
agreed with China that American opium traders who violated the Chinese ban on opium 
imports would not receive special protection from Washington.  Chinese Imperial edicts 
against opium importation in the eighteenth century had failed to stem this important trade, 
which was protected by British gunboats and diplomats and spurred by Chinese domestic 
demand.  Opium imports to China became legal in the British-imposed 1858 Treaty of 
Tientsin.  In the same year an American treaty with Japan, however, returned to the U.S. 
trend of restricting American opium traders.  In 1880 a bilateral treaty with China and 
another with Korea two years later restricted American opium traders from those countries 
and kept Chinese and Korean merchants from exporting opium to the United States.  In 1902 
the U.S. Congress banned U.S. citizens from selling opium to natives of the Pacific Islands 
not yet claimed by a “civilized power.”  In 1903 an additional treaty with China barred U.S. 
citizens from introducing morphine and instruments for injection without authorization.177 
The U.S. government moved against this trade for two general reasons.  American 
officials believed that sacrificing the trade would increase economic opportunity, particularly 
in China, by improving political relations.  (It helped that the American share had been tiny.)  
Further, the progressive social movement that prospered in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, along with a vocal evangelical community, agitated against the trade.  These trends 
had reinforced one another and prompted Washington to exclude the opium business from 
the larger drive to expand foreign trade.178 
177 See John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1903), 
56-97, 256-306. Also see the first chapter of Taylor’s American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 3-19. 
 
178 Kathleen L. Lodwick addresses the religious charges against the trade in Crusaders Against Opium: 
Protestant Missionaries in China, 1874-1917 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996). Walter 
LaFeber examines the U.S. drive to expand foreign trade in American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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The Philippine experience broadened the U.S. diplomatic agenda regarding drugs.  
American officials in Manila realized that they had to control opium production, distribution, 
and use in countries surrounding the Philippines in order to make the proscription in the 
Philippines more effective.  Brent wrote Roosevelt in 1906 proposing a conference of “all 
countries where the traffic in and the use of opium is a matter of moment.”  Brent argued that 
the United States had a “duty” to lead because of its “manifestly high” course of action 
regarding opium and the “responsibility” of opium control in the Asian colony.  Brent 
hastened to suggest that opium control could even foster peace in Asia: “nothing tends to 
promote peace more than a common aim.”179 Roosevelt, who would win the Nobel Peace 
Prize that winter for his efforts to end an Asian war, accepted Brent’s proposal.180 
The ingredients for a vigorous debate materialized while the State Department 
endeavored, from the fall of 1906 to early 1909, to organize the international gathering.  
During this period the Americans were developing a colonial policy in the Philippines that 
embraced a universalistic and punitive ban on non-medical drug use.  Other colonial powers 
in Asia were also pursuing reforms in opium policy but without imposing a punitive ban.  
These reforms primarily involved shifting sales from private to public management.  Under 
the older private monopoly system governments had auctioned the right to sell opium, 
usually to the highest bidder (the Spanish policy in the Philippines prior to the American 
occupation).  The new approach installed government officials in the place of private 
entrepreneurs to administer the import and retail distribution of opium.  This expanded 
oversight allowed governments to impose more comprehensive regulations such as the 
 
179 Brent to Roosevelt, 24 July 1906, NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 1906-
1910, roll 104, 774/1. 
 
180 Roosevelt to Brent, 28 August 1906, Brent papers, Box 6.  
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registration of opium users and rationing of the amount of opium sold.  The German, French, 
Dutch, British, Portuguese, and Japanese colonies all regulated opium use with varying 
severity.  While all had either recently undertaken or were preparing to adopt some form of 
government monopoly at the start of the twentieth century, none was moving toward total 
proscription of non-medical drug use as adopted in the Philippines in 1908.181 
Delegates representing British India and China would also resist a blanket approach 
because of their country’s special situations regarding opium.  In China decades of anti-
opium agitation had culminated with a stiffened enforcement regime in the first decade of the 
twentieth century.  An imperial decree seeking to eradicate opium smoking in 1906 was the 
one of many intended to rid the country of opium through education, registration, rationing, 
hospitalization, and some bans on opium smoking.  However, Chinese leaders remained 
unwilling and unable to enforce an immediate total ban on opium smoking; doing so would 
have turned millions of people into criminals and caused widespread suffering.182 In British 
India drug control focused on opium smoking and not raw opium eating.  The government 
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accepted opium eating as not detrimental to human health and regulated the sale of raw 
opium in shops.  In contrast the government considered opium smoking to be a pernicious 
social pastime and shuttered opium smoking dens to cut at the root of the habit.  The 
government held that a total ban on opium use would have been “impractical, impolitic, and 
even dangerous” because it would foster lawbreaking, blackmail, violations of privacy, and 
contravene the engrained cultural and quasi-medical habit of opium eating.183 
Further, the debate at the international gathering promised to jump the colonial 
firewall.  State Department officials began urging talks about banning drugs in the 
metropoles with no indication that European governments considered drug use to be a 
domestic concern.  In May of 1908 the department requested that all thirteen invited 
countries “devise means to limit the use of opium” in their territory and possessions as well 
as the “gradual suppression” of opium use within their Asian colonies.184 This was sound 
reasoning to Hamilton Wright, who believed that “the opium habit was no longer confined to 
Far Eastern countries” and that “the morphine habit was rapidly spreading over the world.”185 
Wright warned Roosevelt that “our white and black native population” had begun to join 
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immigrant Chinese in using opium for pleasure.186 However, investigations undertaken by 
the State Department in Europe found no evidence of similar domestic concerns.  The 
department found a paucity of national legislation banning non-medical consumption.  Most 
of the extant legislation was limited to regulating pharmacy sales.  Austria-Hungary and 
Italy, two countries that would attend the Shanghai commission that did not have Asian 
colonies, typified European drug policies during this period.  Austria-Hungary only had 
pharmacy regulations and no “special legislation” to control drugs with potential for abuse.187 
The American Consul in Rome similarly reported that “the use of opium in Italy is so 
insignificant that no special national or municipal laws governing its use have been 
enacted.”188 
The Shanghai Commission Puts Punishment on the International Agenda 
The opening of the International Opium Commission, 1 February 1909 at Shanghai’s 
Palace Hotel, marked a real achievement for the U.S. diplomatic campaign.  The State 
Department had succeeded in organizing the first international gathering about drug control.  
However, to Brent and Wright’s disappointment, the arriving representatives lacked the 
plenipotentiary powers necessary to frame binding legal agreements.  Still, the State 
Department pushed ahead, raising the Philippine policy as its model and putting on the 
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meeting agenda all types of non-medical drug use, not just the smoking of opium.189 Brent 
was elected chairman at the State Department’s request.190 
The American delegation proceeded to press for the elimination of all types of non-
medical opium use both in colonies and in the home territories of the assembled states.  
Wright read a telegram to the delegates from President Roosevelt calling for “the general 
suppression of the opium evil throughout the world.”191 The U.S. commissioners made it an 
article of faith that the non-medical use of opiates was “fraught with grave danger, if it is not 
actually vicious.”192 The other delegates quickly realized, as Wright recalled, that “the 
United States government and people stood for immediate and total prohibition of the misuse 
of opium.”193 But just in case anyone had missed U.S. intentions Brent took the podium after 
his election as chairman of the commission to tell delegates their job was to study “every 
phase of the opium question in their own territory, including the homeland.”194 
There was one major vulnerability in Washington’s position: the Philippine model of 
a punitive ban on non-medical drug use had not yet been introduced in the continental United 
States.  Thus U.S. policies differed between colony and metropole, as was the case with other 
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imperial powers.  Federal law allowed legal importation of raw opium and opium prepared 
for smoking and there were no stipulations about non-medical drug use.  Congress had 
approved two domestic measures in 1906, one year after intervening in the Philippine 
Commission’s drug policy, but neither approached the breadth of Philippine ban.  The first, 
the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act ordered proper labeling and removed some dangerous 
drugs from products labeled “pure.”195 The second, an act to regulate the practice of 
pharmacy in the District of Columbia, banned non-medical sales and ordered that addicts 
could receive cocaine, morphine, opium, or chloral hydrate only in the course of a cure and 
not as a part of addiction maintenance.196 
To obscure the gap between the U.S. diplomatic goal in Shanghai and the legislative 
reality in the continental United States, Secretary of State Elihu Root hastily drafted a simple 
bill that would provide the American delegates some political cover.  Root titled his bill with 
this foreign audience in mind.  It was, in Root’s description, “short enough to quote” and 
suggested a comprehensive ban: “An Act to Prohibit the Importation and Use of Opium for 
Other Than Medicinal Purposes.”  He informed key congressmen that passing the bill into 
law would allow the United States to avoid a “glass house” critique and “save our face in the 
Conference at Shanghai.”  Root used the phrase “save our face” repeatedly.197 President 
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Roosevelt quickly signed the bill into law on 9 February 1909 just as the Shanghai 
commission was settling into work.198 The law was much weaker than the title implied.  The 
constitutional limitation of the federal policing powers posed serious obstacles to raising a 
federal ban on drug use.  (As I explain in Chapter Four, it would take more than another 
decade to craft such a law.)  So Root wisely opted to ban just the importation of opium 
prepared for smoking.  The text of the law contained no provisions about opium consumption 
and crude opium could still be imported and prepared for smoking (by repeated boiling) 
without breaking a federal law.  Root’s focus on imports of opium prepared for smoking had 
assured a quick passage.  Opium smoking was widely considered a Chinese vice and, as the 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act had demonstrated, Chinese formed a vulnerable and unpopular 
political constituency in the United States.199 Further, Root reminded key congressmen that 
the Congress had already banned the importation of opium for non-medical purposes into the 
Philippine Islands (and Congress has the constitutional power to regulate U.S. imports).200 
Root’s bill served the American commissioners in Shanghai nicely.  Washington had 
assembled reluctant nations, aggressively widened the scope of the talks, and espoused a 
universalistic principle against non-medical drug use.  Such an expansive platform (and 
America’s comparatively minor share in the drug trade) gave the U.S. delegation good reason 
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to fear accusations of hypocrisy.  They hoped that Root’s bill would strengthen the basis of 
their standing by demonstrating good faith.  Wright played the law for all he could, 
announcing the misleadingly grand title and detailing the stiff penalties: a fine up to $5,000, 
up to two years in prison, or both.201 Despite the limited actual control imposed by the law, 
the American delegation reported to the State Department that the law demonstrated that the 
United States was “in line with the best thought in regard to the immorality of the use of 
opium except as a drug for purely medicinal purposes.”202 
The American delegates pressed their attack.  To be sure, Wright conceded states 
sovereignty.  But he also insisted upon establishing a principle against all non-medical drug 
use and railed against “opium abuse throughout the world.”203 He urged the delegates to 
raise a “uniform effort” to confine opium consumption of any type to “legitimate medical 
practice.”204 A formal U.S. proposal resolved that “the principle of the total prohibition” of 
opium smoking was “the right principle to be applied to all people,” and that governments 
should stamp “out the evil of opium smoking in the shortest possible time.”205 As for 
morphine, the American delegation argued that “strict International Agreements” were 
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needed to proscribe its “possible future abuse” because the drug was “indissolubly bound up 
with the abuse of opium itself.”206 Finally, the American delegation reached still further into 
the domestic policies of other nations by suggesting that they should cooperate “in the 
solution of their internal opium problems” and then meet for a follow-up international 
conference with plenipotentiary powers that would frame a binding treaty on the drug 
issue.207 
Differing views about what constituted modern governance largely guided the 
outcome of the commission.  Formal empire had created the geographical space and legal 
leeway (from constitutional constraints) for U.S. officials to forge a novel policy against drug 
use.  American officials interpreted their style of colonial administration in the Philippines as 
the vanguard of a progressive wave within global history.  Their late start to the colonial 
endeavor strengthened the feelings of U.S. officials that the American approach was in tune 
with modernity.  American diplomats envisioned the export of the punishment solution as the 
path of progress, with modernity displacing immorality.208 Other colonial powers defined 
modern governance differently.  European powers and Japan viewed greater regulation as the 
progressive approach.  Many officials held that the shift from private opium sellers to 
government-run shops or oversight offered a better approach to reducing opium smoking in 
the Asian colonies than punitive proscription.   
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The British led the resistance to the American approach regarding “traditional” drug 
use such as raw opium eating and opium smoking.  Cecil Clementi Smith, governor of the 
Straits Settlements (a British crown colony now part of Malaysia and Singapore), accused the 
Americans of reaching too far.  Smith noted that criminal proscription of non-medical opium 
use would lack popular support and produce a dysfunctional policy.  He felt that India 
offered a successful example of government regulation as “an efficient instrument in the 
prevention of abuse.”  Smith drew a battle line.  The British delegation, he announced, was 
“not able to accept the view that opium should be confined simply and solely to medical 
uses.”209 He had outlined the core of the British position that would last for almost forty 
years: opium eating in India was a culturally engrained and relatively harmless phenomenon, 
while opium smoking “should be done away with” but in a practical manner fitted to local 
conditions.210 
To the dismay of the Americans other delegations, including the Chinese, the 
Japanese, and the Dutch, generally endorsed Smith’s arguments about colonial policies 
regarding “traditional” drug use.  The Chinese delegation, led by Duan Fang, was proud of 
the advances made against opium production and consumption following the 1906 imperial 
edict that sought to eliminate both within ten years.  The delegation was not convinced that 
an immediate total ban on smoking would be a wise course.  Rather, Duan announced that 
China hoped to register all users in order to “learn the number of persons suffering from the 
habit” and then close the opium shops “concurrently with the abandonment of the opium 
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habit.”211 The Japanese defended their policy for Taiwan, which was designed so that addicts 
could “break off their habit with [the] least inconvenience to themselves.”212 The Dutch 
advocated for their régie system (a highly regimented government monopoly) and presented 
samples of their special opium packaging designed to shrink the black market, while 
affirming that they would check “the consumption of opium gradually and continually by all 
available means.”213 
Brent and Wright could not extract from delegates lacking plenipotentiary powers 
resolutions with the necessary teeth to enforce a ban.  Still, the U.S. offensive hardened the 
tone of the final resolutions, which incorporated the language of proscription.  Taken 
together, the resolutions anticipated the eventual criminalization of non-medical drug 
consumption.  The commission resolved that each government should: “take measures for the 
gradual suppression of the practice of opium smoking in its own territories and possessions, 
with due regard to the varying circumstances of each country concerned.”214 While not a 
ringing endorsement of proscription, this nonetheless established a principled stand against 
the opium pipe.  Another resolution addressed other types of non-medical drug use: non-
medical opium use was “a matter for prohibition or for careful regulation,” and drug policies 
should aim, “as opportunity offers, at progressively increasing stringency.”  The resolution 
recognized the “wide variation” among countries, but promoted a move toward uniform 
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policies by urging governments to re-examine “their systems of regulation in the light of the 
experience of other countries with the same problem.”215 
The U.S. delegation made headway on other fronts.  The commission addressed 
morphine injection in a manner that promised future progress for the Americans.  The British 
delegation had introduced a resolution on morphine, which the Americans accepted after the 
British agreed to expand the scope of the resolution from China and the people of the Far 
East to a universal application.  The commission resolved that “drastic measures” were 
needed immediately to stem the spread of this “grave danger.”216 Other resolutions aimed to 
restrict opium use in China.  One lauded China’s efforts to limit non-medical opium use.  
Another suggested that all the governments with concessions or settlements in China close 
the opium “divans” as soon as possible, limit the trade in so-called opium addiction remedies 
in China, and apply national pharmacy laws to national subjects in consular districts, 
concessions, and settlements in China.217 
The U.S. delegates recognized they had made a promising start.  The American 
universalistic stand against non-medical drug use was embedded in the final resolutions, 
which anticipated an eventual global ban.  Wright praised the resolutions registering “a 
practical condemnation of the illiberal use of opium even in India.”218 He was also gratified 
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that other nations had accepted at least in principle the need for “drastic measures for the 
suppression of the morphine habit and the gradual suppression of opium smoking.”219 
Part II. Breaking Through on Manufactured Drugs 
 
The United States carried its case to Europe, seeking to turn the vague Shanghai 
commitments into something more ironclad.  Meeting in the Netherlands, in the winter of 
1911-1912, thirteen nations agreed to ban the non-medical use of manufactured drugs such as 
morphine and cocaine.  This breakthrough would have a wide impact on national drug 
legislation when the treaty finally came into general application after the First World War.  
However, European, Japanese, and Chinese governments remained unwilling to trade their 
established policies regarding “traditional” drug use for the punitive approach that 
Washington cast as progressive. 
 
From Shanghai to The Hague: America’s Second Attempt 
 
At the close of the Shanghai commission Brent was eager for another international 
conference to build on the Shanghai success.  He thus cabled the State Department before 
heading for an evening at an inspiring anti-opium play at the Chinese theatre.220 Four months 
later he and Wright would be organizing a second international drug control gathering.  In 
Brent’s estimation, the United States had “assumed leadership in a big moral question.”221 
There was no question of abandoning the campaign. 
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With the continued backing of the State Department Brent and Wright immediately 
began to plan for another gathering.  Brent selected The Hague, in the Netherlands, as the 
venue because he felt that a gathering in Europe would draw important delegates, rather than 
“men of no weight who happen to be on the spot,” as he had encountered in Shanghai.  He 
pictured a conference attended by delegates from all of the countries that had been 
represented at the Shanghai commission, but this time enjoying full plenipotentiary powers to 
forge international law.  He also hoped that scientific experts would attend and issue an 
“authoritative scientific pronunciamento” that would proscribe any non-medical drug use.222 
Wright shared the vision, but was less interested in scientific inquiry.  He thought it was 
“recognized pretty generally over the world now that, in spite of the fact that there is no 
International Report on the scientific aspects of the uses of opium and anti-opium remedies, 
that the excessive use of these drugs is morally, economically and otherwise unsound.”223 He 
wanted to focus instead on expanding prohibition to include all drugs with potential for 
abuse.  He thus sought to head off drug users shifting from one prohibited substance to 
another.  He was convinced that “where the use of opium and morphia was suppressed, 
cocaine, India hemp [cannabis], and other habit-forming drugs tended to take their place.”224 
Organizing a second conference proved to be more difficult and time-consuming than 
the first attempt.  The State Department spent two years—from September of 1909 to 
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September of 1911—requesting, cajoling, and prodding the invited countries to assemble at 
The Hague.225 The delegations assembled at Shanghai had already collectively dismissed the 
American proposal for a follow-up meeting.226 The disinclination for a conference remained 
after the State Department issued a round of invitations for a second gathering.  The British, 
who were probably the most important participants due to their expansive empire and opium 
trade agreements with China, allowed a year to pass before responding to Washington’s 
query.227 The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ response was also cool.  However, the 
ministry was willing to entertain a “study” of the “proper measures to bring about the gradual
suppression of the production and the use of opium.”228 
After finally winning the consent of major powers, the years of planning culminated 
with just two months of meetings at The Hague from December 1911 to January 1912.  
Brent, who served as the chief, and Wright, who continued to apply his views tenaciously, 
comprised the American delegation, along with a California physician named Henry J. 
Finger, who added little.  Delegates from eleven other countries attended (China, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia, and Siam) 
while two countries declined the U.S. invitation (Austria-Hungary and Turkey).229 
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The U.S. delegation shrewdly reached out to incorporate the concerns of others.  The 
Americans would again push for a ban on all non-medical drug use, but they initially 
suggested that other delegations request discussions regarding limitations on the use of 
morphine, coca products, and cannabis, as well as opium smoking (carrying forward the 
difficult subject of the talks at Shanghai).  This approach worked nicely as the British wished 
to discuss morphine and cocaine, both of which were a growing concern in India, and the 
Italians desired an agreement on cannabis, which was worrying Rome.230 These concerns of 
course advanced Wright’s interest in closing loopholes. 
The U.S. efforts were rewarded with a real breakthrough regarding manufactured 
drug use.  The final treaty, signed in January 1912, forbade non-medical consumption of 
manufactured drugs such as morphine and cocaine.  This ironclad stipulation far surpassed 
the Shanghai Commission’s vague resolutions.  Signatories agreed without qualification to 
“enact pharmacy laws or regulations to limit exclusively to medical and legitimate purposes” 
the use of morphine, cocaine, or any derivatives, such as heroin.231 The desire to ban non-
medical consumption of these drugs overwhelmed the customary defense based on rights of 
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national sovereignty.232 Once put into force, the Hague Opium Convention granted only six 
months for countries to proscribe the non-medical use of manufactured drugs.  Delegations 
also agreed to “co-operate with one another to prevent the use of these drugs” for any non-
medical purpose.233 
However, the American delegation continued to face resistance to banning 
“traditional” drug use.  Already at Shanghai, J.B. Brunyate, acting Financial Secretary to the 
Government of India, had defended Indians’ traditional use of opium “in addition to its use as 
an indulgence.”234 The British continued to oppose tough restrictions on raw opium, still 
protective of the cultural and economic practices in India.235 They held that India already 
had effective regulations “endeavoring to reduce consumption” to legitimate needs.236 The 
final agreement imposed some restrictions on raw opium production and distribution but did 
not tackle the issue of consumption and thus posed little threat to the status quo in India 
regarding domestic opium use.237 The U.S. delegation had also introduced a stiff measure 
against opium smoking only to see it weakened so that it did not add teeth to the hortatory 
Shanghai resolution.  Signatories were to adopt policies for the “gradual and effective 
 
232 In addition to the British, the German delegation was also hesitant to cede sovereign control over drug 
imports and consumption rules see, for example, “Minutes from the Twentieth Plenary Session,” 16 January 
1912, Brent Papers, box 38, file: Correspondence on Opium, 1860-1931, 3. 
 
233 See article 9 of chapter 3. Additionally, article 11 of chapter 3 ordered that countries adopt policies to bar the 
“delivery” within their borders of manufactured drugs “to any unauthorized person.”  
 
234 See Report of the International Opium Commission, 24; and “International Opium Commission, Shanghai,” 
n.d., NA, RG 43, entry 39, box 2, 4.  
 
235 “Minutes from the Twentieth Plenary Session,” 16 January 1912, Brent Papers, box 38, file: Correspondence 
on Opium, 1860-1931, 3. 
 
236 Appendix I, Report of the British Delegates to the International Opium Conference Held at The Hague, 
December 1911-January 1912, NA, RG 43, entry 41, box 1, file: Second International Opium Conference: 
Dominica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Greece, Great Britain, France, 28-30. 
 
237 See chapter 1 of the International Opium Convention.  
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suppression” of opium smoking “with due regard to the varying circumstances of each 
country concerned.”238 While vague, this statement confirmed the Shanghai Commission’s 
general affirmation that opium smoking was doomed to eventual criminalization.  At the core 
of the British resistance to the American approach was sense that “repressive measures” had 
to suit the local circumstances.239 The Chinese delegation also remained wary of an 
immediate ban on opium smoking.240 Cannabis control was also delayed, as the convention 
had settled upon calling for further study.241 
Why did the Americans succeed in banning the non-medical use of manufactured 
drugs but not “traditional” drug use in colonial possessions?  Certainly revenue produced 
from colonial opium sales was a factor.  The American model also proved most attractive to 
other governments in relation to drugs that were quintessentially “modern.”  Manufactured 
drugs were linked to technological progress both through their genesis in the laboratory and 
their industrial manufacture in the early twentieth century.  As historian Timothy Hickman 
notes, U.S. addiction experts in the early twentieth century considered manufactured opiates 
as “a product of modern medical technology that, rather than fulfilling optimistic predictions 
of a world made better by science, turned its human subjects into the slaves of human 
 
238 See article 6 of chapter 2. On the stiff U.S. proposal see Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics 
Traffic, 101.  
 
239 Report of the British Delegates to the International Opium Conference Held at The Hague, December 1911-
January 1912, n.d., NA, RG 43, entry 41, box 1, file: Second International Opium Conference: Dominica, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Greece, Great Britain, France, 23.  
 
240 “Minutes from the Twentieth Plenary Session,” 16 January 1912, Brent Papers, box 38, file: Correspondence 
on Opium, 1860-1931. 
 
241 See the discussion in Secretariat of the League of Nations, “Final Protocol of the International Opium 
Conference,” 3 April 1923, League of Nations Archive, Geneva, Switzerland (hereafter LONA), O.C. 1(1), 34. 
 
89
discoveries.”242 This perception that manufactured drugs posed an essentially modern threat 
helps to clarify the seemingly bifurcated stance of imperial powers such as Britain that 
accepted proscription for manufactured drugs while defending “traditional” drug use.  Opium 
eating and smoking by colonial subjects was somehow “timeless” and a natural state of 
affairs.243 In contrast, morphine, heroin, and cocaine were part and parcel of industrial 
advancement, necessitating special controls for social protection.  Brent and Wright also 
crafted their arguments to strengthen the sense that advanced nations must adopt the 
“modern” approach toward the new drugs.   
The stand against non-medical consumption of manufactured drugs was the second 
major U.S. diplomatic success.  During the conference Wright had boasted to Roosevelt that 
it had “been through steady pressure exerted by this Government since 1906 that the many 
Governments have enacted new and in some cases vigorous legislation for the suppression of 
local opium evils.”244 The Hague Opium Convention promised to widen the campaign by 
banning the non-medical use of manufactured drugs.  The treaty did not spell out 
punishment, but rather exhorted parties to consider “making it a penal offense to be in illegal 
possession” of all the drugs under consideration.245 The British delegation felt that the 
 
242 Timothy A. Hickman, “‘Mania Americana,’: Narcotic Addiction and Modernity in the United States, 1870-
1920,” Journal of American History 90 (March 2004): 1274.  
 
243 Impartial studies of the danger associated with different drugs and styles of ingestion were rare. There is an 
argument (growing in stature in recent studies) that these “traditional” types of use were not particularly 
harmful (especially in comparison with manufactured drugs) and that the British did well to resist a rush to 
proscribe them. See, for example, John F. Richards, “Opium and the British Indian Empire: The Royal 
Commission of 1895,” Modern Asian Studies 36 (May 2002): 375-420.  
 
244 Wright to Roosevelt, 31 December 1912, NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1.  
 
245 See article 20-21 of chapter 5. Governments would be able to track each other’s progress, due to their 
agreement to share the texts of their existing laws and provide statistical reports on their drug trade. Such efforts 
continued and expanded the sort of data collection begun by the State Department in preparation for the 
Shanghai commission.  
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convention was a landmark and predicted internal bans on non-medical possession of 
manufactured drugs in China and India.246 As we shall see in Chapter Four, the Hague 
Opium Convention would have worldwide impact on drug legislation.  Legal opium smoking 
and eating in colonies were to become exceptions to the advancing criminalization of drug 
use.  The U.S. delegation looked to a promising future.  
The fly in the Hague ointment was the onerous ratification process.  The convention 
required the ratification of all the powers of Europe and the Americas.247 Hague delegates 
had intentionally inserted such a difficult standard because they were worried about losing 
their nations’ profitable shares of drug production and manufacturing business and wanted to 
make sure all who profited suffered equally.  Countries with major drug manufacturing 
interests, especially Germany, did not relish the prospect of delivering the business to non-
signatory nations.248 Enactment efforts thus dragged on for years (and through two more 
international conventions at The Hague organized to promulgate ratification) until 
 
246 Report of the British Delegates to the International Opium Conference Held at The Hague, December 1911-
January 1912, NA, RG 43, entry 41, box 1, file: Second International Opium Conference: Dominica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Greece, Great Britain, France, 25-26; Also available as British Delegates to International Opium 
Conference to Sir Edward Grey, 10 April 1912, reproduced in Foreign Office, The Opium Trade, 1910-1941,
vol. 2 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1974), pt. 5: 79-114.    
 
247 Article 24 of Chapter 6. The original signatories of the Convention on 23 January 1912 were Germany, 
United States of America, China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Russia and 
Siam; Great Britain later that year. Wright provided a insider’s account in his letter to Low, 19 April 1913, NA, 
RG 43, entry 36, box 1. 
 
248 Report of the British Delegates to the International Opium Conference Held at The Hague, December 1911-
January 1912, NA, RG 43, entry 41, box 1, file: Second International Opium Conference: Dominica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Greece, Great Britain, France, 26. H. Richard Friman offers an in depth assessment of Germany’s 
views toward the Hague convention, particularly about the financial implications regarding drug manufacturing 
in NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 15-34.   
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completely losing steam as the First World War absorbed all available diplomatic and 
political energy.249 
The Hague Opium Convention finally came into general force with the conclusion of 
the war.  The Americans and British, with Chinese support, incorporated the convention in 
the peace treaties with the defeated Central Powers.250 The principle against non-medical 
drug use, which had been generally affirmed at Shanghai in 1909 and strengthened at The 
Hague, was then ensconced in an international law.  Signatories now had a formal obligation 
to control the consumption of manufactured drugs.  The Americans did not rest on their 
laurels.  They pressed ahead in their campaign.  
 
Part III. The Continued Impasse over “Traditional” Drug Use 
Though he would not live to see it, President Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a League 
of Nations became a white marble reality on a wooded bluff overlooking the magnificent 
Lake Geneva.  The Covenant of the League of Nations appointed the League responsible for 
the management of the Hague Opium Convention and the initial League gatherings set to 
work on the drug issue.  The first League Assembly voted in 1920 to create an Opium 
Advisory Committee, which would be a quarterly (and later an annual) gathering of 
governmental representatives.  An Opium Section also emerged, staffed by League 
 
249 The Dutch government gained the administrative tasks associated with the convention.  For coverage of 
follow-up gatherings see Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 110-20; and Willoughby, 
Opium as an International Problem, 34-43. 
 
250 The relevant clauses were: Article 295 of the peace treaty with Germany (Versailles), Article 247 of the 
treaty with Austria (Saint-Germain), Article 230 of the treaty with Hungary (Trianon), Article 174 of the treaty 
with Bulgaria (Neuilly), Article 280 of the treaty with Turkey (Sévres), all cited in McAllister, Drug Diplomacy 
in the Twentieth Century, 35n44. Also see Sir William Meyer, “General Supervision over the Execution of 
Agreements with Regard to the Traffic in Opium in Accordance with Article XXIII of the Covenant,” 14 
December 1920, LONA, R.706, 12a/9674/1717, 4; Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 141-
45. 
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employees, to provide administrative oversight and a supranational perspective.251 A Mixed 
Sub-Committee (comprised of members of the League’s Health Committee and the Opium 
Advisory Committee) formed to examine medical questions.  As the League became the 
center of anti-drug diplomacy during the interwar period, Washington’s interest in drug 
control trumped its uncooperative stance toward the world organization.  Americans tried to 
use the League but found themselves stalemated there over banning “traditional” drug use. 
The stalemate developed in the 1920s and continued through the 1930s.  Two new 
generations of U.S. diplomats would remain committed despite frustrations, proving that the 
U.S. campaign could withstand a political shift in the White House. 
 
Hitting a Wall at Geneva 
 
The U.S. Congress’s 1919 rejection of the League meant that American officials 
found themselves temporarily estranged from international drug control talks after more than 
a decade of leadership.  Ironically Henry Cabot Lodge, who had assisted with Philippine drug 
control, led the congressional opposition to joining the League.  The Opium Advisory 
Committee forged ahead without American representatives.  With the assistance of the 
Opium Section, the committee prepared to assume authority and, perhaps, steer in new 
directions.  A fact-finding mission was the committee’s first step.  The committee sent 
questionnaires about the drug issue to governments around the globe.   
As discussions in Geneva began to frame international schemes to better control 
dangerous drugs, Washington’s interest in drug control began to outweigh the political 
 
251 The official title of the Opium Section was the Opium and Social Questions Section. League Secretary 
General Eric Drummond suggested in February 1920 that the drug issue be organized like the section on the 
Traffic in Women and Children, which came under the same article of the covenant. See Drummond, “Memo 
Suggesting Organization of the LON Opium Committee,” 5 February 1920, LONA, R.706, 12/2931/1717; and 
McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 44-45. Also see League of Nations Advisory Committee 
on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (hereafter OAC), “Report of the Fifth Committee of the 
Assembly,” 24 September 1921, LONA, A.143(a).1921, R.707, 12a/16130/1717, 1. 
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aversion to cooperating with the League.  In 1923—after three years of U.S. detachment 
from the League’s emerging drug control efforts—President Warren G. Harding and 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes found an appropriately low-key way for the United 
States to rejoin the international movement.252 They sent Rupert Blue, the U.S. Surgeon 
General and public health advocate, to Geneva to serve as an official observer beginning with 
the Opium Advisory Committee’s fourth session in January 1923.  His instructions from 
Hughes were to reassert the U.S. positions staked out in Shanghai and at The Hague.  Hughes 
wanted the issue of non-medical drug use addressed during the Opium Advisory 
Committee’s sessions.253 
Blue was the first member of a new U.S. diplomatic team to arrive at Geneva.  Brent 
remained engaged but yielded the spotlight to Stephen Porter [R-PA], who was Chairman of 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.  Porter reintroduced to the U.S. delegation the 
sense of indignation and the grandstanding tactics that had been lost with Hamilton Wright’s 
death in the First World War (from injuries sustained during an auto accident).  Porter would 
be the new star but Wright’s widow, Elizabeth, also worked to advance the American agenda 
and vied for official and public recognition.254 She began as an assessor at the League’s 
Opium Advisory Committee in 1923 and continued with anti-drug diplomacy becoming the 
first woman in American history to receive plenipotentiary powers. 
 
252 Taylor offers a detailed discussion of U.S. cooperation with the League of Nations in American Diplomacy 
and the Narcotics Traffic, 146-70. Also see Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem, 123-38.  
 
253 Hughes to Blue, 24 March 1923, NA, Record Group 90, Records of the Public Health Service, 1912-1968, 
Central File, 1897-1923 (hereafter RG 90), file 2123, box 206, folder: 1923. 
 
254 Edwin R. Neville of the State Department also arrived for the May 1923 session of the Opium Advisory 
Committee. Elizabeth Wright was contacting the Under Secretary-General of the League, Inazo Nitobe, and 
urging U.S.-style drug policies from the outset. See Wright to Nitobe, 25 August 1920, LONA, R.706, 12/6526/ 
1717. 
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As a team, the Americans sought an unqualified commitment that any use of opium 
“for other than medical and scientific purposes is an abuse and not legitimate,” and that illicit 
opium smoking would be punished.255 Like Blue, these Americans sat as “observers” 
because the United States was not a member of the League but, regardless of status, they 
asserted a familiar goal.  Blue focused League discussions on eliminating “traditional” drug 
use.  He dismissed talk of “semi-medical” use, a phrase that had been gaining in popularity in 
relation to opium eating in India.  He prompted the Opium Advisory Committee to attempt to 
define legitimate needs for drugs.256 Blue also guided the Mixed Sub-Committee to resolve 
that “all non-medical use should be recognized as an abuse” and that the use of opium as a 
stimulant “could not be considered legitimate even in tropical countries.”257 Porter stuck to a 
strict interpretation of the intent of the Hague Opium Convention.  He argued that that treaty 
had already affirmed an international consensus against non-medical drug use.  Thus it 
should be a matter of course to now add “traditional” use to the prohibition.  Brent stuck with 
sermon-like statements.  He asked: “Why in a colony one law in matters of science and 
morals for the citizens of the mother country and another for the natives?”258 
255 Porter to Bourgois, 24 May 1923; Blue to Cumming, 15 June 1923, both in NA, RG 90, file 2123, box 206, 
folder 1922; OAC, “Report on the Fifth Session of the OAC, May 1923,” LONA, O.C. 492, Col.307, 
12a/28791/10346, 8.  
 
256 See Blue to Crowdy, 23 January 1923, RG 90, file 2123, box 206, folder: 1923; and Hughes to Blue, 24 
March 1923, NA, RG 90, file 2123, box 206, folder: 1923. 
 
257 Blue noted the “tropics” in a letter to Andrew W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, 16 January 1923. Also 
see Blue to Hughes, 26 March 1923; Blue to Crowdy, 27 February 1923; all three in NA, RG 90, file 2123, box 
206, folder: 1923; OAC, “Report on the Discussions of the Mixed Sub-Committee,” 9 January 1923, LONA, 
O.C. 86(Annex Z), Col.307, 12a/28791/10346, 3; and McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century,
46-53.   
258 OAC, “Speech Delivered by Bishop Brent on May 25, 1923, to the Advisory Committee,” LONA, R.708, 
12a/28567/1717.  
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The American barrage triggered a push back from states committed to defending the 
legality of “traditional” drug use.  The representatives of France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Siam all dissented on opium smoking in the colonies.  
It was legitimate as long as it was regulated in accordance with the Hague Opium 
Convention’s stipulations for gradual suppression based on local conditions.  John Campbell, 
the representative of the Indian government, added that raw opium eating was “not 
illegitimate” under the convention.259 The British proposed that sovereign governments 
“decide what is or is not” medical or scientific use (only to see the proposal voted down).260 
The Bolivian government added a defense of another “traditional” drug to the discussion by 
warning that banning the use of coca would be ill advised as coca-chewing was entirely 
different from cocaine use.  Bolivia suggested an in-depth international study to head off any 
rash pronouncements.261 
Porter responded in a tone more suited to the floor of the U.S. Congress than the halls 
of the League of Nations.  He laid down an ultimatum.  He found it unconscionable that 
countries were unwilling to strengthen the Hague Opium Convention’s anti-consumption 
measures.  Worse, it seemed to Porter that other delegates wished to dismantle the extant 
controls, unsatisfied with the numerous available loopholes and qualifications.  He conceded 
that sovereignty was an important consideration.  “The internal affairs of other nations are 
 
259 OAC, “Report on the Fifth Session of the OAC, May 1923,” LONA, O.C. 492, Col.307, 12a/28791/10346, 
8. 
 
260 The British proposals are reproduced in reproduced in Blue to Cumming, 15 June 1923, NA, RG 90, file 
2123, box 206, folder 1922. There is evidence that the British Foreign office was amendable to the “complete 
suppression of opium smoking” but needed to defer to the Colonial Office. See, for example, Waterlaw to 
Delevingne, 1 August 1924, reproduced in Foreign Office, The Opium Trade, 1910-1941, vol. 5 (Wilmington: 
Scholarly Resources, 1974), pt. 21: 16-17. 
 
261 OAC, “Letter from the Bolivian Government on the Coca Industry and the Preparation of Cocaine,” 28 
August 1923, LONA, O.C. 158, R.747, 12a/28369x/18661.  
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their own concern.”  However, he found it “most unwise” to “admit that the domestic usages 
of any particular State are legitimate under the Convention.”  Sovereignty could not engender 
a “special privilege.”262 Porter continued, as politely as possible, that “it would seem quite 
undesirable to pass upon the legitimacy” of the kind of opium use that was widespread in 
India.  And he concluded that if the other powers were unwilling to even approximate the 
intent of the Hague Opium Convention, that he would lead the U.S. delegation back to 
Washington.263 
Porter’s fireworks prompted a scheme to keep the Americans engaged.  The threat of 
the U.S. walkout alarmed League officials because they favored more, not less, U.S. 
participation in the fledging world organization.  Other delegations were also wary.  Most 
had endorsed much of the American program, not just in Geneva in 1923 but also at the 1909 
Shanghai and 1911-1912 Hague gatherings.  The crux of contention was not the overall 
thrust of the U.S. proposals but their application to colonial territories.  Therefore, the plan to 
assuage Porter involved keeping the Americans at task while excluding them from talks 
about colonial policy.  On a British suggestion, the Opium Advisory Committee called for 
two new conferences.264 The first would address opium smoking and be attended only by 
governments that still allowed smoking, thereby excluding the Americans.265 The Americans 
 
262 OAC, “Note from the American Delegation Regarding Reservations Made by the Members of the Advisory 
Committee,” 5 June 1923, LONA, O.C. 141, R.708, 12a/28745/1717. Also see OAC, “Observations of the 
United States Representatives on the Resolution Adopted by the Advisory Committee on June 5, 1923,” 6 June 
1923, LONA, O.C. 143, R.708, 12a/28745/1717. 
 
263 OAC, “Note from the American Delegation Regarding Reservations Made by the Members of the Advisory 
Committee,” 5 June 1923, LONA, O.C. 141, R.708, 12a/28745/1717. 
 
264 My account of the Geneva conventions underscores the consumption angle.  For broader assessments, 
especially about drug production and trade see McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 51, 57-
78; and Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University who served 
as a counselor and expert to the Chinese delegation and penned Opium as an International Problem: The 
Geneva Conferences.
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would be invited to the second conference, which would examine ways to better control 
manufactured drugs (already barred from non-medical consumption by the Hague Opium 
Convention).  In a nod to the Americans, the Opium Advisory Committee suggested that this 
conference could consider endorsing uniform penalties for legal infractions, including opium 
use outside of government regulations.266 To further placate the Americans, the committee 
agreed to rush the schedule for the two conferences.  The League Assembly issued 
resolutions in September of 1923 suggesting that the two conferences should convene 
consecutively and as soon as possible.267 
The plan was terrible and the Americans ignored it.  The first convention, convened 
in November of 1924, quickly ground to a halt on the issues of registering opium smokers 
and establishing uniform amounts for consumption, prices, and penalties for infractions.  
Watching from outside the proceedings, Brent lamented that they had left “the substance of 
the problem untouched.”268 Due to the rushed timeline of the two conferences, the second 
convention assembled before the first convention had reached a conclusion.  Porter arrived at 
the second convention and issued a call for a comprehensive and punitive ban including 
opium smoking.  Thus, the ruse to box in Porter produced a deadlock, with the two 
conferences in an uproar about their competencies.  The plan had misread not only Porter but 
 
265 Aside from China, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Japan, Portugal, India, Siam received invitations 
because they had “territories in which the use of prepared opium is temporarily continued under the provisions 
of Chapter II of the Convention,” see Crowdy to Blue, 4 February 1924, LONA, R.775, 12a/32737/24297.  
 
266 OAC, “Report on the Fifth Session of the OAC, May 1923,” LONA, O.C. 492, Col.307, 12a/28791/10346, 
22. There was also a growing trend to push for more serious penalties for traffickers, especially in replacing 
fines with imprisonment. See OAC, “Resolutions Adopted by the Committee,” 7 June 1923, LONA, O.C. 145, 
R.708, 12a/28745/1717, 1-4. 
 
267 The Committee on Traffic in Opium of the Foreign Policy Association, “International Control of the Traffic 
in Opium,” May 1925, reproduced in Gerald N. Grob, ed., Narcotic Addiction and American Foreign Policy: 
Seven Studies, 1924-1938 (New York: Arno Press, 1981), 5-6. 
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also the tenor of the U.S. Congress, which had provided public instructions to the American 
delegates: only scientific and medical use of any drugs was acceptable (and production of 
opium and coca had to be limited to medical and scientific requirements).269 
The conventions attempted to regain headway but the controversy over “traditional” 
drug use would not yield.  To move forward, a joint committee convened with eight 
delegates from the two conferences.  The Americans stuck to their tough stance, proposing 
that each nation make it a penal offense to be in illegal possession of controlled opiates, 
cocaine, and coca leaves and agree to prosecute their own citizens who had illegally 
possessed or consumed drugs in other countries.270 Porter continued to call for a ban on 
opium smoking, depicting any less as a breach of the Hague Opium Convention.271 “What is 
forbidden and punished with severity in Western lands,” he asserted, “must not be excused 
and defended and promoted in the East.”272 Congress’s instructions offered a ten-year limit 
on legal opium smoking in the countries that were “gradually suppressing” the habit.  In 
contrast, the Dutch and the British argued against an immediate ban on opium smoking and 
eating; it would simply foster criminal behavior until smuggling was eradicated.273 The 
 
269 For the instructions see resolution dated 15 May 1924, NA, RG 350, entry 5, box 846, file 15541-74.  
 
270 U.S Delegation, “International Control of the Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs, Fourth International 
Conference,” November 1924, LONA, O.D.C. 34, R.787, 12a/40639/37887. On coca leaves see article 20 in the 
U.S. draft proposals in Second Opium Conference, “Report of Subcommittee E,” 28 January 1925, LONA, 
O.D.C./S.C.E. 5, R.789, 12a/41120/37887. Also see Second Opium Conference, “Verbatim Record of the 
Plenary Meetings, Thirteenth Meeting,” 8 December 1924, LONA, R.794, 12a/40524/39417. 
 
271 Second Opium Conference, “Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, Twentieth Meeting,” 20 January 
1925, LONA, R. 794, 12a/40524/39417, 9-10. 
 
272 Second Opium Conference, “Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, Fourteenth Meeting,” 12 December 
1924, LONA, R.794, 12a/40524/39417, 8.  
 
273 British colonial authorities had advised Delevingne against accepting a ban on non-medical opium use, but 
the British were willing to accept registration. The Foreign Office was bound to support the Indian positions 
despite the sense that reform was inevitable. See First Opium Conference, “Proposal Submitted by the British 
Delegation,” n.d., LONA, C.O.P. 38, R.776, 12a/404840/28626. The debates can be followed in Second Opium 
Conference, “Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, Twenty-Second Meeting,” LONA, R.794, 
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Dutch mentioned the continuing opium use in the Philippines as an example (distressing 
Porter greatly).274 Delegates also favored the registration of opium smokers and a 
government monopoly, which they considered a more efficacious policy.  The Japanese 
delegate, Sagataro Kaku asserted that, due to “inveterate” smokers, immediate total 
suppression of opium smoking would be not be humanitarian.  Such a step, he warned, would 
turn smokers into “narcotic addicts,” as people would turn from the pipe to hypodermic 
needles, which were easier to conceal.275 The Bolivian delegate, Arturo Pinto Escalier, 
offered a third objection to the American approach.  He dismissed the convention’s right to 
ban coca chewing, a habit that he defended as “perfectly innocuous.”276 Putting these 
objections together, the Indian delegate issued a general dismissal of the American attempt to 
“question the right of each country to control its own domestic consumption.”  This was 
“idealism pure and simple” and likely to lead “into a morass.”277 
12a/40524/39417. Also see McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 62, 70-76; The Committee 
on Traffic In Opium of the Foreign Policy Association, “International Control of the Traffic in Opium,” in 
Grob, Narcotic Addiction and American Foreign Policy, 7-9. 
 
274 The Dutch had provided an in-depth discussion of their government opium monopoly for the benefit of the 
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Continued sparring led Porter to follow through on his threat.  He ridiculed the call to 
delay a ban on “traditional” drug use until smuggling was eradicated.  “Smuggling is a crime 
like homicide,” he announced, “crimes have existed for centuries, and it is likely that they 
will exist for centuries to come.”278 He countered the call for the registration of opium 
smokers within government monopolies with a revisionist telling of the history of American 
drug control in the Philippines, asserting that President Roosevelt said that opium smoking 
“must stop, and it did stop.”279 The U.S. delegation offered a concession of an additional five 
years to their proposed ten-year deadline to criminalize opium smoking.280 The British 
insisted that the countdown to an ultimate ban on “traditional” opium use begin when 
smuggling was no longer a concern.  Brent was shocked by the animosity of the exchanges 
but nevertheless stiffened his tone.  “Shall we try to make a compact with an evil, or shall we 
declare of war of extermination upon it in terms that admit of no compromise?”281 Porter 
reached his limit.  He announced that Washington would abide by the principles of the 
 
defending opium use in British India in Second Opium Conference, “Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, 
Twenty-Seventh Meeting,” 7 February 1925, LONA, R.794, 12a/40524/39417. 
278 Second Opium Conference, “Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, Twentieth Meeting,” 20 January 
1925, LONA, R.794, 12a/40524/39417, 7.  
 
279 The Dutch delegation asked for an update on the seizure statistics. See Second Opium Conference, 
“Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, Twentieth Meeting,” 20 January 1925, LONA, R.794, 
12a/40524/39417, 5.  
 
280 The ten-year deadline is noted in Second Opium Conference, “Proposals Submitted by the Delegation for the 
United States of America,” 24 January 1925, LONA, O.C.S.D. 1, R.777, 12a/41905/28626. The Portuguese 
delegation offered insights on the five-year extension in Second Opium Conference, Committee of Sixteen, 
“Statement by the Portuguese Delegation,” 3 February 1925, LONA, O.C.S. 8, R.777, 12a/42041/28626. Also 
see Porter’s comments in Second Opium Conference, Committee of Sixteen, “Verbatim Report of the Third 
Meeting,” 3 February 1925, LONA, R.77, 12a/4197X/28626. 
 
281 Second Opium Conference, “Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, Tenth Meeting,” 28 November 
1924, LONA, R.794, 12a/ 40524/39417, 12-13.  
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Shanghai commission and the stipulations of the Hague Opium Convention and led the 
Americans out of the talks.282 
The new U.S. team had failed to broaden the ban asserted in the Hague convention.  
The chief delegate for the Dutch opined: “it was precisely the points on which it was 
impossible to reach an agreement which formed the essential part of the American 
proposals.”283 Yet the Americans had deepened their verbal attack on “traditional” drug use.  
The Japanese delegation concluded that the U.S. suggestions “concerning the abolition of the 
use of opium for smoking” had yet to be “unanimously adopted, but everyone is agreed as to 
its great moral significance, which no civilised nation worthy of the name will dare to 
deny.”284 
Removed from the Geneva conferences, Washington could only watch while 
delegates produced two treaties in February 1925 that would shape international policy.  The 
treaties made negligible advances regarding non-medical use (though they reached important 
agreements about limiting the production, manufacture, and trade of dangerous drugs).  
Ultimately, the First Geneva Convention included the British proposal to begin a fifteen-year 
countdown to the end of legal opium smoking after opium production and distribution was 
 
282 The Chinese delegation also abandoned the conference in the wake of the American departure. See Second 
Opium Conference, “Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, Twenty-Sixth Meeting,” 7 February 1925, 
R.794, 12a/40524/39417; the Committee on Traffic In Opium of the Foreign Policy Association, “International 
Control of the Traffic in Opium,” in Grob, Narcotic Addiction and American Foreign Policy, 8-9; and Chinese 
Delegation to the First Opium Conference, “Letter to the President of the First Opium Conference,” 10 February 
1925, LONA, C.O.P. 55, R.777, 12a/42255/28626.  
 
283 Cited in the Committee on Traffic In Opium of the Foreign Policy Association, “International Control of the 
Traffic in Opium,” in Grob, Narcotic Addiction and American Foreign Policy, 15. 
 
284 Second Opium Conference, Committee of Sixteen, “Verbatim Record of the Fourth Meeting” 6 February 
1925, LONA, R.77, 12a/4197X/28626, 1.  
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sufficiently controlled.285 Other measures in the treaty accelerated the trend of reform 
already underway in Asia, including replacing opium farms with government monopolies 
staffed by salaried employees, a ban on sales to minors, and anti-opium education.286 The 
Second Geneva Convention escalated controls upon the drug trade, including a system of 
import and export certificates and the creation of the Permanent Central Board to assess 
national estimates of medical drug supply needs.287 
More Americans Face Frustration 
 
Powerful bureaucrats would form the third generation of U.S. anti-drug diplomats.  
Brent, disappointed by the American walkout at the Geneva convention, finally obeyed his 
inner calling to focus on religious affairs.  He died soon thereafter in 1929.288 Porter died in 
1930.  Thus the stage was cleared for Harry J. Anslinger, commissioner of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics.  The bureau emerged within the Treasury Department in 1930 and 
President Herbert Hoover appointed Anslinger as its first commissioner.  Unlike earlier anti-
drug diplomats, Anslinger had a bureaucratic interest in tying his office to the U.S. campaign.  
Anslinger’s most important counterparts in the State Department were John Caldwell and 
Stuart J. Fuller, both were specialists in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.  
 
285 See, for example, Second Opium Conference, Committee of Sixteen, “British Declaration,” 24 January 1925, 
LONA, C.S.D. 3, R.777, 12a/41903/28626.  
 
286 The Parties also agreed to try to limit the number of opium shops and divans, attempt a census of smokers, 
and meet no later than 1929 to review their progress. See articles 1-12 and article 2 in the protocol.  Raymond 
Leslie Buell reproduces the treaty in International Opium Conferences With Relevant Documents (Boston: 
World Peace Foundation, 1925), 169-75.  
 
287 The convention also called for “adequate penalties” for breaches of national drug laws and recommended 
that countries punish citizens who violated drugs laws in other jurisdictions, though neither of these statements 
aimed expressly at illicit consumers. Buell reproduces the treaty in International Opium Conferences With 
Relevant Documents, 176-94. 
 
288 Brent died on 27 March 1929 in Lausanne, Switzerland. 
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The new U.S. crew grasped its first opportunity to recover from the Geneva debacle.  
In 1931 another round of treaty negotiations began, now focused upon limiting excess drug 
production.  American efforts to interject tough clauses on use produced a final treaty that 
included significant measures.289 The treaty advanced domestic controls by requiring 
signatories to create a “special administration” that would organize “the campaign against 
drug addiction, by taking all useful steps to prevent its development and to suppress the illicit 
traffic.” 290 National drug control bureaucracies thereby gained a mandate based on 
international law as well as a stipulation that they adopt policies against non-medical drug 
use.291 Further, the U.S. call to make illicit possession proof of an offense and the suggestion 
that signatories should “supplement the penalties” for legal infractions were adopted as 
formal recommendations.292 As a side benefit to Washington, the 1931 agreement (the 
Convention on the Limitation of Drug Manufacturing) also augmented the legal basis of U.S. 
drug diplomacy beyond the 1912 Hague Opium Convention, which provided for more U.S. 
cooperation with the League and a platform for continued agitation for criminalization.  
An unexpected setback soon put the Americans on the defense.  The issue of opium 
smoking returned to the fore of anti-drug diplomacy largely due to a technicality.  The First 
Geneva Convention (on opium smoking) contained a clause that called for a follow-up 
 
289 Joining Anslinger and Caldwell on the U.S. delegation for the 1931 talks were Walter Lewis Treadway, 
Assistant Surgeon-General, and Sanborn Young, a California State Senator, who was close to President Hoover. 
 
290 The convention introduced the concept of scheduling drugs by their potential to produce addiction and the 
League’s Health Committee gained more responsibility for assessing the addiction-producing qualities of new 
drugs and assigning them to the proper schedule. See the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and 
Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, Official Journal 12 (1931), 1795. 
 
291 OAC, “Model Administrative Code to the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the 
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, Points to be Considered by the Sub-Committee on the Model Code,” 4 October 
1932, LONA, Opium Traffic Section, S.212.20, file: Model Code Memoranda, 5.  
 
292 See recommendation 5 of the convention, 32.  
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gathering to assess progress achieved.293 As opium smoking would be the focus, the 
gathering was to be held in Asia where many governments continued to sanction smoking.  
The Siamese offered to host the convention in Bangkok.  In anticipation of the gathering, a 
Commission of Enquiry, staffed by diplomats from impartial countries, took an eight-month 
tour, from 1929 to 1930, studying the conditions of opium smoking in East Asia.  The 
itinerary included two weeks in the Philippine Islands.294 Rather than endorsing the policies 
in the Philippines, however, the Commission of Enquiry concluded that opium smoking was 
commonplace among Chinese and Filipinos after more than two decades of punitive 
prohibition.295 The Commission of Enquiry ultimately recommended that “the opium 
smoking habit should be suppressed gradually by legalising smoking by confirmed addicts 
and by supplying such smokers with Government opium.”296 A series of measures would 
help: public education, limits on opium production and distribution, restrictions of all sales to 
government monopolies, rationing the amount of opium sold, only allowing opium smoking 
in government establishments, outlawing opium sales to minors, offering medical treatment 
 
293 See the protocol of the First Geneva Convention, article 5.   
 
294 See Second Opium Convention, “Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, Twentieth Meeting,” 20 January 
1925, LONA, R.794, 12a/40524/39417, 9-10; OAC, “Memorandum Respecting the Control of Opium Smoking 
in the Far East,” 13 August 1928, LONA, C.386.1928.XI; OAC, “Memorandum Regarding the Far Eastern 
Commission of Enquiry,” 21 May 1929, LONA, Opium Section, S.201, file: Far Eastern Commission 
Memorandum; and Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 271-78. 
 
295 Report of the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East, 
LONA, Opium Section, Opium Commission of Enquiry, S.199, file: Philippine Islands Statements and 
Documents, 10.  
 
296 OAC, “Report by the Representative of Yugoslavia,” 19 January 1931, LONA, C.84.1931.XI, R.3204, 
12/25331/6245.  
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with follow-up care to smokers, and provisions to improve overall social and hygienic 
conditions.297 
The Commission of Enquiry’s recommendations served as the starting point for the 
1931 convention at Bangkok, which meant that the Americans were in for an impossible 
slog.  The U.S. delegation had little evidence of the efficacy of the policy in the Philippines 
to back their assertions.298 Worse, an unofficial study of the Philippines sponsored by the 
Foreign Policy Association and conducted by Herbert May, an American who served on the 
Permanent Central Board, had called for a transition to a government opium monopoly for 
opium smokers.299 Facing committed opposition to an immediate ban on opium smoking, the 
State Department complained that the Commission of Enquiry had been “unduly influenced” 
 
297 In addition to the Philippines, the commission visited Burma, Straits Settlements, Federated Malay States, 
the Netherlands Indies, Siam, Union of Indo-China and Kwang-Chow-Wan, Hongkong, Macao, Formosa, 
Kwantung Leased Territory, and the South Manchuria Railway Zone. They did not visit China proper because 
they refused China’s demand that all drug manufacturing countries also be visited and that China gain a seat on 
the commission. These recommendations were similar to the ill-fated recommendations of the 1905 U.S. 
Committee of Enquiry as well as the Dutch proposals regarding opium smoking at the 1909 Shanghai 
convention. The Commission of Enquiry studied the 1905 U.S. report. See the relevant documentation in 
LONA, “Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, 1930,” Opium Section, S.199. 
Also see OAC, “Report by the Representative of Yugoslavia,” 19 January 1931, LONA, C.84.1931.XI, R.3204, 
12/25331/6245; Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 274-75; OAC, “Statement Regarding 
the Work of the Bangkok Conference,” 19 April 1932, LONA, O.C. 1430; and Commission of Enquiry into the 
Control of Opium Smoking in Asia, 1930, “Memorandum Regarding the Far Eastern Commission of Enquiry,” 
21 May 1929, LONA, Opium Section, S.201, file: Far Eastern Commission Memorandum. 
 
298 The absence of good information was already evident in 1913 when Frank McIntrye, Acting Chief of Bureau 
of Insular Affairs, complained to Governor General of the Philippine Islands William Cameron Forbes that 
there had “been published no good report which shows the result of the prohibitive and punitive measures 
adopted by the Philippine government to suppress the opium traffic and the use of the drug.” See McIntrye to 
Forbes, 1 July 1913, NA, Record Group 350, entry 5, box 160, 1023-195. Weak attempts to compile convincing 
reports followed. See OAC, “Letter From Mrs. Hamilton Wright to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee,” 
3 June 1926, LONA, O.C. 452, R.709, 12a/51976/1717; Philippine Commission, “Opium Legislation and 
Regulations”; Schuneman to Secretary of War, 8 May 1929; Caldwell to Nutt, 6 April 1929; and the report 
dated 1 July to 31 December 1928 and “Amended as suggested by Mr. Caldwell,” all in LONA, Opium Section, 
S.199, file: Philippine Islands, Evidence.  
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by the governments that still allowed legal opium smoking.300 Anslinger turned to damage 
control, dispatching Elizabeth Hamilton Wright to Manila to stir up some positive reports.301 
Nevertheless, the final 1931 Bangkok Agreement on Opium Smoking embraced government 
monopolies as the preferred method to manage smokers.  President Hoover’s administration 
declined to sign the treaty.302 The Americans had to settle for formal statements stressing 
their commitment to a total ban on non-medical drug use.303 
A final U.S. attempt to overcome the stalemate on banning “traditional” drug use 
came in 1936, but the barrier remained firm.  Anslinger and his State Department 
counterpart, Stuart Fuller, arrived in Geneva for talks about confronting illicit drug 
traffickers.304 The proposed improvements in the anti-trafficking effort involved enhanced 
 
300 See Prentiss B. Gilbert, “Memorandum on the Work of the League of Nations,” 9 March 1931, Papers of 
Harry J. Anslinger, Special Collections Library, Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Pennsylvania State 
University, (hereafter Anslinger Papers), box 10, file 13; and Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics 
Traffic, 273-74.  
 
301 Other efforts at damage control included a memorandum by Colonel C.H. Bowers, Superintendent of the 
Intelligence Division of the Philippine Constabulary, 19 January 1931, which called the Commission of Enquiry 
“more or less a junketing or pleasure trip” and criticized May’s report as uninformed, Anslinger Papers, box 9, 
file 59, 3. Anslinger lauded Bowers’ report and noted that it would provide “a splendid defense against all 
critics at Geneva.” See Anslinger to Parker, 11 March 1931, NA, Record Group 170, Subject Files of the 
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 1916-1970 (hereafter RG 170), Acc# 71-A-3554, box 23, file: 
Philippines #1. Also see Anslinger to Cox, 22 October 1930, and Cox to Parker, 20 October 1930, both in NA, 
RG 350, entry 21, box 712, file: Mrs. Hamilton Mabie Wright (Elizabeth Washburn Wright). 
 
302 See OAC, “Report by the Representative of Yugoslavia,” 19 January 1931, LONA, C.84.1931.XI.12; and 
Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 274-75.  
 
303 John Caldwell of the State Department, and Colonel Lucien Sweet, Assistant Chief of the Philippine 
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that the American delegation made it plain that an opium smoking ban was their primary goal, William Castle, 
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n.d., Anslinger Papers, box 9, file 59; and Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 274-79.  The 
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Foreign Office, 23 December 1932, reproduced in Foreign Office The Opium Trade, 1910-1941, vol. 6 
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304 The preparation for the 1936 convention had begun after the 1931 Convention on the Limitation of Drug 
Manufacturing. See, for example, OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of the Sixteenth Session,” 15-31 
May 1933, LONA, Col.307, 12/4716/4313, 32. 
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international cooperation and higher penalties aimed at deterring traffickers.  Washington had 
expressed little interest from the outset in the anti-trafficking conference, confident that the 
existing treaties, properly followed, and the numerous bilateral agreements to fight illegal 
drug traders were sufficient.  However, enthusiasm waxed when the State Department 
secured the right to broach additional topics at the convention including a ban on 
“traditional” drug use.  At the conference in Geneva, the other delegations hastily considered 
and quickly dismissed Anslinger and Fuller’s proposals to add opium prepared for smoking 
and cannabis to the Hague Opium Convention’s ban on the non-medical use of manufactured 
drugs.  The conference moved on to consider measures designed to make drug trafficking 
more onerous.  Anslinger and Fuller wanted to abandon the talks, but the State Department 
would not countenance a reprise of Porter’s 1924 theatrics at Geneva.305 The final 
convention of 1936 stiffened international law regarding drug trafficking.  It stipulated, for 
example, “severely punishing, particularly by imprisonment,” those convicted of infractions 
related to illicit trafficking.306 However, an American delegation had again suffered 
frustration about “traditional” non-medical drug use and the United States would again 
decline to sign a drug control treaty.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Three generations of U.S. anti-drug diplomats with the support of both Democratic 
and Republican presidents had achieved much in three decades.  Brent and Roosevelt had 
 
305 See OAC, “Further Replies from Governments to the Secretary General's Letter,” 18 May 1935, LONA, 
O.C. 1599, 9(a); OAC, “Draft International Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous 
Drugs, Report of the Sub-Committee,” 30 May 1934, LONA, O.C. 1558(1); and Taylor, American Diplomacy 
and the Narcotics Traffic, 289-97.  
 
306 See article 2 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Limitation of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous 
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gotten nations to discuss drug control in 1909.  Though non-binding, the resulting resolutions 
espoused the language of proscription.  The 1912 Hague Opium Convention added a legal 
obligation to the rhetorical trend.  When that convention came into general force after World 
War I, international law banned non-medical use of manufactured drugs and pledged the 
gradual suppression of opium smoking.  Suppression of “traditional” drug use remained for 
American campaigners a frustrating exception to this program.  These changes had 
consequences.  Chapter Four examines how the U.S. diplomatic campaign—and especially 
the breakthrough against non-medical drug use embodied in the Hague Opium Convention—
spurred a global wave of punitive drug control laws. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
The Punitive Regime in Practice, 1914-1945 
 
A twenty-nine-year-old woman named Chang Yu was one of thousands caught during 
anti-drug raids in Shanghai in 1934.  She was discovered smoking “red pills,” a cheap 
substitute for prepared opium.  Chang endured a “compulsory treatment” of forced 
detoxification and was discharged as “cured.”  However, when she was caught again 
smoking red pills two months later, the government abandoned any effort at rehabilitation.  
Chang was shot in public.  The Chinese government duly reported her execution (and 
others’) to the League of Nation’s Opium Advisory Committee.  This reporting was not 
unique to China.  Delegates to the League’s Opium Advisory Committee could peruse 
reports sent by dozens of countries detailing the punishment of illegal drug users.307 
The previous chapter covered American efforts to promote a global punitive ban of 
non-medical drug use; this chapter examines the practical results of the campaign.  The 
American model of punishing illicit drug consumption fully shifted from a radical 
proposition to a global reality before the Second World War.  The criminalization of certain 
types of non-medical drug use and the punishment of users became a common feature across 
 
307 The execution came under a special “drastic prohibition” that anticipated a national campaign described 
below. OAC, “Summary of Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous 
Drugs for the Year 1934,” LONA, C.299.M.182.1936.XI, 91-93. Also see OAC, “The Opium and Drug 
Situation in Shanghai,” 17 May 1935, LONA, O.C. 1597 (b), O.C.S. 239 (b), 1-3. The London Times reported 
on the plans to execute “obstinate” smokers and repeat offenders. See The Times, 3 September 1934, clipping in 
LONA, R.4882, 12/14386/792. See articles 1, 5, 6, and 10 of the Provisional Regulations for the Drastic 
Prohibition of High-Powered Narcotic Drugs, Promulgated in May 1934, in Permanent Office of the Chinese 
Delegation to the League of Nations, “Latest and Most Important Regulations concerning opium and dangerous 
drugs as now applied in China (Provisional translation),” 14 November 1934, LONA, O.C. 1576, 19. 
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the globe as nations joined within a punitive regime.  The punitive regime was comprised of 
international treaties and U.S. advocacy that gave rise to national legislation, national 
motives that affirmed a punitive approach toward drug use, and finally, national reports of 
punishing drug users sent to the League of Nations. 
 Case studies best show the regime in practice.  The five cases in this chapter are 
drawn from the key countries in the treaty talks (the United States and China) as well as 
Great Britain through its control in the Third World (British India, South Africa, and Egypt).  
Collectively the cases demonstrate that the punishment of drug users had international 
ramifications and that punishment became normative prior to the Second World War.  
Individually, the cases demonstrate how the international campaign shaped national policies.  
The U.S. case stands for the pattern that was most common among nations, particularly 
throughout the Americas and Europe.  Stipulations in the 1912 Hague Opium Convention 
prompted Congress to pass a tough law that criminalized non-medical drug use.  The cases of 
China, British India, South Africa, and Egypt each show how the regime also expanded in a 
more subtle manner: by affirmation.  Each of these case studies assesses national motivations 
for joining the punitive regime, the application of punishment, and the reporting of 
adherence.308 
This chapter offers a historical account of the international drug control movement 
that is different from the leading extant studies.  Punitive bans were the rule, rather than the 
exception, before the Second World War, and U.S. officials enjoyed the support of foreign 
governments who brought their own interests to the punitive regime.  Though such a policy 
was not expressly stipulated in the treaties, the cases in this chapter show that governments 
 
308 For a helpful discussion about using historical case studies see Raymond Grew, “The Case for Comparing 
Histories,” American Historical Review 85 (Oct., 1980): 763-78.  
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imposed punishment and reported about it to international organizations as a function of their 
participation in the movement.309 
Part I. Trumping the Constitution: A U.S. Domestic Ban  
 
In 1914 Congress passed the Harrison Act, which finally cleared a federal avenue to 
penalize non-medical drug use.  American officials had created a tough proscription in the 
Philippines in 1908 but had been hamstrung in the continental United States due to the U.S. 
constitution, which invested state governments with the policing power to ban drug use, 
withholding such authority from the federal government.  The obligations set forth in the 
1912 Hague Opium Convention provided for the breakthrough.  The U.S. federal ban would 
be complicated because of the constitutional issues.  Still, federal officials set forth to impose 
its tough penalties on drug users and sent reports to the League of Nations stressing the 
benefits of the stiff penalties. 
 
The International Connection  
 
Hamilton Wright led the effort to overcome the constitutional hurdle to a federal ban 
on non-medical drug use.  He initially called upon fear and racism by publicizing the ideas 
that opium smoking was spreading from the Chinese to white communities and that cocaine 
use made blacks in the southern United States violent.310 By 1913 Wright had struck upon a 
 
309 David Bewley-Taylor’s account asserts that the United States forced an overly punitive and proscriptive 
international policy norm banning drug use after the Second World War when Washington gained the status of 
a global hegemon. See David R. Bewley-Taylor, The United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997 
(London: Pinter, 1999). Attorney and drug policy commentator Rufus King argues that up until the 1960s “most 
of the rest of the world” was “indifferent or resistant” to U.S. preferences for “stringent repression” of drug 
use.” See Rufus King’s entry on Harry J. Anslinger, in American National Biography, ed. John A. Garraty and 
Mark C. Carnes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 537. King provides a broader statement, though 
without archival research, in The Drug Hang-Up: America’s Fifty-Year Folly (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972). 
Also see Jurg Gerber and Eric L. Jensen, eds., Drug War American Style: The Internationalization of Failed 
Policy and Its Alternatives (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001). 
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more effective argument.  He began to stress the “international side” of the issue, which had 
(he claimed) developed to Washington’s “entire satisfaction,” and called for a strict federal 
ban to uphold the “decent opinion of the rest of the civilized world.”311 Backed by the State 
and Treasury departments and stressing America’s “international pledges,” Wright advanced 
three bills in the winter of 1913.312 The bills were timed in anticipation of the next gathering 
at The Hague scheduled for June 1914 that would seek to ratify the 1912 Hague Opium 
Convention.  The linkage between the international movement and pending legislation was 
reminiscent of Root’s 1909 push to pass the face-saving opium smoking bill in advance of 
the Shanghai commission.  The United States had signed the Hague Opium Convention and 
the State Department was urging nations to ratify it.313 Even beyond its utility, Wright 
wanted the legislation to demonstrate Washington’s commitment to drug control.   
The legal obligation tied to the Hague Opium Convention and the sense that 
America’s reputation required a bill were strong forces backing passage in Congress.  
Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox felt that the United States had to prove that “it 
seriously intends to enact the necessary laws to redeem its international obligations” because 
the United States had “secured pledges from over thirty nations for legislation of this 
character, and because several of those nations have already redeemed their pledges.”314 
310 H. Wayne Morgan provides an overview of the growing fears about Chinese opium smoking in Drugs in 
America, A Social History, 1800-1980 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 29-43. Also see Hamilton 
Wright, “The International Opium Commission, Part 1,” American Journal of International Law 3 (July 1909): 
648-73; Wright to Assistant Secretary of State, 8 February 1909, NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the 
Department of State 1906-1910, roll 108, 774/693a; and Musto, American Disease, 294-300. 
 
311 Wright to Harrison, 10 February 1913, NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1.  
 
312 Wright to Harrison, 22 January 1913, NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1. 
 
313 The Hague Opium Convention became U.S. Statutes at Large 38 (1915): 1912 
 
314 Wright to Harrison, 3 February 1913, NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1. 
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Wright rallied Representative Francis Burton Harrison (D-NY), who served on the Ways and 
Means Committee, to the cause.  Wright drafted the bills, with the assistance of the solicitors 
of the state and treasury departments.  Harrison helped to shepherd them through passage.  
Wright prepared Harrison to make the international case by drafting a memorandum for the 
House Committee on Ways and Means.  The memorandum outlined the three bills as 
necessary to “Redeem the Pledges of the United States as Contained in the International 
Opium Convention Signed at The Hague.”315 Wright also informed Harrison that although 
there was no likelihood of “the international movement breaking down” it would be delayed 
if Congress remained “obtuse in the matter of domestic legislation.”  Passage of domestic 
drug control bills prior to the June meeting at The Hague would be of great advantage from 
the diplomatic viewpoint.316 
The bills signed by President Woodrow Wilson in 1914 allowed Washington to 
adhere to the punitive regime but, due to the constitutional limits on federal policing power, 
the laws would be complicated measures based on the federal taxation and commerce 
powers.  Two of the laws dealt with opium smoking.  One updated the 1909 ban on the 
import of opium prepared for smoking (passed in 1909 to bolster American standing at the 
Shanghai Conference).  Wright considered this law the “first link in the chain” to constrain 
opium within medicinal channels.317 The other law imposed regulations designed to be so 
 
315 See Wright’s “Memorandum for the Committee on Ways and Means, of the House of Representatives, on 
H.R. 26833, 25240, and 28277, Being Bills Intended to Redeem the Pledges of the United States As Contained 
in the International Opium Convention Signed at The Hague…,” n.d., NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1, 7. 
 
316 Harrison to Wright, 3 February 1913, NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1. The records in this box document the 
pressure applied by the executive branch to secure passage of the bills.  Wright also called upon President Taft 
to press the National Wholesale Druggists’ Association to drop its concerns about increased governmental 
regulation and support the three bills.  Wright’s efforts are evident in Wilson to Taft, 2 October 1912; and 
Meyer to Taft, 18 October 1912, both in NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1. 
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onerous that prepared opium would not be manufactured from raw opium in the United 
States.  It also deemed possession of prepared opium evidence of a violation.318 The third 
bill was more comprehensive and would supersede the others to become the major law to 
punish illicit drug possessors.  In correspondence with Wright, Harrison referred to it as “our 
big narcotic bill.”319 It became the eponymous Harrison Act.320 The Harrison Act banned 
unlicensed and untaxed distribution of all opium, coca, and their derivatives.  Because 
unlawful possession was prima facie evidence of a violation, possession (obviously 
necessary for consumption) was effectively criminalized and the federal government thus 
raised a punitive ban on non-medical drug use.  Offenses, including unauthorized possession, 
could trigger a fine of up to two thousand dollars, a prison term up to five years, or both.321 
The government put the Harrison Act into action against drug consumers.  The 
Treasury and Justice Departments interpreted the law expansively, including penalties 
imposed on users.322 The federal judiciary generally assented to this expansive interpretation 
 
317 See Opium Acts, U.S. Statutes at Large 24 (1914): 275-77; Wright’s “Memorandum for the Committee on 
Ways and Means, of the House of Representatives, on H.R. 26833, 25240, and 28277, Being Bills Intended to 
Redeem the Pledges of the United States As Contained in the International Opium Convention Signed at The 
Hague…,” n.d., NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1, 8; and House, Reenactment of the Opium Exclusion Act, 63rd 
Cong., 1st sess., 1913, H. Rept. 24. 
 
318 See Opium Acts, U.S. Statutes at Large 24 (1914): 277-78; and Treasury Decision No. 2211, 10 June 1915, 
copy in NA, RG 350, entry 5, box 846, file 15541-43. For a discussion of these measures and a list of federal 
court rulings from 1915 to 1918 that held possession of prepared opium to be an violation see House, 
Importation and Exportation of Narcotic Drugs, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., 1922, H. Rept. 852, 3-4, 10. 
 
319 Harrison to Wright, 6 February 1913, NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1. 
 
320 Harrison departed soon after the bill’s passage for Manila to serve as Governor-General and where, as 
Wright phrased it, insular laws had already “aimed to suppress the monstrous opium evil.” See the letter drafted 
by Wright for Bryan to send to the secretary of war, 26 May 1914, NA, RG 43, entry 36, box 1. 
 
321 See Congressional Record, 63th Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 3: 2191-2211. Wilson signed the bill on 17 
December 1914. See Harrison Acts, U.S. Statutes at Large 38 (1914): 785-90.  There was controversy about 
extending the Harrison Act to insular possessions particularly the Philippine Islands where bans on drug use 
were already strict. See Senate, Habit-Forming Drugs, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1914, S. Doc. 473. 
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of the law over the following years.323 For example, in 1915 a U.S. District Court upheld the 
Harrison Act conviction of Kenneth Brown who was caught with “about three drams of yen 
shee,” which was the ash from an opium pipe.  The ruling found that possession of an 
outlawed article was proof of a violation.324 The following year a U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the Harrison Act conviction of New York jewelry salesman Tom Wilson.  
Wilson was convicted for having prepared opium in his house, which he kept “solely for the 
purpose of smoking.”325 
There were two main categories of Harrison Act offenders: registered and 
unregistered.  The provisions of the Harrison Act required medical professionals to apply to 
register and to pay a nominal tax.  Drug users, with organic diseases or otherwise, were 
ineligible.326 Registered offenders were usually physicians or pharmacists who ran afoul of 
the onerous accounting requirements.  Unregistered Harrison Act offenders were mostly 
people who possessed drugs for personal consumption (but also included drug peddlers).  A 
 
322 The relevant agencies with the Department of the Treasury were: the Bureau of Internal Revenue (1915-
1927), the Bureau of Prohibition (1927-1930), and the Bureau of Narcotics (1930-1968). 
 
323 A 1919 amendment to the Harrison Act helped the Justice Department avoid some complications in 
prosecution raised by Supreme Court decisions regarding unauthorized drug possession. U.S. Statutes at Large 
40 (1919): 1130-1133.  Favorably court decisions included Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928), United 
States v. Wong Sing, 260 U.S. 18 (1922), Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925). These cases, and 
similar rulings, remain controversial because they often strayed from the text of the legislation, endorsed 
congressional oversight over medical practice, and underlay the federal criminalization of drug addiction. 
Joseph F. Spillane provided one of the best reviews of the cases in “Building a Drug Control Regime, 1919-
1930” in Federal Drug Control: The Evolution of Policy and Practice, ed. Jonathon Erlen and Joseph F. 
Spillane (New York: Pharmaceutical Products Press, 2004), 25-59. Also see Arnold Jaffe, Addiction Reform in 
the Progressive Age: Scientific and Social Responses to Drug Dependence in the United States, 1870-1930 
(New York: Arno Press, 1981), 160-95.  
 
324 The ruling bolstered the Treasury Department’s interpretation see Treasury Decision No. 2204, 15 May 
1915, copy in NA, RG 350, entry 5, box 846, file 15541-43. 
 
325 Treasury Decision No. 2280, 16 January 1916, copy in NA, RG 350, entry 5, box 846, file 15541-63. 
 
326 Treasury Decision No. 2172 expressly denied the right of consumers to apply for registration under the 
Harrison Act. See Martin I. Wilbert, “Poisons and Habit-Forming Drugs,” Public Health Reports 31 (February 
1916): 474. 
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majority of unregistered offenders were users, but an exact accounting is impossible due to 
the style of record keeping and the illicit nature of the drug market in which some users were 
peddlers and vice versa [see Tables 3-4].  A study by Assistant Surgeon General Walter 
Treadway (who also served as Chief of the Narcotics Division, of the United States Public 
Health Service [USPHS]) suggested the general trend.  He scrutinized the cases of 
unregistered Harrison Act offenders in Massachusetts for a nine-month period in 1930.  Out 
of 175 arrested, 174 were “addicts,” 149 were charged with “possession” or “drug addiction,” 
4 were charged with “forging prescriptions,” and 22 were charged with “sale.”327 While 
clearly not exhaustive, these findings suggest that the majority of unregistered Harrison Act 
offenders were users.  Further, when detailed accounting was available the numbers indicated 
that enforcement focused on users.  For example, Treadway reviewed the Harrison Act arrest 
records for four months from July to October 1929.  He found that 2,040 people were 
arrested and 367 were placed under surveillance during this period.  Around 90 percent were 
“unregistered,” and of these around 74 percent were addicted or using habit forming drugs.328 
Another study of arrests, from January 1932 to June 1934, found that 72 percent of “narcotic 
violators” were “addicted to the use of drugs” and that over 80 percent of those convicted 
were incarcerated.  The average sentence lasted 672 days.  Just 19 percent of those convicted 
were fined.329 The ambiguity in the conviction record was deepened by the tendency of the 
federal agents to press “selling” charges instead of “possession” charges because, as 
 
327 Walter L. Treadway, “Some Epidemiological Notes on Narcotic Drug Addiction in the State of 
Massachusetts,” copy sent to Anslinger on 5 August 1930, Anslinger Papers, box 3, file 10. 
 
328 W.L. Treadway, “Further Observations on the Epidemiology of Narcotic Drug Addiction,” Public Health 
Reports 45 pt. 1 (March 1930): 541-553. Also see House Judiciary Committee, Establishment of Two Federal 
Narcotic Farms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 18. 
 
329 The average fine was $213. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fines and Imprisonments in Federal 
Narcotics Cases (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938), 3, 8, 10. 
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Commissioner Anslinger explained, “the former indicates to the court that the case has a 
trafficking angle and that it is not one involving merely the possession of a drug by an 
unfortunate addict.”330 This charging strategy predisposed the bench to issue longer prison 
sentences.  Historian Joseph F. Spillane surmises that that the enforcement of the Harrison 
Act focused on the “most vulnerable groups,” most of whom were addicts or drug users 
charged as unregistered offenders.331 
330 “Enforcement of the Narcotic Drugs Laws in the United States of America,” 14 May 1938, LONA, O.C. 
1734, 3. 
 
331 Spillane, “Building a Drug Control Regime, 1919-1930” in Federal Drug Control, ed. Erlen and Spillane, 
25-59.  
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The Harrison Act’s basis upon the federal constitutional power to tax complicated its enforcement.  
Drug users were prosecuted as “unregistered” offenders.  The initially high number of prosecutions 
and failure to convict in 1915 reflected the medical profession’s forced transition into compliance 
with registration. The increase after 1919 followed from favorable court rulings easing prosecutions 
for illicit possession. Despite its complications, the Harrison Act introduced the federal incarceration 
of non-medical drug users. Figures for 1915 cover 1 March 1915 to 20 June 1915.  
 
Source: Jaffe, Addiction Reform in the Progressive Age, 178, 248. 
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As the enforcement came on line, American reports to the League’s Opium Advisory 
Committee conveyed the strict U.S. adherence to the punitive regime.  From 1910 to 1923 
the number of drug offenders committed to federal penal institutions rose 2,066 percent from 
around 300 to just fewer than 6,500.  In 1923 there were 3,953 federal convictions for 
Harrison Act violations and 1,794 narcotic offenders serving sentences in federal prisons.332 
The next year Lawrence Kolb, Acting Surgeon General, noted that the Narcotic Division had 
secured over four thousand convictions leading to more than four thousand years of prison 
sentences “imposed on persons, chiefly addicts, who insisted on getting narcotics in violation 
of the law.”333 The 1924 report to the Opium Advisory Committee cited 4,242 total 
convictions (only 245 were “registered” violators).  The U.S. reports also presented the 
penalties imposed in aggregate, a technique that produced a shockingly large figure.  For 
example, prison sentences imposed in 1924 would last 5,028 years, 10 months, 15 days and 
the fines would total $511,664.91.334 In 1925 the number of convictions reached 5,600 with 
aggregate penalties imposed of 6,361 years, 11 months, 7 days, and fines totaling 
$453,330.27.  Of 5,600 convictions, only 317 were “registered” offenders.335 A 1926 report 
by a private research organization comprised of leading physicians, sent by Washington to 
Geneva, confirmed the sentencing trend.  That reported noted the “large” number of addicts 
in prison and concluded that people charged with Harrison Act violations were “almost sure 
 
332 An in-depth study of drug enforcement in this period remains to be written. Bureau of the Census, 
Department of Commerce, Prisoners, 1923: Crime Conditions in the United States as Reflected in Census 
Statistics of Imprisoned Offenders (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1926), 41; cited in 
Alfred R. Lindesmith, The Addict and The Law (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 131. 
 
333 Kolb to Cumming, 20 August 1924, National Library of Medicine, History of Medicine Division, Bethesda, 
Maryland, Lawrence Kolb Papers (hereafter Kolb Papers), box 2, file: Richmond P. Hobson, May 1924 to 
November 13, 1924. 
 
334 “U.S. Annual Report on the Traffic in Opium and Dangerous Drugs, 1924,” LONA, O.C. 23(h), 4-5, 15. 
 
335 “U.S. Annual Report on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, 1925,” LONA, O.C. 23(i) 3-4, 
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to be convicted and sentenced to a year or more.”336 The U.S. reports to the Opium Advisory 
Committee also equated drug “addicts” with habitual criminals.  For example the 1936 report 
noted that 65 percent of convicted narcotic offenders had “previous criminal records” as 
compared with “only” 38 percent of people convicted upon other charges.337 This neglected 
to note the frequency of repeat drug convictions for people who used drugs.   
Appointed as Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics within the Treasury 
Department in 1930, Harry Anslinger opened another route to expand U.S. adherence to the 
punitive regime: state enforcement.  Anslinger recognized that states enjoyed “supreme 
police power within their own boundaries” while the federal policing was “hampered by the 
narrow limitations that restrict the Federal Government.”338 States could avoid the conceit of 
the revenue basis of the Harrison Act.339 They could greatly expand the number of law 
enforcement officers involved beyond the few hundred federal agents.  States could assume 
much of the cost of enforcement and incarceration.  Warning that “as long as the addict is at 
liberty to come and go, the peddler has a steady and trustful customer,” Anslinger drafted a 
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and campaigned for the U.S. states to adopt it as law.340 The 
 
336 See “Sixth Report of Committee on Drug Addiction, Meeting May 1926,” copy in Anslinger Papers, box 8, 
file 16. The U.S. Department of State also sent this report to the League of Nations. See OAC, “Connection 
between Crime and Drug Addiction,” 26 July 1933, LONA, O.C. 1460(a), 6-7. 
337 OAC, “Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 
1936,” 16 July 1938, LONA, C.241.M.140.1938.XI, O.C.1723 (1), 13. Also see OAC, “Enforcement of 
Narcotic Drug Laws in the United States of America, 1938,” 14 May 1938, LONA, O.C. 1734.  
 
338 Anslinger, “Federal Machinery Limit in Fighting Drug Traffic, Says Anslinger,” n.d., Anslinger Papers, box 
5, file 6. 
 
339 For a digest of state laws prior to the Harrison Act see Martin I. Wilbert and Murray Galt Motter, “Digest of 
Laws and Regulations in Force in the United States Relating to the Possession, Use, Sale, and Manufacture of 
Poisons and Habit-Forming Drugs,” Public Health Bulletin 56 (November 1912): 1-278. According to Morgan, 
“by 1931 the possession of opiates was illegal in thirty-five states, of cocaine in thirty-six, and of hypodermic 
paraphernalia in eight.” See Morgan, Drugs in America, 122. 
 
340 Harry J. Anslinger, “The Reason For Uniform State Narcotic Legislation,” Georgetown Law Journal 22 
(November 1932): 60. 
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved Anslinger’s draft 
legislation in 1932 and the commissioner campaigned for widespread adoption.341 By 1934 
nine states had adopted the Uniform Act.  Eight states reported a total of 3,033 convictions 
that year.342 In 1935 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt joined in calling for states to adopt 
the act, to provide their “people far better protection than they now have against the ravages 
of the narcotic drug evil” and aid the federal government “in its efforts to aid them and to 
further combat this evil abroad through full cooperation between our country and other 
nations.”343 When Congress passed the Uniform Act for the District of Columbia in 1938, a 
total of thirty-nine states and the territories of Hawaii and Puerto Rico also enforced the 
act.344 
Anslinger included the state enforcement within the U.S. reports to Geneva, which 
bolstered Washington’s calls for tough controls.  For example, in 1939 the U.S. report to the 
Opium Advisory Committee reported that, despite the constriction of the illicit drug market 
due to the outbreak of the Second World War, there were 1,817 unregistered convictions 
under the Harrison Act triggering 4,118 years of prison sentences and fines imposed of 
 
341 In October 1932 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recommended the 
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. See Anslinger, “Speech Before the International Association of Chiefs of Police at 
St. Petersburg, Florida,”13 October 1931, Anslinger Papers, Box 1, File 7; and Anslinger, “The Necessity for 
Uniform State Narcotic Drug Legislation,” 1932, Anslinger Papers, Box 10, File 9. 
 
342 The Harrison convictions in 1934, as reported to the Opium Advisory Committee, totaled just 2,674 despite a 
“nation-wide drive.” Penalties aggregated to 5,073 years in prison and $149,193.67 in fines imposed. See OAC, 
“Summary of Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the 
Year 1934,” 14 July 1936, LONA, C.299.M.182.1936.XI, O.C. 1621(1), 67, 70-72. 
 
343 See “Uniform Dope Laws Is Plea of Roosevelt,” Washington Herald, 22 March 1935, clipping in Anslinger 
Papers box 5, file 14.  Eleanor Roosevelt also backed the Uniform State Law. See her “First Lady Writes of 
Narcotic Evil,” Washington Herald, 9 June 1935, clipping in same file. 
 
344 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Narcotics, Protection Against Habit-Forming Drugs 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 10. Also see OAC, “Annual Reports of 
Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1938,” 27 August 1940, LONA, 
C.124.M.113.1940.XI, O.C. 1781(1), 8. 
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$108,321.  The Uniform State Narcotic Act added 3,117 convicts and aggregate sentences of 
697 years and fines imposed of $12,705.345 
Part II. China: The Regime with Revenue  
In the late 1920s China began imposing dramatic penalties on users as a part of major 
domestic anti-drug campaigns.  The Chinese Nationalist Party under the leadership of Jiang 
Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] replaced what had been a piecemeal approach to punishment with 
full participation in the regime.  China’s motives for joining the punitive regime were 
multiple.  There was a longstanding anti-opium sentiment.  American officials began lauding 
punitive policies in China in the early twentieth century.  The international drug control 
treaties provided another spur.  Finally, by joining the punitive regime and highlighting cruel 
penalties imposed on users in reports to Geneva, China lessened international criticism of the 
government’s continued opium sales. 
 
The Punitive Regime with Chinese Characteristics 
 
Imperial distaste for the popularity of opium smoking materialized right after 
European traders had introduced it in the seventeenth century.  By 1729 an imperial order 
banned opium smoking but exempted smokers from punishment, a concession to the vast 
number of smokers.346 The popularity of the habit underscored the basic difficulty facing 
anti-opium campaigns to come.  The threatened penalties increased in 1796 (the possibility of 
pillory and bamboo) and 1836 (the chance of a death sentence).  Still, Xu Naiji, a Qing court 
 
345 There were only eighty-nine “registered” Harrison Act convictions. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year Ended December 31, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1940), 73-74, 76.  
 
346 Brook and Wakabayashi, Opium Regimes, 6. Martin Booth notes the exemption from penalties for smokers 
in Opium: A History (New York: Pocket Books, 1997), 109. Also see Lowes, Genesis of International 
Narcotics Control, 10, 13, 34, 40, 43-44; and McCoy, Politics of Heroin, 5. 
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official, lamented that “the smokers of the drug have increased [in] number, and the practice 
has spread throughout almost the whole empire.”347 Motivated primarily to protect state 
revenue, the emperor responded with another edict and sent Lin Zexu to serve as maritime 
commissioner in Canton to enforce the regulations against opium imports.348 For the local 
opium smokers, Lin introduced a system of registration, prescriptions, and dosage reduction 
in which smokers were supposed to wean themselves from their pipes.349 The recalcitrant 
could still face stiff penalties.  For example, historian David Bello notes that some convicted 
“addicts” had their capital convictions reduced to banishment to the province of Xinjiang.350 
In the following decades other officials launched similar, local anti-smoking measures, but 
no wide-ranging, systematic enforcement developed.351 Demand for imported and locally 
grown opium remained strong.  “In spite of the official measures taken against it,” 
summarizes historian R.K. Newman, “opium became a common and accepted feature of 
Chinese agriculture, commerce and social life.”352 
347 See Baumler, Modern China and Opium: A Reader, 7; C.P. Spencer and V. Navaratnam, Drug Abuse in East 
Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 11; and E.T. Williams, “Opium in China,” 8 September 1906, 
NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 1906-1910, roll 104, 774/8-9, 1-2.   
 
348 By 1839 Lin’s attacks on imported opium exacerbated the pre-existing British frustration about trade 
restrictions to the China market and helped to unleash the Sino-British War (1839-1842), often called the 
Opium War. See Brook and Wakabayashi, Opium Regimes, 6; David Anthony Bello, Opium and the Limits of 
Empire: Drug Prohibition in the Chinese Interior, 1729-1850 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 
2005), 3; Joyce A. Madancy, The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin: The Opium Trade and Opium 
Suppression in Fujian Province, 1820s to 1920s (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003); Dikötter, 
Laamann, and Zhou, Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China, 45; and Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War, 
1840-1842 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
 
349 Spencer and Navaratnam, Drug Abuse in East Asia, 12. 
 
350 David Bello, “Opium in Xinjiang and Beyond,” in Brook and Wakabayashi, Opium Regimes, 129. Also see 
Walker, Opium and Foreign Policy, 6. 
 
351 Baumler, Modern China and Opium: A Reader, 22-27. 
 
352 See Madancy, The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin; Edward R. Slack, Jr., Opium, State, and 
Society: China’s Narco-Economy and the Guomindang, 1924-1937 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 
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American officials may have motivated Chinese leaders to harden policies against 
opium smokers.  Bishop Brent reported to Theodore Roosevelt in 1906 that the U.S. Opium 
Committee Report (translated into Chinese) helped to turn public opinion in China against 
opium smoking.353 Brent exulted to his sister that the fruits of his labors included an 
“Imperial Edict prohibiting the drug,” but in reality the 1906 edict relied on taxes, a system 
of registration, and public shaming to deter smoking.354 Historians Timothy Brook and Bob 
Tadashi Wakabayashi agree with Brent’s claim, but for different reasons, arguing that the 
report’s condescending discussion stiffened nationalist sentiment against opium.355 The 
Americans grasped onto punishments inflicted on users as evidence of China’s commitment 
to a total ban.  Thus Samuel L. Gracey, American Consul at Fuzhou dwelled on the “sound 
beating” given to a scholar who smoked opium.356 In 1912 Charles Tenney lauded the 
 
2001); and R.K. Newman, “Opium Smoking in Late Imperial China: A Reconsideration,” Modern Asian Studies 
29 (October 1995): 769. 
 
353 Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox was also sure that the American opium policy in the Philippines 
had a “profound influence” on Chinese leaders who wanted “to destroy the vice of opium smoking.” See 
Senate, The Opium Traffic, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., 1911, S. Doc. 736, 3; and Brent to Roosevelt, 20 August 1906, 
NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 1906-1910, roll 104, 774/5-6.  
 
354 Dikötter, Laamann, and Zhou argue that the “Qing waged the world’s first war on drugs,” though the 1906 
edict replicated policy trends already underway in the Philippines, adopted a longer timeline (ten years instead 
of three), and fell short of the total ban enforced after 1 March 1908. See their Narcotic Culture: A History of 
Drugs in China, 110. For a translation of the edict and W.W. Rockhill’s discussion of the importance of the 
revenue see the memorandum dated 21 September 1906, NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the 
Department of State 1906-1910, roll 104, 774/126-7. Historian Thomas Reins equates the public shaming with a 
hopeful assessment of the instructive power of “Confucian morality.” See Thomas D. Reins, “Reform, 
Nationalism and Internationalism: The Opium Suppression Movement in China and the Anglo-American 
Influence, 1900-1908,” Modern Asian Studies 25 (February 1991): 126. Also see E.T. Williams, “Opium in 
China,” 8 September 1906, NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 1906-1910, roll 
104, 774/7, 15; R. Bin Wong, “Opium and Modern Chinese State-Making,” in Brook and Wakabayashi, Opium 
Regimes, 189-211; and Brent to Edith Brent, 4 May 1907, Brent Papers, box 68, file: Brent, Edith S, 1901-7. 
 
355 Brook and Wakabayashi, Opium Regimes, 40. 
 
356 See “Cultivation of Poppy and Suppression of Sale of Opium in Locality of Foochow, China,” 29 May 1907, 
NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 1906-1910, roll 104, 774/110; Memorandum 
by James W. Ragsdale, 12 January 1907, NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 
1906-1910, roll 104, 774/223; and “The Anti-Opium Crusade,” South China Daily Journal, 3 May 1907, 
clipping in NA, RG 59, Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State 1906-1910, roll 104, 774/83-90. 
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governor of Anhui province for taking “strenuous measures” against opium smokers.  They 
were imprisoned and “severely punished.”  The military governor of Hunan province also 
garnered Tenney’s praise for imposing “summary executions,” a drastic punishment intended 
to make smokers “feel the rigor of the law.”357 In the wake of the republican revolution 
(1911-1912), Edward T. Williams found reassuring news: officials made “earnest efforts” to 
fight opium including capital punishment for repeated smoking offenses.358 
The Republic of China embraced the international drug control movement, but lacked 
the political unity to raise comprehensive policies regarding consumption until the 1920s.  
China signed the Hague Opium Convention along with the other participants in 1912 and 
ratified it in 1914.  Real progress toward adherence to the punitive regime, however, required 
the rise of the Chinese Nationalist Party and the leadership of Jiang Jieshi.  Jiang’s first major 
campaign began in 1925.  He established a monopoly and set to register all smokers who 
were supposed to reduce the amount they smoked by one fourth each year.  Smokers who did 
not register, or who neglected to reduce the amount smoked, were to be arrested and forced 
to detoxify.359 While this was a move toward proscription, Jiang also benefited from the 
monopoly sales bureaus that had multiplied, providing much-needed revenue for the 
Northern Expedition and the extension of nationalist control.360 Jiang stiffened the approach 
in 1929 adding a time limit for smokers to quit and raising the penalties for unauthorized use 
 
357 Tenney, “Memo on the Opium Trade in the Nanking Consular District,” 24 December 1912, NA, Records of 
International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43 (hereafter RG 43), entry 41, box 1, 
folder: Second International Opium Conference: China, 2 of 3, 4-5. 
 
358 See, for example, E.T. Williams, “Opium in China,” 4 March 1913, NA, RG 43, entry 41, box 1, folder: 
Second International Opium Conference: China, 2 of 3, 15, 19, 21. 
 
359 M.R. Nicholson, “Survey of the Narcotic Situation in China and the Far East,” 12 July 1934, Anslinger 
Papers, box 10, file 3, 8. 
 
360 See Slack, Opium, State, and Society, 74-85; McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 25; and 
Kathryn Meyer and Terry Parssinen, Webs of Smoke: Smugglers, Warlords, Spies, and the History of the 
International Drug Trade (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 144-45. 
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to at least one year in prison for those under twenty-five years of age and up to three years 
for others.361 
Jiang made sure that his domestic campaign scored points with the international 
movement.  For example, in 1930 the Chinese government reported to the League’s Opium 
Advisory Committee that opium smoking was being suppressed with “the guilty punished 
without exercising leniency.”  The report stressed that over eighteen thousand people were 
convicted of opium violations that year.362 
Jiang again hiked the penalties during the mid-1930s.  Unauthorized opium smokers 
risked a prison term of six months to two years and compulsory detention in a detoxification 
prison.363 Second offenders or those caught smoking after detoxification faced a sentence of 
one to three years and forced detoxification.  A third opium smoking offense triggered the 
death penalty.  People caught using manufactured drugs (cocaine, morphine, or morphine-
based “colored pills”) faced one to three years in prison, and detoxification.  An offense after 
forced detoxification or a second offence brought a three to seven year term.  Those caught a 
third time, such as Ms. Chang, were to be executed.364 In 1935 Jiang proclaimed the tougher 
 
361 There were also fines that could reach the equivalent of one thousand U.S. dollars. A translation of the law is 
in Memorandum by Frank P. Lockhart, 24 September 1929, NA, RG 59, Decimal File, 1910 to January 1963, 
893.114/Narcotic Laws/ 22. Also see enclosures with translations in Commissioner for Foreign Affairs to 
Senior Consul, 13 February 1928; and Lampson to Henderson, 17 September 1929, both reproduced in Foreign 
Office, The Opium Trade, 1910-1941 vol. 5 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1974), pt. 25: 108-109, pt. 26: 
52-55. 
 
362 “China Annual Report for 1930,” 18 December 1931, LONA, O.C. 23(e), R.3232, file: 23002 Annual 
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approach as the “Six Year Opium Suppression Plan.”  Each year after 1935 one fifth of 
registered smokers were to be shunted into forced detoxification.  After 1936 anyone found 
using manufactured drugs faced a three to seven year prison term after forced detoxification.  
The death penalty was the fate for anyone caught smoking opium or using drugs after 
detoxification.365 
Jiang’s government detailed the penalties imposed to the League’s Opium Advisory 
Committee thus demonstrating adherence to the punitive regime.  A 1935 report described 
31,259 drug offenders: sixty-seven were fined, 6,533 were imprisoned (fifty for life terms), 
995 were executed, and 16,515 were sent to detoxification prisons.366 Reports for the next 
year indicated that the majority of offenders were opium smokers: out of around twenty 
thousand convictions, 339 were for opium trafficking, 11,967 for opium smoking, 1,074 for 
operating an opium den, and 3,261 were manufactured drug users caught again after a forced 
detoxification.367 China also reported to the League that it had created 4,397 detoxification 
prisons from 1935 to 1940 including “mobile units” in remote areas.368 During those years 
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the government reported the forced detoxification of at least 2,457,489 people and the 
standard imprisonment of 135,754 drug offenders.369 
China’s numerous reports of long prison sentences and the execution of drug users 
helped China avoid criticism at the Opium Advisory Committee for the continuing 
governmental opium sales.  Rather than dwelling on the swelling ranks of Chinese who 
registered to buy opium from the government (a number that would surpass four million by 
1937), foreign observers viewed the harsh punishments as proof of progress on opium 
control.370 The Opium Advisory Committee responded with official praise (despite some 
disquietude over the executions) supporting the Chinese “campaign against the drug evil” 
and “paid a unanimous tribute to the determined efforts” of the Chinese government.  The 
committee even surmised that the Chinese policies would “react favorably on the rest of the 
world.”371 The reports also struck U.S. observers as evidence of a success story.  For 
example, the American representative on the Opium Advisory Committee in 1934 lauded 
Chinese enforcement tactics, asserting that the “present situation is, above all, a police 
question” and stressing that the “existence of prohibition laws in China was a symbol which 
tended to keep alive in the minds of people the principle of total prohibition in the use of 
opium for non-medical purposes.”372 Stuart Fuller, Assistant Chief of the State Department 
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, collected extra reports of the strict policies, including the 
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executions of smokers, from U.S. officials in China.373 Stuart Allen, the American Consul 
General at Yantai (Chefoo), was also impressed by the executions.  In 1937 he relayed one 
addict’s experience with Chinese enforcement. Upon his release from a three year prison 
term for a drug offense, the government tattooed his arm with the Chinese character for 
“poison.”  Caught a second time, the government added another tattoo (the character for 
“scorpion”) and then shot him.374 The appreciation of Nationalist China’s punitive approach 
by U.S. officials would continue into the 1960s when Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
Commissioner Harry Anslinger was still lauding Jiang for removing the “bonds by which 
Opium held the people.”  Anslinger explained: “This was accomplished by 1,000 executions 
yearly for trafficking or opium smoking.”375 
Part III. Selective Adoption in British India 
 
British India opted to punish cocaine users while still allowing raw opium eating. 
Officials in British India viewed raw opium eating as a traditional type of drug use that 
inflicted little harm and offered medical benefits.  They viewed cocaine use as a foreign 
threat.  Thus British India joined the punitive regime even with the continued defense of 
“traditional” drug consumption.  British Indian officials endorsed the international treaties 
banning cocaine use and raised the penalties for violations.  They reported the enforcement to 
Geneva as evidence of cooperation in the international drug control movement. 
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Fitting the Punitive Regime to Local Mores  
 
British Indian officials equated cocaine use with vice as well as foreign production 
and distribution networks.  Cocaine was delivered by rail, purchased in urban settings, and 
mostly used for pleasure (by chewing, often with betel nut).376 In contrast, raw opium eating 
was connected to rural life, the agricultural economy, and the lack of medical services.377 
Common explanations for a global increase of recreational cocaine use in the early twentieth 
century included a social fabric tattered by war, a burgeoning “bohemian” urban nightlife, 
and—of course—the excessive manufacture of cocaine.378 A cocaine-infused lifestyle 
famously emerged in interwar London, Paris and Berlin.379 But, the trend spread far beyond 
Western Europe.380 By the 1930s, according to one estimate, India had perhaps half a million 
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cocaine users including both Muslims and Hindus.381 Users included medical professionals, 
landowners, merchants, students, and prostitutes, all seeking the drugs’ “gentle excitement,” 
and mental or sexual stimulation.382 A 1930 study of two hundred Indian cocaine “addicts” 
signaled the importance of social factors.  Fifty-five percent cited association with other users 
as the cause of their habit.  A little of 25 percent cited “luxury and pleasure” or “curiosity and 
fancy.”  A little over 6 percent blamed fatigue or worry.383 
While tenaciously defending “traditional” drug use in the treaty talks, British Indian 
officials supported the U.S. call to ban cocaine use.  At the Hague convention State 
Department officials had encouraged British delegates to address British India’s call for 
cocaine controls.  The British delegates endorsed the views of J.B. Brunyate, Acting 
Financial Secretary to the Government of India, who defended raw opium use as a part of 
Indian culture while depicting cocaine as a threat to the country.384 Officials feared that 
proscription of raw opium eating would help to popularize cocaine, which they considered to 
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be much more detrimental habit.385 The distinction remained central to Indian policy with 
Sir John Campbell’s term as India’s representative to the Opium Advisory Committee from 
1921 to 1934.  Campbell endorsed the American interpretation of the Hague Opium 
Convention that held that the non-medical use of manufactured drugs such as cocaine would 
have been eliminated if the convention had been properly applied across the globe.386 Lord 
Robert Cecil, another British diplomat, announced at the Geneva convention that cocaine was 
the “gravest possible evil” in India.387 
Officials in British India thus adhered to the regime for cocaine users.  Controls of 
cocaine use had begun in the early twentieth century at the provincial level, spreading 
generally throughout British India by around 1908.388 A more comprehensive ban, with 
stiffer penalties, came via Great Britain’s signature of the Hague Opium Convention on 
behalf of British India.  In response to the treaty, revised laws raised the penalties for illicit 
cocaine use.389 Political scientist M. Emdad-ul Haq notes that, following from the Hague 
convention, “the government of India banned the ‘possession’ of non-medicinal cocaine in 
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all the provinces.”390 For example, Bengal and the Central Provinces raised the maximum 
penalties for cocaine offenses in 1915 to one year of imprisonment and a fine of two 
thousand rupees.391 A 1922 commentator called the cocaine controls in India (and Burma) 
“stringent and severe.”392 Drawing again on the treaty system, this time responding to the 
Second Geneva Convention, India increased the penalties for cocaine use with the Dangerous 
Drugs Act of 1930.  This further raised the penalties for illicit possession of manufactured 
drugs such as cocaine to a maximum of two years in prison or a fine and four years 
imprisonment for a second offense.393 
British Indian officials sent reports of the penalties imposed to the League of Nations 
to demonstrate their adherence to the punitive regime.  The First World War disrupted the 
delivery of cocaine to India.  With peace, cocaine delivery to the sub-continent resumed.394 
The United Provinces blamed a surge in cocaine possession offenses in 1919 on the war’s 
end: there were just eleven arrests relating to cocaine in 1918, whereas in 1919 thirty-nine 
people were arrested just for illicit possession.395 The Bombay Presidency arrested fifty-
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seven people for illicit cocaine possession in 1919 and 119 in 1920.396 India’s annual report 
to the League’s Opium Advisory Committee for 1925 noted that police across India had 
arrested 1,576 people for cocaine offenses and secured 1,227 convictions.397 However, the 
Statesmen (a conservative English language daily) complained that the “cocaine menace in 
Calcutta” continued as the arrests touched only the “dupes and victims of the traffic [who 
were] trapped and punished” instead of the “men who pull the strings and the profits.”398 
Reports forwarded to Geneva for 1926 included convictions for cocaine possession in the 
Province of Bihar and Orissa and described cocaine in paper packets for retail 
consumption.399 In 1930 British India again raised the penalties.  The report to the League of 
Nations cited 790 people who had been arrested for cocaine offenses (excluding cross-border 
smuggling).400 The Opium Advisory Committee responded with alarm, stressing that 
cocaine was “streaming” into India.401 However, the numbers of cocaine convictions 
dropped over the decade, probably due more to the war-related reduction of cocaine 
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production in Germany and Japan than the increased penalties.402 India reported just seven 
arrests for cocaine violations to the League in 1935.403 Ten years later the numbers reported 
remained low: again just seven arrests resulting in five convictions and penalties of fines and 
imprisonment.404 
Part IV. Southern Africa: The Regime as Social Control   
 
Led by the Union of South Africa, settler colonial governments across southern 
Africa used anti-drug enforcement as a tool to socially control native Africans.  The drive to 
control native subjects inspired Union officials to support the U.S. push to include a ban on 
cannabis use within the punitive regime.  When cannabis control finally entered the treaty 
system, in the Second Geneva Convention, the punishment of native African cannabis users 
gained a new significance.  Settler colonial governments reported punishment to the League 
as evidence of their participation in global drug control.   
 
The Cannabis Complex 
The prerogatives and insecurities inherent in settler colonialism in southern Africa 
quickened the urge to control native people and police cultural practices deemed offensive by 
settlers, including non-medical cannabis use.  Colonial administrators in the Union of South 
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Africa began to raise criminal penalties for cannabis use early in the twentieth century.405 
Legislation in 1907 was based on complaints that the traditional habit of cannabis smoking 
made native Africans “indolent and stupid.”  Suspicions about the connection between 
cannabis use and lunacy also prompted the legislation, but the Medical Council related no 
cases of madness.406 The bill imposed a fine of twenty-five pounds for infractions.  
Following independence in 1910, officials in the Union of South Africa continued to proceed 
against cannabis use in a manner reflecting a commitment to impose the cultural viewpoints 
of colonial powers upon a colonized population.  A 1922 law increased the penalties for 
cannabis smoking to a one hundred pound fine or imprisonment for up to six months, or 
both.407 Charles J. Pisar, U.S. Consul in Charge, wrote to Washington from Cape Town in 
1923 asserting that Union officials were stamping out the “evil” drug that made “the native 
or Negro population, and the mixed colored element” become “violent in their actions.”408 A
governmental report issued the next year explained that cannabis smoking was “widespread 
amongst the native races, notably the Hottentots, Swazis, Zulus, and Basutos” and caused 
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frenzies of violence, murder, and rape.  White farmers blamed cannabis for “bad tempered” 
and “unreliable” labor.409 
These attitudes spurred Union officials to support the ongoing U.S. effort to advance 
cannabis control within the international drug control movement.  American officials had 
been calling for strict control from the outset.  After the 1909 Shanghai Commission, Wright 
and Brent pushed to include cannabis in the upcoming 1911-1912 talks at The Hague, 
worried that opium suppression would promote cannabis use.410 However, the final Hague 
Opium Convention bent to French and British colonial concerns about rushing to criminalize 
a habit that was widely practiced in their colonies (particularly in North Africa and the Indian 
Sub-Continent).411 Thus, the Hague Opium Convention’s protocol of cloture merely called 
for further study of cannabis from the “statistical and scientific point of view” in order to 
evaluate the need for “internal legislation” or “international agreement” about proscription.412 
In 1923 the Union of South Africa spurred another attempt.  The Union proposed to the 
League’s Opium Advisory Committee that cannabis “should be treated as one of the habit-
forming drugs” and included in control treaties.413 This proposal helped to introduce 
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cannabis to the Second Geneva Convention of 1925, where the American delegation asserted 
a general principle against non-medical drug use (including cannabis).  A subcommittee 
appointed to study the issue of cannabis also backed a ban.  However, resistance, particularly 
from British India, kept a rigorous ban out of the treaty.414 Nonetheless, the finalized Second 
Geneva Convention deemed cannabis to be dangerous enough to limit its international trade 
to amounts based upon medical necessity.415 
Though the Second Geneva Convention stipulated only trade regulations, the treaty 
spurred nations to introduce the drug into the punitive regime, which lent an international 
significance to the Union of South Africa’s cannabis policies.  Legal cannabis use became an 
anachronism during the interwar period.  Only a handful of states continued to regulate legal 
access to cannabis while upholding their treaty requirements (notably Siam, Tunisia, 
Morocco, and British India).416 The far more prevalent route was to include cannabis in 
existing legislation that banned non-medical use of manufactured drugs.  Accordingly 
cannabis was legally defined as a “narcotic” in many countries and the drug was often 
criminalized in the absence of domestic concern about its use.417 As cannabis control entered 
the punitive regime, the Union of South Africa’s cannabis policies gained a new relevance.  
What was before a function of local social controls against native Africans’ cultural 
traditions then became evidence that the Union was doing its share to combat the 
 
414 For a overview of the proceedings see OAC, “Preliminary Note on the Chief Aspects of the Problem of 
Indian Hemp and the Laws Relating Thereto in Force in Certain Countries,” 23 May 1934, LONA, O.C. 1542, 
1-3. 
 
415 See Chapters IV and V of the Second Opium Conference. Copy in Buell, International Opium Conferences 
With Relevant Documents, 179-80. 
 
416 OAC, “Preliminary Note on the Chief Aspects of the Problem of Indian Hemp and the Laws Relating 
Thereto in Force in Certain Countries,” 23 May 1934, LONA, O.C. 1542, 17, 40-45, 48-49, 55-56, 59-61, 
quotations on page 44. 
 
417 For an example see the description of Britain’s 1925 Dangerous Drugs Act, passed in accordance with the 
Second Geneva Convention, in Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion, 189.  
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international traffic in dangerous drugs (even if the cannabis was grown and smoked within 
the Union). 
Union officials sent detailed reports to the League’s Opium Advisory Committee 
linking domestic enforcement to the international movement.  A portrait of the social control 
imposed by the government upon the native population through cannabis proscription 
emerged from the conviction figures.  Summary figures reached impressive totals.  For 
example, the total number of convictions rose from 3,504 in 1925 to 7,576 in 1935.418 The 
trend continued, reaching a total of 14,016 convictions shortly after the Second World War.  
As presented in Table 5, the number of convictions of “natives” outpaced all others from 
1925 into the postwar era.  Convictions of “other coloured” people, meaning people of mixed 
race and South Asian immigrants, were a distant second.  Convictions of whites were 
comparatively rare. 
418 See Union of South Africa, “Annual Report on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs,” 26 March 
1926, LONA, O.C. 23(y)14; OAC, “Summary of Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and 
Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1934,” 14 July 1936, LONA, C.299.M.182.1936.XI, O.C. 1621(1), 136; 
and Union of South Africa, “Annual Report on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs,” 14 
December 1936, LONA, C.512.M.324.1936.XI, R.4979, file: Annual Reports, 1935, South Africa, 2. 
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Table 5: Cannabis Possession Convictions in the Union of South Africa  
Source: Union of South Africa, “Annual Report on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous 
Drugs,” 26 March 1926, LONA, O.C. 23(n)3, 5; Union of South Africa, “Annual Report on the 
Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs,” 3 November 1931, LONA, O.C. 23(w)20, 4; and John 
Mitchell Watt, “Dagga in South Africa,” Bulletin on Narcotics 13 (July-September 1961): 9-14. 
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Settler colonial governments across southern African also fit the social control of 
native Africans within the punitive regime in practice.  An overview of reports sent to the 
League of Nations about cannabis enforcement in southern Africa documented the trend.419 
Portuguese colonialists in Mozambique passed legislation to fine cannabis violators, unless 
the convicted person was a “native,” in which case imprisonment for up to twenty days 
would be the punishment.420 Angola also punished the use of cannabis by “natives.”421 In 
tiny Swaziland, British colonials imposed fines and hard labor for up to three months on 115 
“natives” in 1932, based on a 1925 law against cannabis possession.422 British Northern 
Rhodesia [Zambia] banned cannabis possession in 1919 (though a colonist noted in 1934 that 
“probably the amount grown and smoked is as much the same to-day” as before the First 
World War).423 During the Second World War the country reported 170 prosecutions for 
illicit possession (and six for illicit sale), all of whom were “Africans.”424 British Southern 
Rhodesia [Zimbabwe] reported comparable figures, but with an additional penalty inflicted 
 
419 For a discussion of the issue see OAC, “Preliminary Note on the Chief Aspects of the Problem of Indian 
Hemp and the Laws Relating Thereto in Force in Certain Countries,” 23 May 1934, LONA, O.C. 1542. 
 
420 OAC, “Preliminary Note on the Chief Aspects of the Problem of Indian Hemp and the Laws Relating 
Thereto in Force in Certain Countries,” 23 May 1934, LONA, O.C. 1542, 66. 
 
421 OAC, “Summary of Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs 
for the Year 1934,” LONA, C.299.M.182.1936.XI, O.C. 1621(1), 143. 
 
422 OAC, “Preliminary Note on the Chief Aspects of the Problem of Indian Hemp and the Laws Relating 
Thereto in Force in Certain Countries,” 23 May 1934, LONA, O.C. 1542, 65. Also see OAC, “Summary of 
Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1934,” 
LONA, C.299.M.182.1936.XI, O.C. 1621(1), 141; and OAC, “Reports from Governments on the Illicit Traffic 
in 1941,” 17 December 1942, LONA, O.C.S. 323, 39. 
 
423 Wilfred Robertson, “African Drug Addicts,” August 1934, copy in Anslinger Papers, box 9, file 10.  The 
Northern Rhodesia Native Drugs Proclamation of 1919 was noted in OAC, “Northern Rhodesia Response to the 
Opium Questionnaire,” 5 November 1931, LONA, O.C. 13(v).   
 
424 OAC, “Northern Rhodesia Annual Report, 1940” 3 December 1941, LONA, C.82.M.79.1941.XI, R.5027, 
file: 1940 Annual Reports on Opium Traffic, Northern Rhodesia, 2. 
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by “cuts with the cane.”425 The 1937 report noted that 113 “natives” were punished for illicit 
possession of cannabis, with prison terms aggregating seventy-two months and three weeks 
with hard labor.  The report warned readers who were not acquainted with conditions in 
African territories not to interpret the widespread punishment of “natives” as evidence of 
“extensive indulgence” in dangerous drugs in Southern Rhodesia, aside from cannabis.426 
Part V. Egypt’s “Modern” Problem 
Neocolonial officials in Egypt advanced punishment on a grand scale in the 1920s.  
They were convinced that widespread drug use represented a novel threat to Egyptian 
society.  Thus Egyptian officials joined in the international anti-drug diplomacy, raised the 
penalties for non-medical use dramatically, and sent detailed reports to the League of Nations 
to demonstrate adherence to the punitive regime.   
 
Mass Punishment 
 
During the 1920s Egyptian drug policy underwent a transformation as neocolonial 
officials reinterpreted the significance of drug use.  Non-medical drug consumption had been 
popular in the nineteenth century.  The production and consumption of cannabis and opium 
had developed under Ottoman rule.  Cannabis was usually converted into hash and smoked in 
water pipes.  Opium was usually eaten raw from the dried capsules and seeds of the poppy 
plant.  The two drugs were also mixed, singly or together, into aromatic confections known 
 
425 OAC, “Summary of Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs 
for the Year 1934,” LONA, C.299.M.182.1936.XI, O.C. 1621(1), 112, 140.   
 
426 OAC, “Southern Rhodesia Annual Report, 1937,” 23 June 1939, LONA, C.193.M.122.1939.XI, 
O.C./A.R.1937/124.   
 
143
as magoun, manzoul, and garawish.427 Up to the First World War, the British had merely 
imposed regulations meant to dampen domestic cannabis use.  These measures were 
haphazardly enforced and focused upon eliminating public smoking in cafes.428 
An enterprising colonial bureaucrat, Sir Thomas Wentworth Russell (who would 
weather Egypt’s 1922 transition to nominal independence) popularized a new, alarmist 
viewpoint.  Russell argued that the inexorable advance of economic development made 
“traditional” types of drug use destructive in new ways.  Thus he saw the disruption of 
pastoral life as the root of a new drug problem.  Flooding caused by industrial irrigation 
projects had spread diseases that weakened agricultural laborers. A “desire for drugs” arose 
from the laborer’s need to recover physical strength as well as wage earning and sexual 
capacities.429 According to Russell, even with some amounts of hashish “addiction” before 
the First World War, there had been “no more healthy, hard-working and cheerful class of 
person in the world than the Egyptian agricultural laborer.  Today, every village in Egypt has 
its heroin victims and they are the youth of the country.”430 Worse, the drug use had touched 
the upper class.  The Egyptian Gazette amplified Russell’s depiction asserting that cocaine 
 
427 See “Egyptian Government Response to Opium Questionnaire,” March 29, 1922, LONA, O.C. 13(s.2), 3, 6; 
Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem, 375, 377; Sabry Girgis, “Some Observations on the Situation 
Concerning Drug Addiction and Habituation in the Province of Egypt, UAR,” 11 February 1959, UNDCPA, 
item 129, file: 27671, Drug Addiction, UAR, 6; OAC, “Subcommittee on Cannabis,” 24 January 1939, copy in 
Anslinger Papers box 3, file 1, 3; and Russell Egyptian Service, 232. 
 
428 There were only ten convictions for smoking cannabis in public during 1920.  The average penalty was 6.1 
days in jail and a small fine. See Ministry of the Interior, Annual Report of the Alexandria City Police, 1920-
1921 (Cairo: Government Press, 1923), 19, 22.  
 
429 Russell continued to blame disease and a lack of economic development for the fellahin’s desire to use 
opium. See Russell, Egyptian Service, 41; Russell’s comments in, OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of 
the Fifteenth Session,” 15 April to 4 May 1932, LONA, O.C. 1441(2), Col.307, 12/36824/3522; and Francis L. 
Spalding, “Comments by Lewa Sir Thomas Russell Pasha on Narcotic Situation in Egypt,” 17 April 1941, NA, 
RG 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, 883/114/573.  
 
430 OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of the Thirteenth Session,” 20 January to 14 February 1930, 
LONA, Col.307, 12/17873/3522, 14.  
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had enticed “sons of the wealthy notables” and “richer people in the cities.”431 By 1925 
Russell informed the League’s Opium Advisory Committee that Egyptians were “rapidly 
becoming a race of drug addicts.”432 Four years later he complained, “whereas twenty years 
ago practically the only drug used in the country was hashish, today the country is flooded 
with hasheesh and heroin.”433 
Russell led Egypt to affirm the punitive regime.  In 1925 Egypt participated in the 
Geneva Opium Conference, joining in the push to ban cannabis use as well as “traditional” 
opium use.434 Egypt adhered to the convention in 1926 and followed through domestically 
with tough legislation.  The penalties for illicit possession of cannabis and manufactured 
drugs reached a maximum of one year in prison and a one hundred Egyptian pound fine for a 
first offense.  A revision to the law soon increased the punishment to a maximum of five 
years in prison and a one thousand Egyptian pound fine.435 The Egyptian government 
 
431 “Russell Pasha is Right,” Egyptian Gazette, 24 December 1924, reproduced in NA, RG 59, Internal Affairs 
of Egypt, 1910-1929, roll 13, 883.114/5.   
 
432 OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of the Ninth Session of the Committee,” 3 February 1927, LONA, 
C.29.M.19.1927.XI, R.709, 12a/28496/1717, 7.  
 
433 Russell’s biographer drew upon the idea that 1920s drug consumerism was a modern threat in Egypt in the 
title of his book. See Harry D’Erlanger, The Last Plague of Egypt (London: Lovat Dickson & Thompson, 
1936). Quotation in text from Russell to Delevingne, 23 May 1929, NA, RG 59, Internal Affairs of Egypt, 
1910-1929, roll 13, 883.114/8. 
 
434 The Egyptian government had expressed willingness to join the Hague Opium Convention and the 
government of the Netherlands, charged with overseeing the administration of the convention, had invited 
Egypt to join, but the effort fell off inexplicably during the war. See the related correspondence including 
Cheetham to Grey, 19 July 1914; Grey to Chilton, 30 July 1914; Chilton to Grey, 4 August 1914, Grey to 
Chilton, 22 December 1914; all reproduced in Foreign Office, The Opium Trade, 1910-1941 vol. 3 
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1974), pt. 8: 125-49. The delay continued into the 1920s, as noted in Scott 
to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 18 February 1922, reproduced in Foreign Office, The Opium Trade, 
1910-1941 vol. 5 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1974), pt. 17: 24-25. Also see Second Opium Conference, 
“Proposal by the Egyptian Delegation,” 27 November 1924, LONA, O.D.C. 44, R.789, 12a/41081/37877; 
Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem, 374-84. Second Opium Conference, “Subcommittee ‘B,’ Art. 
I of the American Proposals,” 4 February 1925, LONA, O.D.C/S.C.B/12, R.788, 12a/40800/37887. 
 
435 See translation of “Law Regulating The Traffic In and Employment of Narcotic Substances,” in NA, RG 59, 
Internal Affairs of Egypt, 1910-1929, roll 13, 883.114/11; and Russell, Egyptian Service, 225.  
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subsequently announced that these laws brought Egyptian legislation “into line with laws in 
other countries and with the international treaties.”436 However, Dr. Abdel Khalek Selim, an 
observer, complained in 1927 that the Egyptian law still was “too lenient and did not 
favorably compare with the laws” of Britain and the United States.437 Legislation passed the 
next year specifically penalized non-medical consumption of manufactured drugs with a 
minimum prison term of six months and maximum of three years and fines from thirty to 
three hundred Egyptian pounds.438 Persons judged to be “addicts” were considered 
“delinquents” and subject to the same penalties.  Convictions could also be announced in 
newspapers and the offenders ceded “political and electoral rights” for five years.439 
Egyptian police enforced the tougher new laws into action and officials sent detailed 
reporting to Geneva to demonstrate Egypt’s adherence to the punitive regime.  The year 1928 
marked a beginning of the tough approach [see Table 6].  That year police made 5,600 
prosecutions in Cairo alone.  Following his appointment as director of Egypt’s newly 
founded Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Russell also took charge of enforcement and 
reporting to the League of Nations that year.440 Reports detailed equally high numbers of 
 
436 Col. Ahmed A. El Hadka, “Forty Years of the Campaign Against Narcotic Drugs in the United Arab 
Republic,” Bulletin on Narcotics 17 (October-December 1965): 1-12. 
 
437 OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of the Fifteenth Session,” 15 April to 4 May 1932, LONA, O.C. 
1441(2), Col.307, 12/36824/3522, 7. Also see J. Morton Howell’s dispatch dated 26 January 1927 in NA, RG 
59, Internal Affairs of Egypt, 1910-1929, roll 13, 883.114/28.  
 
438 “Aspects of the Narcotic Drug Problem,” Egyptian Gazette, 27 March 1941, copy in NA, RG 59, Decimal 
File 1940-1944, 883.114/570. 
439 See “Egyptian Response to the Addiction Questionnaire,” 24 September 1947, UNDCPA, item 4, file: SOA 
25/01 Part “B”, Drug Addiction Questionnaire to Governments; OAC, “Penalties Applicable under the Law on 
Narcotics,” 23 April 1932, LONA, O.C. 1433, Y4; CNIB, Annual Report for 1930 (Cairo: Government Press, 
1931), 80; and OAC, “Preliminary Note on the Chief Aspects of the Problem of Indian Hemp and the Laws 
Relating Thereto in Force in Certain Countries,” 23 May 1934, LONA, O.C. 1542, 61-62. 
 
440 See Russell, Egyptian Service, 227; and Article 15 of Chapter 6 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture 
and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, Official Journal 12 (1931), 1805. 
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arrests in 1929 when 5,681 people were in prison for illicit possession or “addiction” charges 
(1,813 were imprisoned on trafficking charges).  That year at least “one quarter of the 
population of the prisons” were drug users or addicts.441 Most offenders in the reports were 
punished for drug use.  When the Egyptian reports specified drug convictions as either 
“possession,” “trafficking,” “addiction,” or “cultivation” offenses, possession convictions 
were by far the most common.442 According to one accounting reported to Geneva, there 
were over twenty thousand people convicted and imprisoned as “addicts” and over fifteen 
thousand people convicted under trafficking offenses that included possession from 1929 to 
1940.443 
Egypt’s reports to Geneva (also handsomely published for the public) were 
outstanding examples of government interest in compliance with the regime.  In one 
example, Russell called upon the assistance of eighty-two clerks working for over seven 
months, to create “addict” estimates (based on prison statistics and extrapolations from 
surveys by a selection of local leaders and officials).444 He conceded that the local officials 
had underrepresented the actual total, not wanting to associate their area of control with high-
rates of drug use.  Accordingly, Russell believed that the estimates represented only the “best 
known and more obvious addicts,” whom the local leaders could not avoid reporting.445 
Down from an initial half a million total in 1929, Russell’s estimates settled to around thirty-
 
441 CNIB, Annual Report for the Year 1929 (Cairo: Government Press, 1930), 35. 
 
442 For an example see the table noting that “possession” offenses were twice as common as the “trafficking,” 
“addiction,” and “cultivation” combined for 1933-1935 in CNIB, Egyptian Annual Report for the Year 1935 
(Cairo: Government Press, 1936), 108-109. 
 
443 CNIB, Egyptian Annual Report for the Year 1940 (Cairo: Government Press, 1941), 96.  
 
444 CNIB, Interim Report to End of June 1935 (Cairo: Government Press, 1934), xi. 
 
445 See CNIB, Egyptian Annual Report for the Year 1929 (Cairo: Government Press, 1930), 36; and CNIB, 
Egyptian Annual Report for the Year 1932 (Cairo: Government Press, 1933), 100-112. For a more optimistic 
appraisal see CNIB, Egyptian Annual Report for the Year 1934 (Cairo: Government Press, 1933), 159. 
147
seven thousand in 1932 and dropped to around nineteen thousand by 1938.446 Since the 
Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau held that illicit possession was evidence of addiction, 
the estimates included such examples as a 1932 report that lumped 282,000 “hashish-addicts” 
in with “93,000 opium-addicts, and 54,000 heroin addicts.”447 Raw opium and cannabis 
remained the most popular drugs, while heroin and cocaine were less common.448 A 1930
survey of four hundred “prisoner addicts” suggested the quotidian nature of the possession 
convictions: the top four professions represented were coffee-shopmen, farmers, shoemakers, 
and fruit dealers [see Figure 5].  They were likely to be repeat offenders, as only 44 percent 
had no prior drug convictions and most were between twenty and thirty years old.449 The 
records for 1935 included a milkman, a coffee-shopman, and a white-washer who were 
sentenced to two years in prison and fines while two farmers, three coffee-shopmen, and a 
wool-spinner were sentenced to five years and fines, all convictions for “addiction.”450 
446 See CNIB, Egyptian Annual Report for the Year 1932 (Cairo: Government Press, 1933), 100-112; and 
CNIB, Egyptian Annual Report for the Year 1938 (Cairo: Government Press, 1939), 132. 
 
447 OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of the Fifteenth Session,” 15 April to 4 May 1932, LONA, O.C. 
1441(2), Col.307, 12/36824/3522, 6.   
 
448 “Egyptian Annual Report for 1950,” UNCPA, 81/1 item 10, file: 109/03 Annual Reports Egypt. 
 
449 CNIB, Egyptian Annual Report for the Year 1930 (Cairo: Government Press, 1931), 62-65. 
 
450 CNIB, Egyptian Annual Report for the Year 1935 (Cairo: Government Press, 1936), 108-9. 
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Figure 5: An Egyptian Drug Victim. 
 
The original caption read: “A Drug Victim: In the working clothes of a riveter, brought into 
the Police Station in a state of collapse.”  The “victim” would be sentenced as an “addict” to a prison 
term between six months and three years and ordered to pay a fine from thirty to three hundred 
Egyptian pounds.   
 
Source: Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1929 (Cairo: 
Government Press, 1930), facing page 38. 
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Table 6: Peak Number of Drug Convicts in Egyptian Prisons, 1929-1940  
 
The figures for “traffickers” also represented some drug users, who were “addicts” or were caught 
with small amounts of illegal drugs. An exact accounting is not possible based on these reports.  
There were a number of reasons why the number of convictions fell off over the 1930s.  Russell 
identified three causes: the increased price of illicit heroin, the economic depression which lowered 
purchasing power and worsened the poverty of the fellahin, and the severity of the enforcement of the 
drug law.451 A fourth reason was the limitation of policing powers.452 Russell complained in 1929 
that the estimated half a million drug users (roughly split evenly between heroin and cannabis) faced 
an “infinitesimal” risk of being arrested and imprisoned.453 
Source: Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Egyptian Annual Report for the Years 1929-1940 
(Cairo: Government Press, 1930-1941). 
451 OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of the Sixteenth Session,” 15-31 May 1933, LONA, Col.307, 
12/4716/4313, 17. 
 
452 See, for example, Russell’s comments about the estimates of drug users in CNIB, Egyptian Annual Report 
for the Year 1932 (Cairo: Government Press, 1933), 100-12. 
 
453 See CNIB, Annual Report for the Year 1929 (Cairo: Government Press, 1930), 35; and CNIB, Interim Report 
to End of June 1929 (Cairo: Government Press, 1929), 6. 
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There were notable ironies in Russell’s depiction of drug use as a modern scourge and 
his adoption of the punitive regime.  Russell’s major concern had been manufactured drug 
use, especially heroin, but the stiffened approach sentenced cannabis users to prison as 
well.454 This policy seemed harsh considering Russell’s 1933 statement to the Opium 
Advisory Committee: “There are plenty of normal Egyptian laborers who look upon and 
enjoy a pipe or two of hashish now and then in much the same spirit as their more educated 
cousins look upon a glass or two of whiskey and a visit to the cinema—an evening’s 
amusement in enjoyable company.”455 The crackdown on all types of drug use also 
increased the number of injecting drug users, which created more health problems.  
Government investigation located syringe sharing as a vector spreading malaria.456 Syringe 
injection became a favorite method of opiate administration by the end of the 1930s, even as 
a shortage of heroin prompted “infusions” of prepared and raw opium.  An Egyptian 
physician noted in 1939 that hypodermic injections were the most common form of opiate 
use, whereas the “old way” of eating a small amount of opium, “which seems to be a method 
that can be pursued for many years without producing the uncontrollable habit or destroying 
the user’s health” had become “rare.”457 
Despite such negative factors, Russell remained committed to the punitive approach.  
His faith in the utility of “long term sentences” remained strong, as he held that drug users 
 
454 OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of the Thirteenth Session,” 20 January to 14 February 1930, 
LONA, Col.307, 12/17873/3522, box 104, 14.  
 
455 CNIB, Annual Report for 1933 (Cairo: Government Press, 1934), 54, 156. 
 
456 CNIB, Interim Report to the End of June 1929 (Cairo: Government Press, 1929), 7. 
 
457 “The Opium Menace,” Egyptian Mail, 20 April 1939, copy in NA, RG 59, Internal Affairs of Egypt, 1930-
1939, roll 10, 883.114/387. OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of the Twenty-Fourth Session,” 15 May 
to 12 June 1939, LONA, C.202.M.131.1939.XI, O.C. 1773(1), 4, 31. 
 
151
would benefit from long periods in prison and a “chance to start clear on leaving prison.”458 
He wrote:    
 
All one could do was to consider addiction and possession as a penal 
offence and condemn the victims to terms of imprisonment sufficiently 
long to break them completely of the habit before they returned again to 
their old life and temptation […]  Obviously similar treatment in the case 
of less primitive people would have been dangerously harsh and in some 
cases might have had fatal results, but it was not so in the case of these 
Egyptian working men. Their sufferings during their first few days of total 
deprivation were certainly acute, but they did not die and in a very short 
time had ceased to suffer or to crave for drugs [see Figure 6].459 
458 CNIB, Annual Report for the Year 1929 (Cairo: Government Press, 1930), 89-90. 
 
459 Russell, Egyptian Service, 234. 
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Figure 6: An Egyptian Opiate Addict Endures Withdrawal Symptoms.   
 
Tawfik Abdalla, Director General of the Egyptians Prisons Department, listed the complaints: 
“general collapse, weak feeble pulse, weeping and crying from general pains, diarrhoea in some 
cases, excessive running of the nose and saliva, insomnia, loss of appetite, general nervousness, [and] 
coughing in some cases.” The prisons and hospitals experimented with injecting blood or serum from 
blisters, among other therapies, but got poor results.  
 
Source: Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Egypt Annual Report for the Year 1931 (Cairo: 
Government Press, 1932), 68, photo facing page 120. 
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Conclusion 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the U.S. diplomatic campaign’s most obvious 
breakthrough came in the Hague Opium Convention.  The convention stipulated that 
signatories pass domestic bans on the non-medical use of manufactured drugs.  This 
breakthrough produced a wave of national drug legislation, particularly in the Americas and 
Europe, that often included other types of drugs as well.  This chapter presented the case of 
the United States to represent that larger trend.  The punitive regime also advanced in more 
subtle ways, and even in the countries that defended “traditional” drug use.  China and 
British India both affirmed the regime without closing exemptions for opium smokers and 
eaters, respectively.  South Africa and Egypt both embraced the regime perceiving that it 
would deliver social and political benefits.  By the end of the interwar period the punitive 
regime was in practice globally.  Legal “traditional” drug use remained in some colonial 
possessions, as a temporary exception to the harmonization of punitive policies.  As Chapter 
Six will explain, the “traditional” exception faced extinction after the Second World War. 
As the regime became operative it created problems for governments.  Prisons 
became overcrowded.  Further, the incarceration of drug users had an unfortunate liability: 
sick prisoners.  In Egypt for example, during the first grim year 1928 a quarter of the drug 
convicts developed withdrawal symptoms so serious that they had to be hospitalized upon 
imprisonment and fifty-four prisoners died while suffering.460 Drug control bureaucrats 
would struggle to manage many such difficulties while enforcing tough bans.  Chapter Five 
examines the specialized programs created by governments to make punitive prohibition 
 
460 These comprised 20 percent of all prisoner fatalities that year. See CNIB, Annual Report for the Year 1929 
(Cairo: Government Press, 1930), 35-36, 44-45. Also see CNIB, Interim Report to End of June 1929 (Cairo: 
Government Press, 1929), 6. 
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work better.  Washington would again assert its preferences and strive for international 
influence. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Managing the Regime’s Fallout in the Interwar Years 
 
New York City Police Commissioner, Colonel Arthur Woods described the suffering 
of an opiate addict deprived of opiates in prison.  By the end of the first day the addict 
became restless, apprehensive, and “fidgety.”  Yawning and sneezing, a running nose and 
watering eyes seemed to signal the onset of a “fresh cold.”  Soon, shaking hands and 
muscular tremors indicated a more serious condition of “acute sickness” with profuse sweats, 
vomiting, diarrhea, and muscle cramps in the abdomen, legs and knees that produced 
weakness “to the point of complete prostration.”  Death could occur in severe cases and, 
Woods suggested, the physical suffering often prompted depression and suicidal thoughts.461 
Woods described just one kind of problem forced by punitive prohibition on prison 
wardens and drug control officials during the interwar years.  These problems were manifest 
not only in the United States but in dozens of countries.  Prisons became overcrowded.  
Prisoners took ill and smuggled drugs into their cells.  Recidivism rates were high.  Addicts 
suffered when cut off from a legal drug supply.  
A general response pattern emerged across nations.  The difficulties spawned by the 
application of punitive prohibition stirred debates at the grassroots that quickly reached the 
press.  Professions linked to the drug issue (namely criminal justice and medicine) adopted 
 
461 Arthur Woods, Dangerous Drugs: The World Fight Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics (New Haven: Yale 
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recommendations about how to improve prohibition.  Finally, governments developed 
programs to make proscriptive policies more efficacious. 
Diverse national programs emerged, mostly in the 1930s.  In the United States, public 
agitation to provide medical treatment for addicts and serious prison overcrowding inspired 
the construction of special prisons with medical trappings.  A range of programs developed 
overseas, often with more emphasis on extending medical assistance within established 
prohibitions.  These included short-term hospitalization and ambulatory addiction 
maintenance for pre-existing addicts.    
The different types of programs developed in parallel but, by the end of the interwar 
period, advocates sought international primacy for their preferred approach.  American 
diplomats advanced the special prisons in the United States as the best model.  
Representatives from foreign governments endorsed the programs with more medical 
content.  Experts within the League of Nations bureaucracies also vied to guide the League’s 
imprimatur toward their favored type of program.  Ultimately the Americans, whose 
government had made the largest investment both in diplomacy and in funding a program, 
would have the most pull guiding the League’s endorsement. 
 
Part I. U.S. Prisons with Medical Trappings 
 
By the late 1920s the federal government had worked out a program that lent medical 
trappings to the punitive approach.  The enforcement of the 1914 Harrison Act had triggered 
a public backlash when opiate addicts learned of their tough, new quandary: to risk arrest or 
withdrawal sickness.  The Treasury Department allowed a brief experiment with addiction 
maintenance but only as a way to compel drug users into closed detoxification centers.  
Serious overcrowding in federal prisons tipped the scale toward action and in 1929 Congress 
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approved construction of two new prisons (built in Kentucky and Texas in the 1930s).  The 
U.S. Public Health Service had opposed the plan and then found itself appointed to assist the 
administration of the “narcotic farms.”  
 
Down on the Farm 
 
When the 1914 Harrison Act took effect, local officials and commentators worried 
that a public health crisis would erupt and appealed to Washington for assistance caring for 
the drug addicts who were cut off from a legal drug supply.  Private physicians were no help 
because they faced aggressive federal prosecution if they prescribed drugs to addicts.462 The 
Mayor of Memphis, E.W. Crump, struck a recurrent theme in 1915.  He asked U.S. Surgeon 
General Rupert Blue, who would represent the United States at the League of Nations eight 
years later, to open the marine hospitals (run by the U.S. Public Health Service [USPHS] for 
U.S. seamen) to all drug addicts during the first month of enforcement.  “We realize that 
something must be done for the unfortunates who are most affected by the new federal law,” 
Crump wrote, “at the same time our City Hospital is now badly overcrowded and it will be a 
physical impossibility for us to care for all who have thus far appealed to us for treatment.”463 
A campaign in the press also pressured the USPHS to give “red tape a kick in the ribs” and 
admit addicts into the federal hospitals.464 
462 Doses had to decrease to be legal, but few doctors were willing to risk having to prove their intention to cure 
rather than to maintain an addict.  United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 46 (1919), upheld the constitutionality of 
the Harrison Act as a revenue measure. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919), ruled that addiction 
maintenance without the intent of a cure (e.g. abstinence) was a violation of the Harrison Act. Also see David T. 
Courtwright, Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001); Caroline Jean Acker, Creating the American Junkie: Addiction Research in the Classic 
Era of Narcotic Control (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 51-54; Musto, American Disease,
121-50. 
 
463 Crump to Blue, 11 March 1915, NA, RG 90 Central File, 1897-1923, box 204, file 2123, 1915. 
 
464 Citizens joined the call. See for example, Mrs. P.A. to Anyone who has power to amend the new Harrison 
Drug Law, 15 March 15, NA, RG 90 Central File, 1897-1923, box 204, file 2123, 1915. Quotation in text from 
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Surgeon General Blue and the USPHS rejected responsibility for drug treatment and 
offered only “professional advice.”465 The caution was pragmatic because of the dearth of 
successful therapies and the belief that state governments were responsible for such health 
issues.  The advice dispensed by the USPHS was non-committal: because individual cases 
varied, “no rule-of-thumb method” would suffice.466 Blue explained to Senator Joseph 
Eugene Ransdell (D-LA), Chair of Committee on Public Health and National Quarantine, 
that it would be “impracticable to advocate any general method” of addiction treatment.467 
The USPHS remained skeptical about a crisis in the months following the onset of 
enforcement.  For example, USPHS official Martin Wilbert noted in 1916 that the alarming 
predictions of besieged hospitals, a crime wave, and “a trail of suicide and death” had not 
come to pass, although local hospital admissions had indeed increased.468 With no crime or 
public health epidemic forcing its hand, the USPHS remained wary of assuming 
responsibility for administering treatment therapies that its experts considered to be 
“failures.”469 
The rising number of arrests following escalating enforcement around 1919 finally 
prompted federal action.  A special committee organized by the Treasury Department issued 
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a report that year estimating one million addicts in the United States and urging both the state 
and federal government to act to provide “care and treatment.”470 The Commissioner of the 
Internal Revenue Bureau, Daniel C. Roper, the top federal anti-drug official at that time, 
extended federal permission to local governments to establish “narcotic relief stations,” also 
called “clinics,” that would provide maintaining doses to addicts until they could be shuttled 
into a closed institution for detoxification treatment.471 To expand the number of available 
institutions, Roper urged the USPHS to support a bill to open the marine hospitals to all 
addicts and to provide two years of matching funds to state governments for institutional 
treatment.472 
Roper’s program was short-lived.  A number of clinics soon opened across the 
country.473 Although, in a sign of difficulties to come, many clinic administrators found that 
addicts who were receiving maintaining doses often did not wish to be institutionalized.  For 
example, the Acting Director of the New York City Bureau of Public Health Education, S. 
Dana Hubbard, noted that during the period from April 1919 to March 1920, when the New 
York City clinic operated, less than two thousand of the 7,400 who received drugs at the 
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clinic “were willing to go to a hospital for treatment, with ultimate cure in sight.”474 
Congress was also hesitant and the USPHS offered only tepid support for mass 
institutionalization.  The legislation for providing federal institutional care and state funding 
failed to pass.475 
Without an expanded institutional component Roper’s plan fizzled.  Roper, his 
successor as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Bureau William M. Williams, and 
USPHS officials all felt that ambulatory addiction maintenance was only useful as a way 
station into institutional confinement.  The main rationale for authorizing the clinics was for 
the government to keep “in touch with the addict until the institutional treatment could be 
made available.”476 In the absence of closed detoxification facilities, the USPHS supported 
prisons as a proper setting for addiction treatment.  Investigations by the USPHS found that 
“narcotic drug addicts may be gotten entirely off their drug while under prison restraint.”477 
Levi G. Nutt, who headed the Narcotic Division of the Prohibition Unit (founded in 1919 to 
enforce the Volstead Act to control alcohol traffic), oversaw the demise of the clinics.  Nutt 
shuttered the last remaining clinic in 1923.  In 1928 Nutt summarized the default program to 
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be offered by prisons: “the isolation and segregation of addicts for institutional treatment 
under restraint for a long period of time.”478 
As the punitive approach expanded, the number of drug users sent to prisons created 
new problems for wardens.  Thousands of new inmates condemned under the Harrison Act 
worsened the overcrowded conditions in the federal prisons.  According to Nutt, Harrison 
Act convicts in the fall of 1923 represented 28 percent of the total inmates in the federal 
penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia (697 out of 2460), 38 percent of the prisoners in 
Leavenworth, Kansas (921 out of 2446), and 47 percent of the prisoners on McNeil’s Island, 
Washington (245 out of 519).479 Social historian H. Wayne Morgan describes the narcotic 
violators in the mid-1920s as the “the dominant element in the federal penitentiaries.”480 A
U.S. House of Representatives report noted that in 1928 the three federal prisons had a total 
cell capacity of 3,778, but actually held 7,598 prisoners (of whom approximately 2,300 were 
narcotic law violators and 1,600, or 21 percent, were addicts).  The report remarked: “To 
pack men as though they were animals is a brutal manner of treatment even for convicts.”481 
Aside from their numbers, drug users and addicts posed problems for prison administrators 
by smuggling drugs onto the cellblock or by suffering the violent physical symptoms of 
opiate withdrawal.482 In one notable incident, the Washington Times reported in a 1932 story 
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titled “Drugs End Riot of Addicts” that twenty-three prisoners “staged a desperate mutiny for 
narcotics” by shattering the windows of their train in route to the Leavenworth penitentiary.  
The U.S. Marshall in charge of delivering the prisoners arranged for injections to “quiet his 
charges.”483 
A new type of program emerged to offer a solution: specialized prisons with medical 
trappings.  Veteran anti-drug diplomat and congressman Stephen G. Porter (R-PA), who had 
led the walkout of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva Convention in 1925, introduced a bill to 
ease the prison overcrowding in 1929.  He called for the construction of prisons for drug 
users and addicts to be called “narcotic farms.”484 The legislation described the farms as 
institutions to confine and treat addicts, but their primary purpose was to alleviate the 
overcrowding in federal prisons that was largely caused by the enforcement of the Harrison 
Act.  Porter’s secretary described another motivation for creating the farms: “dope” was 
readily available in the federal prisons.485 The notion of a “farm” drew upon the prison 
reform movement’s commitment to improving prisoners as citizens by instilling community 
orientation and job skills.486 
Porter’s farm bill forced health officials into the role of prison wardens.  The USPHS, 
still resisting the responsibility for addicts, had not been a serious factor in shaping the 
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narcotic farm legislation.  In fact, Acting Surgeon General Lawrence Kolb openly opposed 
the idea.  Kolb questioned the merit of developing a new style of prison; a “prison farm” was 
hardly different than a “conventional type of prison.”  He also predicted that the “greater area 
of a farm would greatly increase the difficulty of preventing the introduction of narcotics.”487 
Nevertheless, Kolb would become the first medical director of the Lexington farm, and 
assumed many warden-like duties.  The farm bill passed in January 1929 and created a 
Narcotic Division within the USPHS charged with administering treatment to the prisoners 
on the farm.  USPHS officials thus gained the power to adjust the prison sentences of 
“addicts” who were broadly defined as users of opiates, coca products, cannabis, and peyote 
(all called “narcotic drugs.”)488 Health officials also set the terms of parole and probation 
that might come after an addiction “cure.”  Escapees risked a five-year extension to their 
prison term.  Anyone attempting to smuggle drugs into a narcotic farm could be sentenced to 
ten years in prison. 
In the early 1930s, the USPHS prepared for running the new types of prisons while 
the two farms were under construction.  An “annex” of the U.S. penitentiary at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas leased from the War Department, provided a “walled prison” for a trial 
run.  The annex soon held over eighteen hundred addict-prisoners, who provided labor (paid 
at twenty-five cents a day) for brush or furniture making, growing produce, or washing 
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laundry, and served as subjects for medical research.489 One USPHS researcher reveled in 
the array of tools available for the research and therapy, including: “electrotherapy, 
hydrotherapy and physiotherapy: massage, mechanical exercise, autocondensation current, 
diathermy, lamps, tubs, baths, packs, nozzle guns, spray guns, [and] steam.”  He added 
ominously, “some of these denarcotization days were rough.”490 A prisoner recalled the 
Leavenworth Annex: “what hurt me more than anything else, is when the federal doctor said 
we were a menace to society.”491 The Washington Herald described the Leavenworth Annex 
as “the world’s largest narcotic laboratory” and was convinced (in the absence of evidence) 
that an addiction “cure” was imminent.  The research at Leavenworth had uncovered at least 
one clear fact: repeated prison sentences were “imposed more often upon drug addicts than 
upon other types of federal prisoners.”492 
“Confinement and treatment” began at the narcotic farms when they finally opened in 
Lexington, Kentucky in 1935 and Fort Worth, Texas in 1938.493 The new prisons were still 
far too small to hold all of the addicts in the United States.494 Together the farms could hold 
just two thousand addict-prisoners (female “addicts” served prison sentences at the Federal 
Industrial Institution for Women, opened in 1927 in Alderson, West Virginia, until the 
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Lexington farm began accepting them in 1942).495 Manual labor was an important part of the 
treatment program.  At the Lexington farm, for example, inmates ran the power plant, 
manufactured clothing, raised livestock, and even canned “Narco Pride” brand tomatoes 
among other tasks.496 
The USPHS and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics stressed the rehabilitation aspect of 
the farms over their detention function.  In one unintentionally humorous example, a Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics radio program claimed that visitors to the farms would find that inmates 
suffered only one kind of punishment: “being deprived of their personal liberty.”497 
Historian David Musto concludes that the farms served their intended purposes as “additional 
prison space for convicted addicts.”498 Thus the windows of the cells were barred and armed 
guards patrolled the gates.  James V. Lowry, who would replace Kolb as Medical Officer in 
Charge of Lexington, explained lamely that the buildings were “less prison-like in 
appearance than most prisons and more prison-like than most hospitals” [see Figures 7-8].499 
The farms were officially renamed in 1937 as U.S. Public Health Service Hospitals, which 
misrepresented their function.500 For example, a USPHS researcher found in 1941 that less 
 
495 On a 1938 inspection of the women’s prison Anslinger found that “exactly half of the population” were 
narcotic violators.  See J.D. Reichard, “The Role of the Probation Officer in the Treatment of Drug Addiction,” 
Federal Probation 6 (October-December, 1942): 15-20; Anslinger to McReynolds, 15 August 1938, Anslinger 
Papers, box 3, file 2; and Acker, Creating the American Junkie, 165. 
 
496 See the clippings assembled in Anslinger’s scrapbook, Anslinger Papers, box 6, file 1.   
 
497 Undated OGR State Broadcast, “Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Number One-A,” Anslinger Papers, box 1, file 
9.    
 
498 See Musto, American Disease, 85, 206; clippings assembled in Anslinger’s scrapbook, Anslinger Papers, 
box 6, file 1; and Cleland Van Dresser, “Project for Dope Addicts,” 6 October 1938, Ken Magazine, clipping in 
Anslinger Papers, box 7, file 9.    
 
499 James V. Lowry, “Hospital Treatment of the Narcotic Addict,” Federal Probation 20 (December 1956): 43. 
 
500 Treasury and Post Office Departments Appropriation Act, 1937, U.S. Statutes at Large 49 (1936): 1827-
1854.  
 
166
than half of the employees at the Fort Worth farm supported the idea of “treating the drug 
addict as a patient.”501 
501 M.J. Prescor, “Attitude of Drug Addicts and Personnel Toward Hospital Policies,” Federal Probation 5 
(April-June, 1941): 28. 
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Figure 7: An Official View of the Lexington Narcotic Farm. 
 
This USPHS depiction reflected the institutional essence of the U.S. federal drug treatment program 
and evoked hope that the “farms” would be factories for an addiction cure.  
 
Source: USPHS, Hospital News 3 (1 December 1936), image from cover. 
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Figure 8: A Popular View of the Lexington Narcotic Farm.  
 
This editorial drawing placed the factory on the farm (see the silos, fences, and windmill) and 
conveyed sympathy for drug addicts.  The accompanying text called for a “narcotic-cure farm in 
every state of the Union.”  
 
Source: Atlanta Georgian, 4 March 1935, clipping in Anslinger Papers, box 5, file 14. 
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The narcotic farms marked a new government program, but hardly a new approach.   
Imprisonment was the “cure.”  Thus the Treasury Department reasoned in a 1938 
memorandum that “the future of the prisoner” relied on the provision of an “adequate 
sentence.”502 The “derelict addict” did not have “the moral fiber necessary to withstand the 
environmental influences” and so required a long term of imprisonment.  Further, all addicts 
who were sent to a narcotic farm “would receive the benefit of treatment in the Public Health 
Service Hospital and the imprisonment which follows, if sufficiently long, will increase the 
effectiveness of the cure.”503 
With hindsight there is a striking similarity between the actions regarding drug 
treatment taken by U.S. officials in the Philippines and in the continental United States.  The 
first of March in 1908, known in Manila as “Black Sunday,” marked the transition from drug 
treatment to specialized incarceration in Bilibid Prison.  On the first of March seven years 
later in 1915, the enforcement of the Harrison Act in the continental United States began.  
When enforcement stiffened around 1919, the federal government made an equally brief and 
poorly executed effort to provide drug treatment before defaulting to regular imprisonment.  
The Bilibid Prison in Manila with its special ward found its counterpart in the narcotic farms.   
 
Part II. Programs Abroad 
 
Foreign governments also created programs to make their proscriptive drug policies 
function better.  The onset of bans (within the punitive regime) created the same sorts of 
problems that U.S. official experienced.  Limited funding for major new programs 
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(particularly after the Great Depression) imposed constraints.  Two major trends emerged 
abroad during the interwar years.  The first relied upon extending hospitalization.  Another 
involved compiling lists of pre-existing addicts and providing them with maintaining doses.  
Addiction maintenance programs aimed to segregate addicts from the black market and put 
them under government supervision.  While governments created such programs to improve 
the function of established prohibitions, the implementation of programs gave expression to 
viewpoints that were critical of a solely punitive approach to drug users. 
 
A Global Wave of New Treatment Programs 
Numerous European governments expanded hospitalization programs for pre-existing 
addicts in the late 1920s and 1930s.  Some governments opened addiction wards in public 
mental hospitals, as was the case in Latvia, Greece, and Poland [see Figure 9].504 Others 
incorporated drug treatment into the services offered by general hospitals, such as Austria, 
Sweden, and Portugal.505 These programs usually relied on physicians reporting addicts to 
government authorities who kept an official register of patients under treatment in the 
medical facilities.506 Some countries funneled all discovered drug users into compulsory 
hospital treatment; others followed more subjective guidelines.  Germany, for example, only 
interned patients for six to eight months after sudden withdrawal treatment if they seemed to 
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threaten “public security.”507 Italy registered addicts, but its legislation provided for 
compulsory treatment only if the addict was “in any way dangerous or the cause of public 
scandal.”508 
507 Werner Thomas, “The Employment of Measures for Safeguarding and Betterment as Applied to Law-
Breaking Drug Addicts, Translation from Deutsche Rechtsflege, 1936,” 25 February 1936, Anslinger Papers 
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Figure 9: A Polish Addiction Hospital. 
After 1933 the Polish government offered addiction treatment at two sanatoria that could 
accommodate one hundred male patients and forty-two female patients respectively. This photo 
shows the men’s center in Bialystok, advertised as a “beautiful eighteenth-century mansion fitted out 
on modern lines.”509 The establishment sought to instill mental and physical tranquility through 
pastoral recreation that would “give the patient a new physical and mental balance” to help deter 
relapses into drug use.510 To this end the establishment offered “a large park and arable land, which 
gives the patients facilities for an open-air life, sports, gardening and agriculture.”511 
Source: Memorandum about “Swiack,” in LON, Opium Traffic Section, box C804, file 9, Drug 
Addiction.  
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May 1939, LONA, O.C. 1769, 41; and memorandum about “Swiack,” in LONA, Opium Traffic Section, box 
C804, file: Drug Addiction, 1. 
 
510 Memorandum about “Swiack,” in LONA, Opium Traffic Section, box C804, file: Drug Addiction, 1.  
 
511 See OAC, “Enquiry into Drug Addiction,” 31 May 1939, LONA, O.C. 1769, 12-13; and memorandum about 
“Swiack,” in LONA, Opium Traffic Section, box C804, file: Drug Addiction, 1.  
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Latin American governments also expanded hospitalization programs.  Brazil was a 
stalwart supporter of medical treatment of drug addicts but struggled to follow through on the 
legislation regarding treatment.  Brazil passed a bill in 1921 providing for a public 
Sanatorium for Drug Addicts that would treat voluntary patients and people interned by court 
order.  The regulations granted patients who wished to depart the sanatorium the right to a 
review of their medical status and escapees were not to be punished, but simply returned to 
the sanatorium.512 As late as 1938, however, public mental hospitals were still functioning as 
government treatment centers because the special sanatoria were yet to be built.513 Colombia 
enacted a law in 1928 for the public hospitalization of addicts, selecting a “mental home” in 
Bogotá instead of building an expensive new facility.514 Decrees in 1937 and 1938 
established more rules and made treatment mandatory, but addicts continued to be, as one 
observer phrased it, “regarded merely as sick persons and not as criminals.”515 Cuba added 
addiction treatment wards to public hospitals.  In the early 1930s Cuba augmented addiction 
treatment available in the Mariel Military Hospital with a special ward in the Calixto García 
National Hospital.  Together those two facilities treated over a thousand addicts annually.516 
512 Translation of Brazilian Decree No. 14969, 3 September 1921, and regulations date 1 December 1923, in 
LONA, O.D.C. 63, 12a/40972/17217. 
 
513 The 1938 decree was similar to the 1921 legislation. See Pablo Osvaldo Wolff, “The Treatment of Drug 
Addicts: A Critical Survey,” League of Nations Bulletin of the Health Organization 12 (1945/1946): 490-91.  
514 OAC, “Measures Against Drug Addiction in Colombia,” 1 November 1933, LONA, O.C. 1499, 2-3. 
 
515 See Pablo Osvaldo Wolff, “The Treatment of Drug Addicts: A Critical Survey,” League of Nations Bulletin 
of the Health Organization 12 (1945/1946): 492-93; “Columbian Annual Report, 1940 (in Spanish),” 15 May 
1941, LONA, R.5027, file: 1940 Annual Reports on Opium Traffic, Colombia; Jorgé M. Velandía, “Response 
to the Addiction Questionnaire (in Spanish),” 28 June 1947, UNDCPA, item 4, file: SOA 25/01 part “A,” Drug 
Addiction Questionnaire to Governments.  
 
516 OAC, “Enquiry Into Drug Addiction,” 27 October 1933, LONA, O.C. 1408(1), 10, 24; Eduardo Usabiaga, 
Assistant Secretary of State, to Drummond, 30 March 1932, LONA, R.3236, file: 26472, Drug Addiction Cuba; 
also see Horacio Abascal, “Tríada cutánea para el diagnóstico de toxicómanias crónicas,” Vida Nueva 35 (June 
15, 1935), copy of reprint in LONA, R.6073, 8a/19338/2065, 1-11. 
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Hospitalization programs also developed in colonies that still allowed “traditional” 
drug use while seeking to reduce the number of users.  The Dutch East Indies offered a 
notable example, which also deserves attention because its key official would contribute to 
the League of Nations activities on addition treatment discussed in the next section.  The 
Dutch program aimed to deter opium smoking with a variety of medical strategies.  All 
aspects of the experience had to be encouraging and inspire the motivation to quit because 
opium smokers in Java could still purchase the drug within the regie system.  The Anti-
Opium Pavilion at Immanuel Mission Hospital in Bandung, Java, was the program’s 
centerpiece.  The pavilion was erected with government funds in 1931 to expand public 
addiction treatment initiated in 1925, and it typically housed thirty to fifty voluntary patients 
at a time. The director of the pavilion, Dr. A. Bonebakker, was hesitant to condemn his 
patients as psychopathic or even self-indulgent addicts because most were “coolies and petty 
traders” who suffered “laborious and irksome work for scanty wages.”517 He made sure to 
keep them comfortable.  The therapy protocol included generous (while diminishing) doses 
because, as Bonebakker phrased it, “the dangers of collapse should not be 
underestimated.”518 The staff was also sensitive to the cultural sources of the patients’ 
distress and strove to be accommodating.  For Chinese speakers, the staff offered lantern 
slide shows and lectures in Chinese that tapped the “rich store of [Chinese] philosophy and 
 
517 Dutch officials did not consider all licensed smokers to be “addicts” because many license holders smoked 
small amounts and would “scarcely suffer any withdrawal symptoms” if they ceased smoking. See OAC, 
“Enquiry into Drug Addiction,” LONA, 31 May 1939, O.C. 1769, 75; and OAC, “Summary of Annual Reports 
of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1934,” LONA, 
C.299.M.182.1936.XI, O.C. 1621(1), 159. Quotations in League of Nations Health Committee (hereafter HC), 
“Report of Dr. Bonebakker on the Treatment of Toxicomania,” 1932, LONA, C.H. 1085(f), 4-5. 
 
518 HC, “Report of Dr. Bonebakker on the Treatment of Toxicomania,” 1932, LONA, C.H. 1085(f), 8. 
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mythology” to inspire recovery. 519 The commitment to comfort also meant that patients 
could use the pavilion’s extensive grounds to socialize, or as Bonebakker described it, “talk, 
eat and smoke tobacco, in Oriental fashion.”  Such freedom increased the risk of smuggling, 
but Bonebakker did not “grudge” the necessary surveillance by the staff because he felt that 
the patients “must always” feel themselves to be free.  He surmised that “a closed institution 
would certainly keep very many away from medical treatment altogether” [see Figure 10].520 
According to Bonebakker’s philosophy, the medical care provided to thousands at the 
pavilion was a benefit even if patients later returned to the opium pipe. 
 
519 HC, “Report of Dr. Bonebakker on the Treatment of Toxicomania,” 1932, LONA, C.H. 1085(f), 3, 12. 
 
520 HC, “Report of Dr. Bonebakker on the Treatment of Toxicomania,” 1932, LONA, C.H. 1085(f), 4, 11-12. 
Also see OAC, “Employment of Visiting Nurses in the Netherlands Indies,” 26 January 1934, LONA, O.C. 
1408(1)a, 1-2; and OAC, “Summary of Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other 
Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1934,” LONA, C.299.M.182.1936.XI, O.C. 1621(1), 159-60, 200. 
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Figure 10: Voluntary Addiction Patients in the Dutch East Indies. 
 
These soccer players at a government-funded addiction treatment center epitomized the openness of 
the Dutch colonial program. 
 
Source: Berichten uitgaande van de Anti-Opiumvereeniging (Messages from the Anti-Opium 
Association) 14 (June 1933), 4, copy in LONA, R.3218, 12/32833/14016. 
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Ambulatory treatment (or addiction maintenance) was the other major type of program 
that developed overseas during the interwar years.  Britain developed the most famous 
example.  The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920, passed in compliance with the Hague Opium 
Convention, imposed a punitive ban.  However, physicians would retain the right to prescribe 
maintaining doses to manufactured drug addicts.521 The Home Office, guided on drug policy 
by Undersecretary of State Sir Malcolm Delevingne, had preferred a policy to criminalize all 
non-medical use and addiction maintenance.522 The Ministry of Health’s 1924 Departmental 
Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction (known as the Rolleston Committee after 
chairman Sir Humphrey Rolleston) stymied Delevingne’s hopes.  The Rolleston Committee 
would set the course of drug treatment for manufactured drug addicts in Britain until the 
1960s.   
 The Rolleston Committee’s major task was to decide whether addiction treatment 
required total abstinence in every case.  The final recommendations, given in 1926, answered 
in the negative.  The committee defended the maintenance of some types of addiction 
through prescribed doses.  The recommendations generally favored withdrawal, but held that 
institutional care was required for any detoxification procedure.  Because there were few 
appropriate institutions in Britain, the committee reasoned that physicians should be allowed 
to maintain addicted patients by prescription.  The recommendations described two types of 
 
521 Virginia Berridge and Griffith Edwards describe the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920 as a “sharp and imposed 
change” that “reflected for the first time the influence of international pressures.” See Virginia Berridge and  
Griffith Edwards, Opium and the People: Opiate Use in Nineteenth-Century England (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1981), 268. Also see Virginia Berridge, Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England (London: Free Association Books, 1999). S.D. Stein also 
argued that that the Hague Opium Convention prompted the Dangerous Drugs Act rather than indigenous 
interests. See International Diplomacy, State Administrators and Narcotics Control: The Origins of a Social 
Problem, 1-5, 89-105, 123-38.  
 
522 See OAC, “The Raw Opium Regulations, 1922,” 15 June 1922, LONA, O.C. 23(n), 4-5; and Stein, 
International Diplomacy, State Administrators and Narcotics Control, 143. 
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addicts that should receive maintaining doses: addicts who could not or did not wish to enter 
an institution where withdrawal treatment could be safely conducted and addicts who 
consumed a stable dosage and were “capable of leading a fairly normal and useful life” that 
would be disrupted by forced abstinence.523 Notably absent from the recommendations was 
the call for the creation of state institutions to provide detoxification procedures.524 
The context of manufactured drug addiction in Britain was the critical factor guiding 
the committee’s recommendations.  Historian S.D. Stein notes that morphine and heroin 
addicts were predominately from “upper socio-economic groups.”525 Historian Virginia 
Berridge explains that the middle-class status of manufactured drug addicts “was crucial” for 
the “realignment of addiction theory and approach […] to accommodate an outpatient and 
voluntary middle-class clientele” rather than detention centers.526 It was equally important 
that addiction to morphine or heroin was “rare” in Britain, according to the committee.527 
The addiction maintenance approach would only affect a few hundred men and women.  
 
523 Ministry of Health, Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction Report (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1926), 18. Also see G.F. McCleary, Deputy Senior Medical Officer, Ministry of 
Health, “Notes on Dr. Wolff’s Report,” 30 July 1932, C.H. 1085(c), 4.   
 
524 See Ministry of Health, Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction Report, 6-7. For an 
overview of treatment philosophies and examples of private addiction treatment centers in Britain see Virginia 
Berridge, “The Inter-war Years: A Period of Decline,” British Journal of Addiction 85 (August 1990): 1023-
1035, and her Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Century England, rev. ed. (New York: Free Association Books, 1999); G.F. McCleary, Deputy Senior Medical 
Officer, Ministry of Health, explained the report’s findings to the LON Health Organization in 1932. See his 
“Notes on Dr. Wolff’s Report,” 30 July 1932, C.H. 1085(c). 
 
525 Stein, International Diplomacy, State Administrators and Narcotics Control, 169.  
 
526 See Virginia Berridge, “Introduction,” British Journal of Addiction 85 (August 1990): 988.  
 
527 Ministry of Health, Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction Report (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1926), 10.   
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Furthermore, the Home Office exercised a supervisory role keeping files on known addicts 
and their physicians.528 
Mexico’s experience with drug treatment in the 1930s suggested how ambulatory 
maintenance could become an attractive approach.  Mexico’s addiction treatment efforts 
began in the early 1930s with hospitalization.  A lack of funding underscored dismal results.  
The Department of Health could only offer treatment in the national capital and in just one 
ward of the General Asylum for the Insane.  The ward could only accommodate up to 
seventy men and women.  Officials complained about “deplorable” conditions, a lack of 
proper medication, and overcrowding.529 By the end of the decade health officials were 
drawing up plans for an addiction maintenance program.  They envisioned a plan that would 
allow addicts to remain on the job instead of being forced into institutions.  Eligibility would 
be determined by background checks to confirm that addicts had respectable lives and 
supported their families.  If so, addicts would be able to receive maintaining doses from 
registered physicians or from a dispensary to be run by the health department.  The plan 
involved subjecting the addicts to slow withdrawal, but signs of distress or discomfort could 
justify sustained doses.  The basic assumption of the program was that some addicts were 
 
528 See OAC, “U.K. Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs Report 1936,” LONA, C.434.296.1937.XI, 
O.C./A.R. 1936/34, 137; and “Information regarding Drug Addiction in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
during the year 1940,” LONA, R.4983, file: Drug Addiction, United Kingdom, Enquiry of November 1936. The 
Home Office oversight was described in memorandum by Bertil Renborg, 17-24 November 1936, LONA, 
Opium Traffic Section, box C805, file: Bertil Renborg, Raw Opium Conference Preparatory Notes, 4. Also see 
Stein, International Diplomacy, State Administrators and Narcotics Control, 160-171; and OAC, “Enquiry into 
Drug Addiction,” 31 May 1939, LONA, O.C. 1769, 30.  
 
529 See Wolff, “The Treatment of Drug Addicts: A Critical Survey,” 493; and Pablo Osvaldo Wolff, “Social 
Aspects of Narcotic Drug Addiction,” Review of Argentine Medical Association 55 (1941): 1-32, Translation by 
U.S. Department of State, copy in LONA, Opium Traffic Section, box C804, file: Drug Addiction, 25-26; OAC, 
“Summary of Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the 
Year 1934,” 14 July 1936, LONA, C.299.M.182.1936.XI, O.C. 1621(1), 81-82; OAC, “Annual Reports of 
Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1935,” 16 July 1937, LONA, 
C.305.M.203.1937.XI, O.C. 1679(1), 12; and “Mexico Annual Report for 1935 (in Spanish),” LONA, R.4978, 
file: Annual Reports, 1935. 
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“incurable sick persons.”  Thus the state had a responsibility to provide maintaining doses to 
allow the addict to be a “value to society.”530 
Ambulatory maintenance of manufactured drug addicts made steady advances in a 
number of countries.  Spain, for example, began adopting a registration program to track 
addicts in 1927.531 A 1935 decree ordered the registration of drug addicts, who numbered 
over six hundred, and the provision of identification cards, which allowed the addicts to 
receive “extra-therapeutic” doses.  Spanish officials noted that this approach allowed for a 
better information gathering about the causes of addiction and reduced smuggling.532 Other 
governments also provided legitimate sources of drugs to maintain manufactured drug 
addicts, often within some type of gradual withdrawal procedure.  These nations included: 
Australia, Belgium, Estonia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Japan, Poland, 
the Netherlands, and Venezuela, among others.533 
Part III. Fighting for International Legitimacy   
 
The diversity of national programs was bound to create conflict at the League of 
Nations.  League delegates were ostensibly working to find the best methods to eliminate the 
 
530 See Wolff, “The Treatment of Drug Addicts: A Critical Survey,” 493-95; and OAC, “New Federal 
Regulations Concerning Drug Addiction in Mexico,” 29 June 1940, LONA, O.C. 1791, R.4879, file: Drug 
Addiction, Mexico. 
 
531 OAC, “Royal Decree Promulgated by the Spanish Government,” 28 June 1927, LONA, O.C. 619, R.811, 
12a/ 58169/58169. 
 
532 See “Spain Annual Report, 1935 (in Spanish),” LONA, R.4979, file: Annual Reports, 1935, Spain; Bertil 
Renborg, “Memorandum on the Existing Legislation as to the Legal Restraint of Drug Addicts,” 23 March 
1937, LONA, R.4880, file: Drug Addiction, Correspondence with the National Council of Mental Hygiene, 
London, 5; Wolff, “The Treatment of Drug Addicts: A Critical Survey,” 489; and OAC, “Enquiry into Drug 
Addiction,” 31 May 1939, LONA, O.C. 1769, 3, 32.  
 
533 See OAC, “Enquiry into Drug Addiction,” 25 May 1936, LONA, O.C. 1408(1)(g)(revised), R.4879, file: 
Drug Addiction Enquiry, 7-8, 10, 16, 18; OAC, “Enquiry into Drug Addiction,” 31 May 1939, LONA, O.C. 
1769, 17, 19, 21, 63.  
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drug problem.  The venue’s supranational authority inspired a competition to establish one 
type of treatment program as the best.  American diplomats labored to win League 
endorsement of the U.S. narcotic farm model.  Advocates of the alternative programs duly 
objected.  The fight would be surprisingly bitter.  Ultimately, the Americans would succeed 
in denying League approval of ambulatory maintenance.  Next they prepared to eliminate the 
threat of future challenges to long-term detention as the preferred addiction treatment 
method.  
 
The Diplomacy of Addiction Withdrawal  
 
Until the mid-1930s anti-drug diplomacy had barely addressed the issue of addiction 
treatment.  The First Geneva Convention of 1925 had settled for a suggestion of a future 
gathering to consider “habitual addicts whose pathological condition is certified by the 
medical authorities.”534 Brazilian officials at the Second Geneva Conference had urged 
unsuccessfully for a resolution advocating medical addiction treatment.535 The 1930 
Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking and the 1931 Bangkok 
Agreement on Opium Smoking had vaguely endorsed improvements of “social and hygienic 
conditions” as well as the sharing of information about treatment methods.536 Most 
significantly, signatories to the 1931 Limitation Convention had gained an administrative 
 
534 Such a meeting remained a distant possibility, however, because the treaty scheduled it to meet fourteen 
years after the League of Nations certified that opium production was fully controlled. See the First Geneva 
Convention, Protocol, Article 5. 
 
535 See the remarks in Second Geneva Conference, “Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings, Fifth Meeting,” 
20 November 1924, LONA, R.795, 12a/40524/39417, 6.  
 
536 See Chapter Three. OAC, “Statement Regarding the Work of the Bangkok Conference,” 19 April 1932, 
LONA, O.C. 1430, 6. 
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interest in the topic due to the treaty’s requirement of a “special administration” that would 
take “all useful steps to prevent” addiction.537 
A number of League committees began to consider the addiction treatment issue in 
the 1930s.  A Joint Sub-Committee of the Opium Advisory Committee and the Health 
Committee emerged to study addiction treatment following a recommendation made at the 
1931 Bangkok conference.538 The League’s General Assembly requested in 1931 that the 
Opium Advisory Committee begin to study addiction treatment programs.  Thus the 
committee issued a circular letter to governments inquiring about national programs.539 Over 
the next two years, forty-two countries responded (though they sent information of uneven 
quality).  A second review came in 1935 when the League Secretariat prompted the Opium 
Advisory Committee to begin sending annual questionnaires on addiction to member states.  
Such activity within the League created the conditions for a political contest over an 
ostensibly medical issue.  The League had the power to endorse a certain type of addiction 
treatment program with its supranational imprimatur.  National representatives naturally 
desired that the League would back their preferred program.  To win the League’s 
endorsement a program had to jibe with the flow of opinions within the organization about 
what constituted a scientific and medical approach.  League staffers and medical experts 
working in the League bureaucracies further complicated what might have been a 
straightforward political showdown by claiming scientific clout.  The permanent support staff 
 
537 See Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, Official 
Journal 12 (1931), 1795.  
 
538 OAC, “Report to the Council on the Work of the Eighteenth Session,” 18 May to 2 June 1934, LONA, O.C. 
1562(1), Col. 307, 12/11666/4313, 42-44.  
 
539 See OAC, “Recommendation X of the Final Act of the Bangkok Conference,” 24 July 1933, LONA, O.C. 
1496, O.C. 1496(a)(c).  
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to the Opium Advisory Committee, known as the Opium Section, collected information from 
the popular and scientific press and speculated about which programs were most effective.540 
Physicians who staffed the League’s Health Committee were intellectually committed to the 
idea that the best treatment method could be detected through comparison.  Thus the Health 
Committee sponsored a proposal by German academic physician, Pablo Osvaldo Wolff, to 
study the different national programs and compile the views of the world’s leading addiction 
researchers (such as Dr. Bonebakker in the Dutch East Indies).541 Of course, addiction 
treatment was not a tidy scientific issue.  Advocates of national programs would have to 
navigate a sea of moral and political claims disguised as science.  
 
Selling the Farm 
American diplomats pushed the farm model from the outset.  The officials most 
involved were Stuart Fuller, Assistant Chief of the State Department Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs, and Harry Anslinger, the Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.  
Anslinger and Fuller together assumed Stephen Porter’s role as the United States’ chief anti-
drug diplomats.  (The force behind the legislation for the narcotic farms in 1929, Porter died 
in 1930.)  When the topic of treatment came under consideration at the League of Nations in 
the 1930s, Anslinger and Fuller intervened calling for “the isolation and segregation of drug 
 
540 OAC, “Enquiry into Drug Addiction,” 27 October 1933, LONA, O.C. 1408(1), 1; OAC, “Enquiry Into Drug 
Addiction,” 2 December 1938, LONA, O.C. 1408(1)(h); Commission on Narcotic Drugs, “Drug Addiction, 
Summary Prepared for the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Ninth Session,” 26 January 1954, UNDCP Archive, 
Vienna, item 45, file: 109/10/01 Narcotic Drugs (G.A. Res. 54 (1) Ecosoc Res.12 (111) Drug Addiction. 
541 Correspondence and documentation on the formation of the committee is in LONA, R.5928, file: Treatment 
of Drug Addicts. In addition to above citations from the committee see HC, “Health Organisation,” 20 July 
1931, LONA, C.H. 1018(1); HC, “Twentieth Session of the Health Committee, Opium Commission,” 21 
September 1933, LONA, C.H. 1075(a); HC, “Twenty-Second Session of the Health Committee, Opium 
Commission,” 7 October 1935, LONA, C.H. 1181; HC, “Thirty-first Session of the Health Committee, Geneva 
November 20, 1939,” 8 November 1939, LONA, C.H. 1451, 1-2; OAC, “Enquiry into Drug Addiction, Brief 
Note on the Present State of the Question,” 22 May 1934, LONA, O.C. 1408(1)e, 1-4; and OAC, “Enquiry Into 
Drug Addiction,” 2 December 1938, LONA, O.C. 1408(1)(h).  
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addicts with a view to treatment.”542 Detention came first.  They urged countries to provide 
detention facilities like the U.S. narcotic farms, even while the farms were still under 
construction.  For example, the U.S. reports to the Opium Advisory Committee in 1932 
justified long-term detention by asserting that addicts were “unstable” people who needed to 
be segregated from vulnerable communities.543 Another dispatch sent in 1933 stipulated that 
“drug addicts must be treated in isolation in special establishments” and encouraged nations 
to provide such institutions.544 Anslinger also shared his hopes with League officials that 
each U.S. state would require “compulsory commitment,” which would provide more 
detention space.545 In 1938, the year that the Ft. Worth farm opened, Fuller explained to the 
foreign representatives how addiction treatment could fit within established penal protocols.  
The Lexington farm, he noted, served as a sorting depot for addicts “condemned by the 
courts.”  Addicts remained at the farm if the staff judged them to be appropriate candidates 
for rehabilitation.  Otherwise, U.S. Marshals escorted them to standard prisons.546 
Anslinger and Fuller also used the farms to stress that long-term detention was the 
most effective type of medical treatment for addiction.  When the institution at Lexington 
opened in 1935, Fuller lauded the farm approach in a report to the Opium Advisory 
 
542 Anslinger’s speech, “The Narcotic Problem” delivered 13 December 1934 to the U.S. Attorney General’s 
Conference on Crime,” copy in Anslinger Papers, box 1, file 10, 5.   
 
543 Treasury Department memorandum dated March 8, 1932, sent to Secretary General Eric Drummond by 
Winthrop S. Greene of the U.S. legation at Berne, 13 April 1932, LONA, R.3237, 12/36384/26472, 9. 
 
544 OAC, “Enquiry into Drug Addiction,” 27 October 1933, LONA, O.C. 1408(1), 22. Emphasis is in the 
original.  
 
545 OAC, “Enquiry into Drug Addiction,” 27 October 1933, LONA, O.C. 1408(1), 30. 
 
546 OAC, “Report to the Council on the work of the Twenty-Third Session,” 7-24 June 1938, LONA, O.C. 
1745(1), C. 237.M.136.1938.XI, 22.  Also see OAC, “Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium 
and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1938,” 27 August 1940, LONA, C.124.M.113.1940.XI, O.C. 1781(1), 
15-16.  
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Committee that disparaged ambulatory treatment.547 Ambulatory maintenance was an 
unacceptable alternative in Fuller’s view.  He recounted the brief episode with “clinics” in 
the United States omitting any positive effects and describing them as “merely supply depots 
for drug addicts.”  “There is very little hope for a cure of drug addiction,” he stressed, “unless 
the patient is confined in an institution or otherwise under the most rigid supervision.”548 
Reports to the League about the supposed efficacy of the farms continued apace.549 In 1938, 
for example, a report strained to put a positive spin on a dismal statistic: of prisoners 
discharged from Lexington 34 percent had not returned to using drugs after thirty-six months.  
The report labeled these results as “good in view of the psychopathic nature” of drug users.550 
The report concluded that this record of “successful cures” discredited all “old theories” that 
sought to substitute “so-called narcotic-drug clinics or drug-supply depots” in place of 
detention.551 By asserting that the farms provided modern therapies, Fuller and Anslinger 
could sound scientific while preserving the prison as a setting for treatment. 
 
547 See OAC, “Dedication of the New United States Narcotic Farm at Lexington, Kentucky, May 25th, 1935,” 29 
May 1935, LONA, O.C. 1605; and OAC, “Minutes of the Twentieth Session, Eighth Meeting,” 25 May 1935, 
LONA, C.277.M.144.1935.XI, Col. 307, 2/18420/4313, 40.  
 
548 See OAC, “Experience in the United States of America with the Plan of Selling Drugs to Addicts at Low 
Prices,” 22 October 1935, LONA, O.C. 1614, 2, 6; and Fuller to Ekstrand, 15 August 1935, LONA, R.4878, 
file: Drug Addiction Enquiry U.S.A.; OAC, “Minutes of the Twentieth Session, Eighth Meeting,” 25 May 1935, 
LONA, C.277.M.144.1935.XI, Col. 307, 2/18420/4313, 40.  
 
549 For example, the United States forwarded forty copies of a special issue of the USPHS’s Hospital News 3 (1 
December 1936), on a symposium on drug addiction held at the Lexington farm in 1936. Also see OAC, 
“Information Concerning the Work of Addict Hospitals in the United States,” 19 July 1938, LONA, O.C. 
1605(d). 
 
550 See OAC, “Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the 
Year 1938,” 27 August 1940, LONA, C.124.M.113.1940.XI, O.C. 1781(1), 15. Walter Treadway, Assistant 
Surgeon General, informed the OAC that U.S. officials were “more than gratified” by results at Lexington. See 
OAC, “Information Concerning the Work of Addict Hospitals in the United States,” 19 July 1938, LONA, O.C. 
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Two medical experts on the League’s Opium Advisory Committee emerged as the 
major advocates for hospitalization and addiction maintenance programs.  Dr. Witold 
Chodzko, Poland’s Health Minister, and Dr. Henri Carrière, Director of the Swiss Public 
Health Service, worked to extend the influence of the League’s Health Committee over the 
issue of drug addiction.552 Overall Chodzko and Carrière’s criticisms of the narcotic farms 
reflected a deeper critique of the punitive regime.  They felt that addicts needed medical care, 
but could function in society.  Hence they preferred “medical supervision (not police 
supervision).”553 Chodzko and Carrière represented minor countries in terms of geopolitical 
influence, but they served as spokesmen for a number of countries that had developed 
hospital programs or addiction maintenance.  In addition, they were medical scientists whose 
arguments carried the weight of their expertise. 
Growing tension over rival types of programs culminated in an open debate by 1939.  
Anticipating a fight at the May 1939 session of the Opium Advisory Committee, Fuller 
obtained a memorandum from Lawrence Kolb, Medical Officer in Charge of Lexington, that 
lauded the Lexington farm and announced the opening of the second farm in Fort Worth, 
Texas.  Fuller forwarded the report to Geneva.554 However, the debate finally erupted in the 
summer of 1939 when Chodzko and Carrière openly criticized the U.S. narcotic farms.  
Chodzko called for more attention to the world’s addicts whom he described as victims of 
disease.  He lamented that “for years it had been mistakenly held that the only way to treat 
 
552 Both Chodzko and Carrière had represented the Health Commit tee on the Mixed Sub-Committee that 
attempted to define addiction and propose proper measures in 1923. Both had also served on the Joint Sub-
Committee of the Advisory Committee and the Health Committee appointed to examine treatment in relations 
to the 1931 Bangkok Conference.  
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187
addicts was to shut them up.”555 Carrière objected to the punitive aspects of confining 
addicted patients and stressed that the “addict should not be regarded and treated as a 
criminal.”556 Together these officials promoted a program of voluntary hospitalization of 
addicted patients and a type of drug dispensary that would extend individualized medical 
supervision to addicts, and provide maintenance doses of opiates if suitable, without 
removing patients from the “everyday life of the community.”557 Chodzko favored research 
on addiction and appreciated that aspect of the Lexington farm.  But, he was unconvinced 
that the farms worked.  Chodzko labeled the 35 percent of abstinence after release as 
“excellent results,” but expressed concern about the remaining 65 percent of addicts who left 
Lexington unimproved.558 “Just as sanatoria had not eliminated tuberculosis,” he argued, “so 
confinement in institutions was not going to cure addicts, though it might find good results in 
certain cases.”559 Besides, he added, “There was not enough room for all of them in the 
institutions.”560 
555 OAC, “Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Session,” LONA, C.209.M.136.1939.XI, 62.  
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558 Anslinger described these results in 1938. See OAC, “Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in 
Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1938,” LONA, C.124.M.113.1940.XI, O.C. 1781(1), 13-5. The 
study actually reported 34 percent abstinence among those who had been released after thirty-six months. See 
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Mexican representative Manuel Tello backed the views presented by Chodzko and 
Carrière.  He presented the Mexican plan to offer an ambulatory drug treatment program in 
which addicts deemed to be incurable would receive “small amounts” of morphine.561 
Tello read a statement written by Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, head of the Narcotics Bureau of 
the Mexican Public Health Department.562 Salazar had already earned the wrath of U.S. 
officials with the publication in early 1939 of an article entitled “El Sueño de Lexington” 
(The Dream of Lexington), which offered strident criticism of the U.S. farms.563 His 
experience treating addicts in the public mental health asylum in Mexico City convinced him 
that ambulatory maintenance was the logical solution to Mexico’s “minor” addiction 
problem.564 Salazar pointed to the 75 percent relapse rate of voluntary admittees to 
Lexington despite the institution’s “up-to-date equipment” and he concluded that “incurable 
addicts” still deserved “to be helped by the State.”565 
Facing an insurrection at the League, Anslinger and Fuller reasserted the points that 
they had been making for years about the farms and ridiculed their opponents.  Anslinger 
argued that the international drug control treaties banned ambulatory treatment, and that 
countries could only endorse “professional treatment which includes confinement or restraint 
upon the addict.”566 Accordingly, he dismissed Chodzko and Carrière’s proposals as 
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simultaneously “revolutionary” and retrograde.567 Anslinger stressed that institutionalization 
was “absolutely necessary” and the only “practical system.”568 He denounced Salazar as 
inexperienced in narcotics policy and determined to “to make marihuana as popular as 
tobacco in Mexico.”569 The Federal Bureau of Narcotics issued publications that lampooned 
ambulatory drug treatment dispensaries as “morphine barrooms.”570 Surgeon General Hugh 
Cumming, who represented the United States at the League’s Health Organization, also 
received the instruction that “dispensaries for drug addicts would be a step in the wrong 
direction.”571 Regarding the failure rate at Lexington, Anslinger pointed out that the narcotic 
farms could re-imprison what he called “relapse cases.”572 He also argued that segregation at 
Lexington had cured men who had been addicted for up to forty years.573 Further, Anslinger 
asserted, “drug addicts were criminals first and addicts afterwards.”574 This formulation 
mirrored the U.S. farm model: detention with medical trappings.  In a final bid to stem the 
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movement toward a League endorsement of ambulatory maintenance programs, he used 
rhetoric that verged into the absurd: if the League approved “the revolutionary proposals of 
Dr. Carrière and Dr. Chodzko,” he argued, “all attempts to apply limitation or control might 
as well be abandoned.”575 For his part Fuller tried to convince Mexico to scuttle the plans to 
expand the ambulatory treatment program.  He urged Tello to convince Mexican officials to 
postpone any action on the dispensary plan until the Opium Advisory Committee could 
review the text of the regulations in one year’s time.576 
Anslinger and Fuller enjoyed support from countries that favored long-term detention 
as addiction treatment.  At the same summer 1939 session of the Opium Advisory 
Committee, for example, Egypt’s Russell reiterated his praise for the American approach.  
Russell called for strengthening “mass methods under police control” within “courts, prisons, 
[and] hospitals.”577 The Canadian representative C.H.L. Sharman, who was also the head of 
the Canadian Narcotics Service, lent the U.S. officials further support.  Sharman announced 
that Anslinger’s assertions “agreed so completely with the Canadian view that it was 
unnecessary to say much more.”578 
The U.S. delegation, with the support of like-minded allies, kept the Opium Advisory 
Committee from resolving in favor of treatment lacking detention.  The committee merely 
approved the possibility for further study of the addiction problem.  Canada’s Sharman 
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objected that further study would be “a waste of time and money.”579 Carrière managed a 
cynical rejoinder.  He hoped that governments would someday have “to explain the attitude 
of their administrations towards addicts and treatment [including their] medical and penal 
attitudes.”580 
With the possibility of a League endorsement of ambulatory maintenance nullified, 
Anslinger moved to crush Mexico’s program just as it was starting to operate in the early 
spring of 1940.  Anslinger blocked all shipments of medicinal narcotics from the United 
States (which enjoyed a stockpile) to Mexico.  The embargo would last until Mexico 
abandoned ambulatory addiction maintenance.581 Anslinger knew that he was “pinching the 
health authorities” because they lacked sufficient supplies of narcotics “to take care of the 
sick and injured.”582 Mexico’s new representative at Geneva, Jorge Daesslé Segura, 
threatened that Mexico would plant poppy and produce its own supply.  But the threat was 
empty and his government quickly abandoned the treatment program.583 After July 1940 
treatment would occur in closed institutions.  The ambulatory maintenance program had 
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never extended beyond Mexico City and had treated only six hundred out of six thousand 
applicants.584 Anslinger had placed his desire to shape government treatment programs 
above the welfare of Mexico’s health care system and Mexican patients. 
Anslinger and his political allies also moved to reduce the chance of a future 
diplomatic debate about treatment without detention.  As historian William McAllister 
details, Anslinger carefully wielded the growing American influence during the Second 
World War to diminish public health authority within the postwar international drug control 
apparatus.585 Anslinger also cultivated like-minded officials for the postwar bureaucracies.  
Examples included Bertil Renborg, a Swedish representative who served as Chief of the 
Drug Control Service.  He set forth an agenda for the postwar era including “severe 
penalties” for illicit opium smoking, with first time offenders given a “compulsory cure to be 
followed on the second or third offences by increasingly severe penalties.”586 Another was 
Leon Steinig, an Austrian attorney and wartime émigré to the United States who served on 
the staff of the Drug Supervisory Body.  He anticipated the need for a new treaty to create 
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stricter rules “to be applied to drug addiction and the addict.”587 A third was Herbert May, an 
American attorney who served on the Permanent Central Opium Board (which oversaw 
states’ licit drug business).  May had strongly disapproved of the Mexican ambulatory 
treatment program.588 
Anslinger and his State Department counterparts also groomed a friendly medical 
expert.  They found an ideal “expert” in Pablo Osvaldo Wolff.  The German-born academic 
had convinced the League’s Health Committee to sponsor his efforts study and publicize the 
world’s leading treatment techniques.589 Wolff’s prolific work depicted the U.S. narcotic 
farms as the highest scientific achievement on addiction and cast them as the goal that other 
countries should strive to achieve.590 Overall, Wolff considered the “American method” to 
be the “best as regards both clinical treatment and the physical, physic and moral re-
education of the addict.”591 Such praise garnered the attention of George Morlock, who took 
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over the drug control work within the Department of State’s Division of Far Eastern Affairs 
after Fuller’s death in 1941.592 Morlock lauded Wolff’s work as “valuable” and had the 
department translate his foreign language articles.593 Anslinger courted Wolff by penning the 
introduction to his book and trying to get Wolff promoted in the United Nations.594 Wolff 
would become a member of the Expert Committee on Habit Forming Drugs and then Chief 
of the Addiction-producing Drugs Section of the World Health Organization.  The U.S. 
investment in Wolff would pay dividends when nations tackled addiction treatment during 
treaty talks in 1961.  
 
Conclusion   
The punitive regime in practice created a number of difficult problems for national 
governments during the interwar years.  Prison overcrowding, troublesome and ill prisoners, 
high rates of recidivism, and public complaints about criminalizing opiate addicts were 
among the most pressing.  States responded and developed a variety of programs to improve 
their drug prohibitions.  Funding was a critical factor in determining the nature of the 
program created.  The type of people addicted was also an important factor.  In the United 
States, Congress was willing to provide funds to create an impressive new program.  The 
narcotic farms lent imprisonment a medical aura.  Overseas programs reflected smaller 
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expenditures and more medical content.  Addiction treatment efforts expanded in hospitals 
and mental asylums.  Some governments opted for ambulatory maintenance to try to stabilize 
the addict population on the cheap without disrupting lives.  The diversity of the programs 
spurred a political fight within the supranational context of the League of Nations.  Anslinger 
and Fuller advanced the farm model, opposing addiction maintenance and asserting that there 
was some scientific basis to attempting to force a “cure” through imprisonment.    
The United States only won half of the battle at the League.  Anslinger and his allies 
kept the League from granting its imprimatur to ambulatory maintenance.  But they did not 
win a resolution backing the farms.  As we shall see in Chapter Six, U.S. efforts to shape the 
postwar drug control apparatus—as well as direct efforts to shape the policies of foreign 
nations—would complete the victory.  A consolidated punitive regime would include a 
United Nations endorsement of long-term detention as medical treatment.   
CHAPTER 6 
 
Consolidating the Punitive Regime in the Postwar Period 
 
Desi Heyward was serving a federal prison term for illicit drug possession in 1959 
when he wrote a bitter letter to Harry Anslinger, the Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics.  Heyward wrote: “You make no distinction when thousands of addicted persons 
(never peddlers) are given the stringent penalties which you advocate to be written into and 
maintained in the federal and state laws on NARCOTIC VIOLATIONS.”  Heyward 
continued, the “poor unfortunate who is addicted, or now in prison for having been addicted, 
is voiceless in the matter which concerns him so much.”  Heyward also tried to prickle 
Anslinger, writing “you surely must conceive of this from the moral standpoint and must 
have equated this with your conscience.”595 
Heyward’s plaint ran against the tide of drug policy not only in the United States but 
also across the globe.  His situation—being jailed for using drugs—became all the more 
common in the decades following the Second World War.  American efforts to consolidate 
the punitive regime continued after World War II, and met with widespread success.  At 
home state and federal governments imposed mandatory minimum prison terms for illicit 
drug possession and endorsed long-term detention as a kind of drug treatment.  American 
diplomats and drug bureaucrats were active internationally.  They used the military 
 
595 Heyward to Anslinger, 1 April 1959, copy in U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter 
NA), RG 170, Subject Files of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 1916-1970 (hereafter RG 170), 
Acc.# 170-73-1, box 38, file: 0120 Addiction: General #2 1951-1960. Capitalization is as in the original.  
 
197
occupation of Japan to induce compliance.  They worked in indirect channels to bring Iran 
into the regime.  They pressured allies to end legal “traditional” drug use in their Asian 
colonies.  In their crowning achievement, they gained in 1961 an ironclad international treaty 
that finally criminalized “traditional” drug use and identified long-term detention as the best 
way to break addiction. 
 
Part I. Updating the Regime at Home  
 
Anslinger and his congressional supporters strengthened the U.S. application of the 
punitive regime during the 1950s.  The regime had first come into action in the United States 
with the 1914 Harrison Act following the 1912 Hague Opium Convention.  Congressmen 
Stephen Porter had successfully added the narcotic farm program in the 1930s to improve 
punitive proscription.  By the 1950s Anslinger and his powerful allies in Congress achieved 
two major updates.  They established mandatory minimum terms in prison for illicit drug 
possession in state and federal law.  And they greatly extended the narcotic farm model of 
long-term detention as addiction treatment by fostering civil commitment of addicts at the 
state and federal level. 
Mandatory Incarceration and Civil Commitment 
 
Anslinger and his congressional allies enjoyed favorable political and social 
conditions for toughening drug control laws in the postwar period.  Back in 1914 Hamilton 
Wright had grasped at strategies, namely racism and xenophobia, before successfully arguing 
that the Hague Convention required a domestic ban.  The political culture of the 1950s made 
stiffening the penalties easy.  Anslinger and his supporters in Congress had a genuine desire 
to reduce drug use, but they did not address actual changes in drug consumption patterns or 
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investigate the medical or social phenomenon of addiction.  Instead, they offered sensational 
narratives about narcotics destroying children and the morals of middle-class females [see 
Figure 11].596 These narratives, along with Cold War concerns about domestic security, won 
Anslinger favorable newspaper coverage and lent his Congressional allies public support 
critical to campaigns for elected office.597 They stressed the drug threat to white youth 
(especially females), but the increase in heroin use was actually most pronounced amongst 
African-Americans who had migrated from the south to major urban centers, particularly to 
New York City.  The misleading, alarmist reports terrified parents.  Newsweek reflected the 
national mood in 1950: “Everywhere, frightened and hysterical parents pleaded with 
narcotics experts and police officials to save their children.”598 A 1951 Gallup Poll reflected 
the high state of alarm: 70 percent of residents of cities with a population of 500,000 or more 
thought teenagers bought “dope.”599 
Congress hiked the penalties for drug violations to levels unprecedented in the United 
States with the Boggs Act, passed into law in 1951.  Named for Representative Hale Boggs 
(D-LA), who had been advised by Anslinger, the law raised the penalties for drug offenses, 
including illicit possession, to a mandatory prison term of two to five years for first 
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offenders, five to ten years for second offenders, and ten to twenty years for third and 
subsequent convictions. The maximum fine was $2,000. The act also suspended parole after 
a second offense.600 Boggs felt that the longer sentences would “enable narcotic violators, 
who are frequently addicts themselves, to be subjected to a longer period of treatment and 
observation.”601 Representative Sidney R. Yates (D–IL) struck a common theme in 
supporting the bill, concluding that “one major means of getting at this evil is to quarantine 
the unfortunate victims from the rest of society by providing stiffer penalties.”602 
A mild dissent quickly faded.  Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY) had 
complained during the congressional debate that mandatory minimum sentences would put 
judges in a “strait-jacket” and that even addicts who deserved sympathy would be mandated 
to serve “at least two years in prison.”603 President Harry Truman, who had supported 
punitive drug laws, addressed such concerns while signing the bill by noting the unease about 
“unfortunates who are merely addicts and not engaged in the traffic for their own profit” who 
might receive long prison sentences.604 Truman addressed the issue by creating an 
Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics that would be charged with examining the 
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operation of the law.  As it happened, Truman appointed Anslinger as chairman of the 
committee, which assured acceptance of the stiff penalties.605 
605 Boggs Act, U.S. Statutes at Large 65 (1951): 767-769.  See Conley to Lyons, 18 October 1951, in Truman 
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and Truman’s 12 April 1952 order and related correspondence in Truman Library, OF 431A, box 1286.   
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Figure 11: “Your Child May Be Hooked.” 
 
Photographer Earl Thesen produced this photo to illustrate a 1953 Look Magazine article titled “Your 
Child May Be Hooked.”  Though females were a small minority of those arrested for drug violations, 
political and media discourse focused on young white women threatened by drugs.  The original 
caption read: “Denied narcotics, her body is tortured by pain, nausea, chills and fever.  And all the 
time, night and day, there is the craving for ‘the fix.’” 
 
Source: Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, File: LOC, LOOK JOB-53-1368. 
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Anslinger’s allies continued to produce results.  Congress extended the prison terms 
for drug violations with the passage of the Narcotic Control Act in 1956.  Boggs and Senator 
Price Daniel (D-TX), who was also advised by the commissioner, pushed the legislation.  
The new law increased the punishment for possession offenses to a mandatory prison term of 
two to ten years upon first conviction, five to twenty years for a second offense, and ten to 
forty years after a third infraction.  Probation, parole, or suspended sentences were eliminated 
after the first conviction.  The maximum fine for all offenses was $20,000.  Reflecting the 
special concern about teen-age heroin addiction, any offense involving selling or giving 
heroin to a minor risked a ten-year to life prison term, up to $20,000 in fines, and the death 
penalty at the discretion of the jury.  The law also banned U.S. citizens who were non-
medical drug addicts (or had been convicted of a state or federal drug violation with a penalty 
of more than one-year imprisonment) from traveling abroad without prior authorization from 
the Secretary of the Treasury.  The legislation tasked the Federal Bureau of Narcotics with 
shaping state legislation, assisting state enforcement, conducting training programs, and 
compiling a register of known addicts.606 Daniel proclaimed “we are never going to lick the 
problem of narcotics until we take the drug addicts off the streets.”607 
Enforcement of the tough federal laws with their mandatory minimum prison 
sentences added significantly to the federal prison population.  Boggs Act violations 
increased the number of drug offenders in federal prison from 2,017 (or 11.2 percent of the 
prison population) in 1950 to 3,181 (or 15.1 percent) in 1956.  Convictions under the 1956 
 
606 Narcotic Control Act of 1956, U.S. Statutes at Large 70 (1956): 567-76. 
 
607 See David Rupert Murph, “Price Daniel: The Life of a Public Man, 1910-1956”  (Ph.D. Diss., Texas 
Christian University, 1975), 234; Charles V. Waite, “Price Daniel: Texas Attorney General, Governor, and 
Senator” (Ph.D. Diss., Texas Christian University, 1999), 167; and “Doctors Opposed On Aid To Addicts,” 
New York Times, 21 September 1955, national edition.  
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Narcotic Control Act spurred further increases.  The number of drug offenders in federal 
prisons reached 4,368 (or 17.7 percent) by 1962.  The average sentence length, rather than 
increases in the number of convictions, primarily drove the growth of drug offenders in the 
federal prisons during these years.  The average sentence for federal narcotics violations 
lengthened from around four years in 1956 to about six years in 1958, with the average term 
for cannabis offenses rising from around three years to about five years respectively.608 By 
comparison, the average sentence for drug convictions in 1951, prior to the passage of the 
Boggs Act, was just under two years.609 Figure 12 offers a visual representation of the 
lengthening sentences.  
 
608 Senate, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on Juvenile Delinquency, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, S. 
Rept. No. 1519, 5. Also see the informative tables included in James V. Bennett, “Penalties Under Public Law 
728, 84th Congress, Narcotic Control Act of 1956,” reproduced from the Kennedy Library in “Johnson (Chapter 
1): Additional Electronic Documentation,” on CD-ROM included in David F. Musto and Pamela Korsmeyer, 
The Quest for Drug Control: Politics and Federal Policy in a Period of Increasing Substance Abuse, 1963-1981 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).  
 
609 House, Increased Penalties for Narcotics and Marihuana Law Violations, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, H. 
Rept. No. 635, 3.   
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Figure 12: Average Length of Federal Narcotic Sentences, 1948-1963. 
 
Data compiled from eighty-six district courts from 1948-1963.  
 
Source: U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous 
Drugs, December 31, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), 71. 
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Anslinger enlisted the states to further amplify U.S. adherence to the punitive regime.  
He lobbied states to adopt so-called “little Boggs acts” in order to expand the enforcement 
net.  In function, the “little Boggs acts” raised the penalties (including mandatory sentences) 
of the Uniform State Narcotic Act, which Anslinger had advanced during the 1930s.610 
There were good reasons for Anslinger’s call to stiffen state controls.  Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics agents were too few to police the nation.  A common estimate of the number of 
“addicts” in the United States in 1956 was around sixty thousand.611 The number of bureau 
agents ranged between 205 and 297 from 1948 to 1964.  Further, the federal prisons were too 
small to hold drug violators from across the nation.  Finally, Anslinger hoped that increased 
enforcement at the state level against drug users and petty dealers would free his agents to 
track large-scale smuggling networks. 
State governments worked with the commissioner.  In addition to bans on use and 
possession, numerous states criminalized addiction and gave the definition broad meaning.  
For example, New Jersey passed a law in 1955 that designated an “addict” as a “disorderly 
person” to be imprisoned for one year and fined one thousand dollars.612 Other typical 
 
610 See Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation: 1945-1964, A Review of Government and 
Politics in the Postwar Years (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1964), 1190; and Senate, 
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on Juvenile Delinquency, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, S. Rept. No. 
1519, 12. 
 
611 A number of historians have demonstrated that the estimates of addiction provided by the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics were manipulated to serve the bureau’s political needs and were poor reflections of actual drug use. 
The point here is that the number of consumers exceeded enforcement capability. The sixty-thousand figure was 
highlighted in numerous statements including Senate, Report on the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1956, S. Rept. No. 1140, 2. 
 
612 These “addiction” laws had to be revised after a 1962 Supreme Court decision held that a California statute 
making addiction a criminal offense ran afoul of the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment. The Supreme Court struck down a California law that provided prison terms for people who were 
addicted for three months to a year in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Anslinger, “Statement 
Before the Senate Judiciary Sub-Committee on Narcotics,” 2 June 1955, copy in Anslinger Papers, box 1, file 8, 
10. 
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restrictions at the state level included statutes that made it a crime for a “habitual user of a 
narcotic drug” to drive an automobile.  Such laws had passed in twenty-eight states by 1965.  
By that same year, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia had made it a crime to 
drive while under the influence of a “narcotic drug.”613 Connecting drug control to sexual 
morality, New York State made it a felony to have sexual “intercourse with a female not 
one’s wife who is under the influence of narcotics.”  This starkly gendered formulation 
carried a penalty of incarceration that could reach a life term.614 
The enforcement record illustrates that men, particularly black men, were arrested far 
more often than women or youths even though the latter were the focus of politicians and the 
media.  According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports from 1949 to 1956, women 
were on average 16 percent of those arrested for drug violations.  Minors averaged less than 
3.5 percent of total arrests in these years.  The police arrested more blacks than whites for 
drug violations in every year from 1949 to 1956 except 1951.615 
Arrests also served as a form of extra-judicial control, as the number of arrests greatly 
surpassed the number of cases prosecuted.  For example, according to the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, state and local authorities arrested 21,853 people for drug violations in 1953, 
whereas the Federal Bureau of Investigation records uncovered just 11,974 prosecutions of 
 
613 National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, “Traffic Laws Commentary,” 30 April 1965, 
UNCPA, file: No. 65-1, Item 128, folder: Road Accidents Caused by Abuse of Narcotic Drugs, 16.  
 
614 New York Mayor’s Committee on Drug Addiction, “Report of a Study on Drug Addiction Among 
Teenagers,” July 1951, copy in Anslinger Papers, box 8, file 14, 30.  
 
615 Statistics and table compiled from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951-7). Also see Walter R. Cuskey, T. Premkumar, and Lois Sigel, 
“Survey of Opiate Addiction Among Females in the United States Between 1850 and 1970,” Public Health 
Reviews 1 (February 1972): 5-39. 
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drug offenses that year.616 Still, the numbers of cases prosecuted by states steadily increased 
over the 1950s: from 5,590 in 1950, to 15,937 in 1955, to 27,735 in 1960 [see Tables 7-8]. 
 
616 U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports, for the United States and Its Possessions, 1954 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 52; and “Report of the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Narcotics to the President,” 1 February 1956, copy in Anslinger Papers, box 7, file 1, 9. 
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Table 7: State and Local Narcotic Law Arrests in Thousands, 1945-1960 
The offenses related to unlawful possession, sale, or use of controlled drugs.  The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation compiled this data from reports sent voluntarily by police departments across the 
country and in U.S. territories.  
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports, for the United States and Its 
Possessions, 1945-1960 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945-1960). 
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Anslinger also moved to expand the reach of the narcotic farm detention program.  
His ambitious goals included the construction of new narcotic farms across the country.  As a 
stopgap plan, Anslinger urged local and state governments to pass “quarantine ordinances, to 
confine the users in controlled wards of city hospitals until they are pronounced cured by 
medical authorities.”  He explained, “As long as they are on the streets, addicts will spread 
addiction and contamination to others.”617 Further, drug users would benefit from the 
medical attention during forced detention while the general population would be protected 
from “addicts” who spread their habit like “typhoid Mary.”  While Anslinger stressed the 
supposed restorative benefits imparted through compulsory confinement, the intent was a 
punitive deterrent.  For example, a 1956 Federal Bureau of Narcotics publication warned 
potential drug users that it was “as much against the law to buy illegal drugs as it is to sell 
them” and threatened, “In many places, addiction itself is an offense for which the addict 
must undergo compulsory imprisonment in an institution until cured.”618 
Numerous state governments heeded Anslinger’s call to confine drug users in 
addiction detention facilities.  The states with the largest numbers of drug users led the trend, 
especially New York, California, Illinois, and Michigan.619 For example, New York’s 1952 
law stipulated “mandatory commitment of all drug users.”620 The Illinois law became the 
 
617 See George E. Connery, “Control of Narcotic Addiction,” Journal of the American Medical Association 147 
(17 November 1951): 4; Anslinger’s introduction to J.D. Ratcliff, “A Sane Look at Teen-Age Drug Addiction, 
1951,” Parent’s Magazine 26 (November 1951), 40-41.   
 
618 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Living Death: The Truth about Drug Addiction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1956), 4.  
 
619 Coverage of the different programs and institutions is beyond the scope of this chapter, for more information 
see Harry J. Anslinger, “Narcotic Addiction as Seen by the Law-Enforcement Officer,” Federal Probation 21 
(June 1957): 34-41; and Senate, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Drug Addicts, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1956, S. Rept. 1850. 
 
620 See Harry J. Anslinger, “Narcotic Addiction as Seen by the Law-Enforcement Officer,” Federal Probation 
21 (June 1957): 39. 
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model for many states.  The law ordered the compulsory hospitalization of addicts, with 
possession of any controlled drug deemed evidence of addiction.  According to a 1954 study, 
involuntary civil commitment of drug users was an option for thirty-seven out of the forty-
eight U.S. states.621 
The federal government also embraced Anslinger’s push for the compulsory 
confinement of “addicts.”  Anslinger called for a confinement bill in Washington, D.C.622 
Congress responded in 1956 by passing a law meant to detain drug users—from their initial 
discovery by the police to their discharge—followed by two years of probation.  The House 
report on the bill had urged that the “first step must be the processing and confinement of all 
addicts who use narcotic drugs illegally.”623 Also in 1956, an Interdepartmental Committee 
on Narcotics reported to President Dwight Eisenhower recommending the “legal 
commitment of addicts to institutions” to augment increased penalties for offenders.624 A
621 See Kenneth W. Chapman, “Care and Treatment of Drug Addicts,” Bulletin on Narcotics 10 (April-June 
1958): 25-28; King, The Drug Hang-Up, 251; Senate, Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, 89th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1965, S. Rept. 72; and Malachi L. Harney, “Current Provisions and Practices in the United 
States of America Relating to the Commitment of Opiate Addicts,” Bulletin on Narcotics 14 (July-September 
1962): 11-23.  
 
622 For one example of many see Miriam Ottenberg, “Anslinger Asks Senate Action on Addict Bill,” 
Washington Evening Star, 23 November 1953. 
 
623 The bill superseded earlier a 1953 law that was more lenient, passing as Dangerous Drug Control Act for the 
District of Columbia, U.S. Statutes at Large 70 (1956): 609-622. When signing the 1953 bill, Eisenhower 
warned that states could not count on the federal narcotics hospitals to handle the anticipated “large volume of 
commitments from the District and the state courts.” See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1960), 449. Treatment of Users of Narcotics in the District of Columbia, U.S. Statutes at Large 67 
(1953): 77-79. A 1954 law had allowed the District to commit “addicts’ to the federal narcotic hospitals until 
local facilities were provided. See To Authorize the Care and Treatment at Facilities of the Public Health 
Service of Narcotic Addicts Committed by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and for 
Other Purposes, U.S. Statutes at Large 68 (1954): 79-81. House, Effecting the Control of Narcotics, 
Barbiturates, and Dangerous Drugs in the District of Columbia, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 1956, H. Rept. 2277, 6, 7, 
43.   
 
624 Eisenhower had appointed the committee in 1954. It also suggested financial support to help states send drug 
users to the two federal farms. See Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics to the President, 1
February 1956, copy in Anslinger Papers, box 7, file 1, 13.    
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Senate Judiciary Committee adopted a similar position prompted by fear that “addicts, who 
are not hospitalized or confined, spread the habit with cancerous rapidity to their families and 
associates.  Yet, less than 20 percent are confined.”625 (The percentage was based on 
questionable estimates of the “addict” population.)  The committee proposed the elimination 
of voluntary commitment of users at treatment centers in favor of mandatory detention 
followed by at least three years of probation.  Further, the committee wanted addicts who 
relapsed three times to be imprisoned for life.  A third failure at a permanent cure would thus 
trigger “an indeterminate quarantine-type of confinement at a suitable narcotics farm.”626 
By the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s it was clear that Anslinger had taken the 
narcotic farm model to a new level.  In December 1959 Anslinger announced that 
compulsory confinement of drug users enjoyed the “unanimous approval of the President, the 
Congress, and fifty Governors.”627 He took satisfaction in penning a work of fiction, titled 
“The Experiences of a Cured Morphinomaniac,” that described an addict’s joy at being 
sentenced to three months in prison for illicit use and possession of morphine; “The benefit 
of the law lies in the fact that it enables a victim of morphine or cocaine…to be brought to 
prison for treatment and be discharged after a cure.”628 The American Medical Association 
and the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences formally endorsed 
 
625 See Senate, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Addicts, 84th Cong., 2nd sess, 1956, S. Rept. 1850, 2.  
 
626 Senate, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Addicts, 84th Cong., 2nd sess, 1956, S. Rept. 1850, 21. 
 
627 Anslinger to Eddy, 24 December 1959, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-73-1, box 42, file: 0120-16, Addiction: 
Committee on Drug Addiction, National Research Council, 1960-1963.  
 
628 Memorandum by Anslinger, n.d., NA, RG 59, Acc #170-74-12, box 157 (old box #25), file: 0660 Great 
Britain, #4. 
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the compulsory civil commitment of drug addicts in 1962.629 The administration of President 
John F. Kennedy described expanded civil commitment programs in a positive manner, as 
did the 1963 President’s Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse.630 And in 1966 Congress 
endorsed the approach (although without providing sufficient funds to apply it) in the 
Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act.631 
During the 1950s Commissioner Anslinger successfully amplified the application of 
the punitive regime in the United States.  He had enjoyed wide-ranging support from the 
legislative and executive branches of state and federal governments.  Anslinger’s progress 
was real, but it was not revolutionary.  Earlier drug control advocates, particularly Hamilton 
Wright, had achieved the major breakthrough regarding a federal ban.  Congressmen Porter 
had grasped the innovation of casting long-term detention as addiction treatment.  
Anslinger’s major contribution had been his tenacious advocacy that attracted fervent support 
within the political culture of the 1950s. 
 
Part II. Promoting Compliance Overseas  
 
American officials advanced on a second front to consolidate the punitive regime in 
the postwar period.  They were active and influential overseas.  The U.S. military occupation 
 
629 Federal Bureau of Narcotics official Malachi L. Harney endorsed civil confinement as “addict control” in 
“Current Provisions and Practices in the United States of America Relating to The Commitment of Opiate 
Addicts,” Bulletin on Narcotics 14 (July-September 1962): 11-23. Also see “AMA Officially Okays Addicts’ 
Commitment,” New York Journal American, 15 May 1962, copy in Anslinger Papers, box 6, file 8.   
 
630 See, for example, Proceedings of the White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, Final Report 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962). Also see King, The Drug Hang-up, 241, 244; and 
President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1963).  
 
631 For supporting statements by the Justice and Treasury Departments as well as Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
Commissioner Giordano see Senate, Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 
1965, S. Rept. 72, 82-83, 102. Also see House, Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation, 89th Cong., 2nd sess, 1966, H. 
Rept. 1486, 8; Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, U.S. Statutes at Large 82 (1966): 1438-1450; 
Courtwright, Dark Paradise, 163; King, The Drug Hang-up, 254; and Musto and Korsmeyer, Quest for Drug 
Control, 15-19. 
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of Japan provided a direct channel to induce compliance with the regime by a state that had 
dropped out of the international control system.  American advisors worked in indirect 
channels to bring Iran into the regime, thus criminalizing the habits of millions of Iranian 
drug users for the first time.  Anslinger also pushed hard to convince colonial powers to 
criminalize “traditional” drug use in their territories.  After finally closing their opium 
monopolies, government officials in Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Macao took up 
the U.S. narcotic farm model to try to make punitive prohibition function.  
 
Bringing Japan into the Regime 
 
Washington welcomed the postwar military occupation as an opportunity to guide 
Japan’s drug policies.  Japanese colonial policies had created opium monopolies in Korea 
and Taiwan.  The profitable monopoly sale of opium had extended to Manchukuo in the 
1930s and opium sales (along with opium production and the manufacture of heroin and 
morphine) followed Japan’s expansionary drive to create a Greater Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.  Anslinger remained convinced throughout the 1930s that Japan was also profiting 
from drug trafficking and blamed Japan for the presence of illicit narcotics in North 
America.632 His accusations melded with the wartime propaganda.  For example, a January 
1942 Treasury Department statement accused the Japanese of scheming to re-establish an 
opium monopoly in the Philippine Islands and complained that the United States had 
 
632 See Kathryn Meyer, “Japan and the World Narcotics Traffic,” in Consuming Habits: Drugs in History and 
Anthropology, ed. Jordan Goodman, Paul E. Lovejoy, and Andrew Sherratt (New York: Routledge, 1995), 186-
205; and Friman, NarcoDiplomacy, 53-61. Walker offers a detailed account in Opium and Foreign Policy, 109-
31, 135-41.  
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“experienced Pearl Harbors many times in the past in the nature of dangerous drugs from 
Japan which were meant to poison the blood of the American people.”633 
Anslinger drew up a policy program for General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, to impose, as historian William O. Walker III 
phrased it, “American-style narcotics control.”634 A 1947 report by U.S. Lieutenant Colonel 
R.G. Hersey indicated that the compulsory commitment of addicts was part of that control.  
Accordingly, the Japanese Narcotic Control Law of 1948 included stiff penalties and broadly 
defined commitment protocols.  Non-medical consumers of manufactured drugs risked up to 
five years in prison, a fifty thousand yen fine, or both.  Opium smoking convictions brought 
up to three years in prison.  The law defined drug addicts as people lacking “self control” or 
“vicious or delinquent” and provided for a six month prison sentence.635 
American officials also brought Japan into the regime by sending reports of 
compliance to the United Nations.  MacArthur sent updates about drug enforcement to 
Anslinger, who in turn forwarded them to the United Nations’ Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, the United Nation’s equivalent to the League of Nation’s Opium Advisory 
Committee.  Thus the commission learned in 1950, for example, that heroin use was on the 
 
633 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Press Release,” 26 January 1942, LONA, Opium Traffic Section, box 
C804, file: Narcotics During 1940-1946, 4.  
 
634 Walker, Opium and Foreign Policy, 167.    
 
635 Lieutenant Colonel R.G. Hersey (on the behalf of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers), 
“Questionnaire Regarding Legal and Practical Standpoint Taken Up Regarding Drug Addiction and Drug 
Addicts,” 18 July 1947, UNDCPA, item 4, file: SOA 25/01 Part “B,” Drug Addiction Questionnaire, 6. Also see  
“Drug Addiction (Replies to the Questionnaire on drug addiction (Japan)),” 2 February 1950, UNDCPA, item 4, 
file: SOA 25/01 Part “C,” Drug Addiction Questionnaire.  Friman notes that the U.S. policies imposed lacked 
controls on pharmaceutical stimulants, which ignored the legacy of Japanese stimulant use that began during the 
war. See Friman, NarcoDiplomacy, 63-85. 
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rise (both the smoking of heroin in cigarettes and by injections) and that the number of 
convictions for illicit possession was 589.636 
The tough approach continued after the Americans departed in 1952.  The Japanese 
government reported to the United Nations in 1955 that it had lengthened the maximum 
prison term for illicit use or possession of heroin to seven years (and a fine of up to one 
hundred thousand yen).  Compulsory confinement also continued, aiming to control the 
known addict population, estimated at 8,700 (mostly heroin users discovered between 1946 
and 1955), as well as possibly forty thousand “unknown addicts.”637 Japan again 
strengthened its compulsory commitment program and increased the penalties for illegal 
possession and consumption of dangerous drugs in 1963.  Like the U.S. Congress, Japanese 
legislators added a mandatory minimum penalty: three months to six years in prison for 
illegal possession.   Illegal drug use risked a minimum prison term of four months to a 
maximum of three years and six months.  Japan also continued to report the enforcement and 
conviction records to the United Nations.638 
Advising Iran 
Iran was an important country to U.S. drug control advocates.  It was one of the 
world’s largest producers of opium and home to millions of opium consumers.  A state 
opium monopoly dated to 1929 and continued into the postwar period.  Domestic anti-opium 
agitation before the war had prompted Iranian legislators to outlaw opium dens and the 
 
636 “Japan Annual Report for 1950,” UNDCPA, item 13, file: 109/03, Annual Reports, Japan. 
 
637 “Japan Annual Report for 1955,” UNDCPA, item 13, file: 109/03, Annual Reports, Japan. 
 
638 “Japan Annual Report for 1965” and “Japan Annual Report for 1970,” both in UNDCPA, item 49, file: 
22883, Annual Reports, Japan. Also see “Japan’s Many Drug Addicts,” The Guardian, 16 November 1959, 
clipping in UNDCPA, item 128, file: 26315, Drug Addiction, Japan.   
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public use of drugs.  Officials in the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics wanted to see much 
stiffer controls in Iran.  Thus they lobbied to influence Tehran.  As we shall see, American 
advisors managed to gain impressive purchase over Iran’s drug policies.   
Federal Bureau of Narcotics District Supervisor Garland Williams arrived in Tehran 
on a special mission to guide Iranian drug policy in 1949.  He immediately reported to 
Anslinger about his disgust with Iran’s lax approach regarding opium.  Williams estimated 
that there were over a million opium “addicts” and described how easy it was to obtain the 
drug, even in grocery stores.  He also described the varied patrons of opium dens, which 
included children, doctors, prostitutes, businessmen, and housewives; “the better class 
people” smoked their opium at home.639 He blamed the central government and the Shah, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, for tepid enforcement of the existing Penal Code bans on opium 
dens and the public use of drugs.640 To improve Iranian drug policy, Williams advocated a 
new tougher law, a reformulated drug control agency, and a permanent U.S. Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics posting in Tehran.  He also warned that opponents of the U.S. “prohibition 
program” might obstruct progress by calling for “great hospitals to cure the addicts,” which 
neither Iran nor the United States could afford to build.641 
A comprehensive drug control law passed in 1955.  Iran criminalized the non-medical 
use of opiates (and adopted a ban on opium production).  Under the new law visiting a public 
 
639 Williams to Anslinger, 1 February 1949, Anslinger Papers, box 2, file 16, 7.  
 
640 See Williams to Anslinger, 1 February 1949, Anslinger Papers, box 2, file 16, 7; Gerald T. McLaughlin and 
Thomas M. Quinn, “Drug Control in Iran: A Legal and Historical Analysis,” Iowa Law Review 59 (February 
1974): 469-524; and the text of the 20 July 1949 law in United Nations Document, E/NL.1951/11 (1951). 
 
641 Williams to Anslinger, 1 February 1949, Anslinger Papers, box 2, file 16, 10. For an in-depth study of the 
introduction of consumerist uses of opium, wine, coffee, and tea in Iran see Rudi Matthee, The Pursuit of 
Pleasure: Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 1500-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).  
Also helpful on more recent periods are McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 468-471; and David T. Courtwright, 
Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 96. 
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place such as a den, café or hotel to smoke opium risked six months to a year in prison for 
the first offense.  Drug “addicts” had six month’s “grace” to quit using drugs.  Thereafter first 
offenders faced prison terms of one to two months, with longer terms lasting up to three 
years for subsequent offenses.642 The new policy eliminated an industry with an estimated 
annual revenue of six million dollars and set the government on a mission to transform the 
habits of millions of Iranians.643 
The new law reflected, at least in part, an increased level of American intervention in 
Iran in the 1950s.  Since the 1940s American officials had pushed Tehran to adopt a “policy 
of complete prohibition of the use of opium for non-medical purposes.”644 A new dynamic 
emerged after the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency returned the Shah from exile in 1953 and 
offered economic support and the protection of the state’s oil revenues, which made the 
opium monopoly less vital to state finances.645 Williams also furthered the U.S. agenda by 
supporting Iranian officials who favored the American approach on drug control and the 
 
642 Dr. Jehan S. Saleh, Minister of Health of Iran, discussed the new law in “Iran Suppresses Opium 
Production,” Bulletin on Narcotics 8 (July-September 1956): 1-2.  Also see A.E. Wright, “The Battle Against 
Opium in Iran: A Record of Progress,” Bulletin on Narcotics 10 (April-June 1958): 8-11. The treatment 
program updated limited efforts undertaken before the Second World War. See OAC, “Minutes of the Twenty-
Fourth Session,” LONA, C.209.M.136.1939.XI, 66.  
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Government of Iran in its Task,” 26 January 1963, copy in NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box 
#26), file: 0660 Iran, #13.  
 
644 See Clayton to Murray, including a translation of the bill provided by William Blake, American Vice 
Consul, 10 February 1945, NA, RG 59, Decimal File 1945-1949, 891.114/2-1045; memorandum by Blake, 9 
July 1945, NA, RG 59, Decimal File 1945-1949, 891.114/7-945; Murray to Byrnes, 12 August 1945, NA, RG 
59, Decimal File 1945-1949, 891.114/8-1245; and Clayton to Murray, 13 November 1945, NA, RG 59, Decimal 
File 1945-1949, 891.114/9-945.  
 
645 Williams probably participated in the Central Intelligence Agency’s activities in Iran. Agents from the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics routinely assisted the agency and its predecessor the Office of Strategic Services.  
McAllister notes that it was “likely that a connection existed between the CIA-backed putsch that placed the 
Shah in control and Iran’s change of heart concerning opium.” See McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the 
Twentieth Century, 306, 307n27. Gerald T. McLaughlin and Thomas M. Quinn considered the promise of future 
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1955 law.  For example, he pushed Anslinger to reward Dr. Jahan S. Saleh, who had served 
as Minister of Health, with an appointment in the United Nations’ Division of Narcotic 
Drugs.  Williams explained that Saleh “seems to voice ideas very similar to yours and my 
own,” including a strict ban on non-medical drug use, and that Saleh pushed for the 1955 law 
“even though many of his friends in the landed elite advised him against such a crusade.”646 
With the onset of the new law, Williams served as an adviser to the Iranian 
government and oversaw policy development and enforcement.  Iran had requested official 
expert assistance in 1956 and Anslinger guided Williams into a position with the 
International Cooperation Administration in the U.S. Operations Mission to Iran Public 
Safety Division.647 Williams then drafted the regulations for the government agencies that 
were charged with drug control in Iran, modeling them on the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics regulations.648 He also trained the narcotic control officers and lobbied Iranian 
officials to toughen the controls on drug use.  Williams described his approach with Iranian 
leaders in a letter to Anslinger: “I simply don’t stop talking long enough for them to 
formulate their own ideas, and after a while they accept my concept.”649 
646 Saleh was also attractive because he had earned a degree from Syracuse University and had married an 
American. Williams to Anslinger, 9 March 1958, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box #26), file: 
0660 Iran, #12.  
 
647 William’s position with the International Cooperation Administration lasted from 1957 to 1961. Though 
Williams was not technically an employee of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics during this period, he worked 
closely with Anslinger and was “of service” to the bureau’s agenda in Iran and Southeast Asia through the 
1950s and during the 1960s. See Williams to Anslinger, 10 March 1960, NA, RG 170, Acc# 170-74-12, box 
158 (old box 26), file: 0660 Hong Kong Spec. File; and Anslinger to Berry, 14 April 1961, NA, RG 170, 
Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box #26), file: 0660 Iran, #13. 
 
648 Williams to Siragusa, 25 February 1958, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box #26), file: 0660 
Iran, #12.  
 
649 Williams to Anslinger, 30 September 1958, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box #26), file: 0660 
Iran, #12. 
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Bravado, however, could not erase the difficulties encountered with implementing the 
ban on opium consumption.  Opium consumers did not rush to quit their traditional habits.  
Williams attributed the lack of movement to the country’s “historic cultural and social 
acceptance of the vice as being objectionable, but not to be greatly abhorred.”650 According 
to two legal scholars, the Iranian government arrested thousands (of the millions) of drug 
users “en masse” and the jails became “crowded with drug offenders.”  The scholars also 
opined that the Iranian government shouldered the expense of apprehending and 
incarcerating drug users while families suffered the “economic and human hardships which 
resulted when a father or brother (often the sole means of a family’s support) was 
imprisoned.”651 
To Williams’ dismay, the 1955 law also provided a role for the Iranian Ministry of 
Health to offer some form of drug treatment.  He need not have worried; the program of 
treatment suffered from a limited reach.  The ministry was to distribute opium pills and 
create drug addiction treatment centers in an effort to help the estimated one and a half 
million opium “addicts” stop using drugs prior to the six-month deadline.652 The ministry 
made some progress with treatment: two years after the six-month deadline the government 
treatment centers (better described as detoxification stockades) had “treated” about forty 
 
650 Williams, “Completion of Tour Report,” 16 March 1959, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box 
#26), file: 0660 Iran, #12, 4.  
 
651 Gerald T. McLaughlin and Thomas M. Quinn, “Drug Control in Iran: A Legal and Historical Analysis,” 
Iowa Law Review 59 (February 1974): 498, 514.  
 
652 Jehan S. Saleh, “Iran Suppresses Opium Production,” Bulletin on Narcotics 8 (July-September 1956): 1-2. 
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thousand opium addicts.653 But in the meantime, the estimates of “addicts” had increased to 
two million.654 
Williams extended his influence in Tehran by funding the training of Iranian officials 
in the United States.  Williams aimed, as he put it, to “orient” Dr. Hasan Ali Azarakhsh, who 
was the first chief executive overseeing the enforcement of the 1955 law and then served as 
Director General of Narcotics Control from 1957 to 1961.  Thus Azarakhsh received training: 
six months with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, including a two-week seminar at the 
bureau’s Narcotics Training School, and one month at the Lexington farm.  Williams also 
sent Iranian drug control agents to Washington to train with the bureau.  In 1960 he estimated 
that his project had spent an average of $8,000 per year to “train and motivate [Iranian] 
Nationals by sending them to the USA.”  Among numerous others, Dr. Manuchehr Saba, 
Director of the Addict Treatment Center in Teheran, trained at the Lexington farm for four 
months and at the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for three months.655 
653 Peyton Kerr, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, “Anti-Opium Campaign in Iran,”12 November 
1955, NA, RG 59, Decimal File 1955-1959, 888.53/11-1255. 
 
654 A.E. Wright, “The Battle Against Opium in Iran: A Record of Progress,” Bulletin on Narcotics 10 (April-
June 1958): 8-11. Also see Ossenfort to Kolb, 5 October 1957 and 1 May 1958, Kolb Papers, box 4, file: 
Ossenfort.  
 
655 With authorization provided by the 1956 Narcotic Control Act, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics opened the 
Narcotics Training School in Washington, D.C. During its first four years of operation the school trained fifty 
officials from seventeen countries. The students received two weeks of training (offered six times a year) that 
covered anti-trafficking methods and policy recommendations about suppressing drug addiction with 
punishment (including tactics to shut down the advocates of alternative treatment approaches). See Williams to 
Anslinger, 10 March 1960, NA, RG 170, Acc# 170-74-12, box 158 (old box 26), file: 0660 Hong Kong Spec. 
File; Harry J. Anslinger, “Narcotics Bureau Conducts Training School for Police,” FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin 31 (October 1962): 7-10; Anslinger to Yates, 11 July 1960, UNCPA, item 130, file: 23449, Technical 
Assistance, General Correspondence; Undated copy of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics Training Manual in 
Anslinger Papers, box 7, file 2, 12-13; Memorandum by Giordano, 19 November 1958, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-
74-12, box 158 (old box #26), file: 0660 Iran, #12; R.S. Tuffnell, “Tenth Progress Report of the United Nations 
Adviser for the period April to June 1964,” NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box #26), file: 0660 
Iran, #14; Williams to Anslinger, 30 September 1958, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box #26), 
file: 0660 Iran, #12; and Anslinger to Ardalan, 10 March 1958, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box 
#26), file: 0660 Iran, #12. 
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A second law, passed in 1959, continued to reflect American advice.  Robert R. 
Schott, Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, called Williams “instrumental” in 
the law’s passage.656 The law reflected William’s effort to increase penalties and transfer 
enforcement authority from the Ministry of Health to a newly formed police department 
under the Prime Minister.  Williams had also advocated for spending “the least possible on 
drug addiction hospitalization programs.”657 He recognized many of his first objectives in 
the new law, including, as he listed them, “punitive actions regarding release on bond, 
prompt trial, mandatory penalties, minimum sentences, and closure of public premises used 
as opium smoking places.”658 He exulted: “After almost two years of talking, working, and 
urging by all of us here we have considerably strengthened the [drug control] program as a 
result of the Parliament giving us 23 articles of new narcotic laws.”659 Prison terms for all 
offenses grew longer.660 Convicted non-medical drug users now faced six months to three 
years in prison661 
656 Schott, “Control of Narcotic Drugs,” 22 October 1959, NA, RG 59, Decimal File 1955-1959, 888.53/10-
2259. 
 
657 Williams, “Completion of Tour Report,” 16 March 1959, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box 
#26), file: 0660 Iran, #12, 9, 11.  
 
658 The law banned unauthorized use of opiates, cocaine, and cannabis under penalty of a minimum of six 
months up to a maximum of three years in prison, with the maximum imposed for morphine and heroin users.  
If the convict was an addict, the Ministry of Health was to provide a facility and “the period of treatment in such 
institution shall be counted as time served under the sentence prescribed by the court.”  See “Iranian Narcotic 
Control Law of 1959,” 22 June 1959, copy in NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box #26), file: 0660 
Iran, #12; and Garland Williams, “End of Tour Report” 23 June 1961, copy in NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, 
box 158 (old box #26), file: 0660 Iran, #13, 3.  
 
659 Williams to Anslinger, 24 August 1959, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box #26), file: 0660 
Iran, #12.  
 
660 See Law of 22 June 1959, United Nations Document, E/NL.1960/1 (1960); and Schott, “Control of Narcotic 
Drugs,” 22 October 1959, NA, RG 59, Decimal File 1955-1959, 888.53/10-2259.   
 
661 See Charles C. Stelle, “Parliament Proceedings,” 14 May 1959, in NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 
(old box #26), file: 0660 Iran, #12, 4-5; and Gerald T. McLaughlin and Thomas M. Quinn, “Drug Control in 
Iran: A Legal and Historical Analysis,” Iowa Law Review 59 (February 1974): 494.   
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While the new law did not eliminate the Ministry of Health’s authority, the 
ascendancy of a penal rather than a medical approach to drug users and addicts was 
unmistakable.  The Minister of Health, Dr. Abdoh Hussein Radji, signaled his acceptance of 
the punitive rationale.  Facing over a million opium users Radji hoped that the new law 
would help to “cure those who can be cured and to remove by imprisonment those who 
cannot be cured.”662 Responding to criticism that the law was too punitive, Dr. Mahmood 
Dadgar, serving as Director General of the Narcotics Control Administration, stressed that 
“severe anti-narcotic laws are effective measures in reducing addiction,” and countered calls 
for addict maintenance by retelling the history of “clinics” written by the U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics.663 Williams’ plan was in action.  A 1959 police report described 5,000 
arrests in just five months by the National Police Bureau of Narcotics “established in 
accordance with the advice of Narcotics Advisor Garland Williams.”664 
Buying the American Model: Narcotic Farms in Southeast Asia 
 
The war in the Pacific provided U.S. officials with an opportunity to apply more 
concerted pressure against legal opium smoking.  In March 1943 Anslinger organized what 
the State Department called an “informal discussion” in his Washington office.  He informed 
British and Dutch representatives that the legal sale of opium for smoking was anathema to 
 
662 A.H. Radji, “Opium Control in Iran: A New Regime,” Bulletin on Narcotics 11 (January-March 1959): 1-2.  
 
663 Mahmood Dadgar, “Prevention of Narcotics Addiction,” 2 October 1962, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 
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664 Williams left Iran in 1961 and U.S. military personnel affiliated with the U.S. Agency for International 
Development took over the advising program. See “Monthly Civil Police Report for September 1959,” 6 
October 1959, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 158 (old box #26), file: 0660 Iran, #12; Garland Williams, 
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the “Four Freedoms.”  Further, American forces would impose a ban on opium smoking as 
they advanced in the Far East.  To avoid a “clash” of policy that might undermine the unity 
of the alliance, the British and Dutch would have to end their colonial opium monopolies.  
That September, the State Department backed Anslinger’s case.  The department cited the 
1912 Hague Convention’s pledge to suppress opium smoking and urged the allies to 
criminalize opium smoking in the “Far Eastern” territories that would be liberated from 
Japanese forces.665 
In November 1943 Britain and the Netherlands submitted.  The British pledged to 
“adopt the policy of total prohibition of opium smoking” in British territories in the Far East.  
The Dutch approved “the complete suppression of the use of opium for smoking” in the 
Netherlands Indies.666 Malcolm Delevingne, who had served as Deputy Undersecretary of 
State and represented Britain at Geneva, described the British decision as the “climax” of his 
country’s involvement with the international drug control movement.667 France and Portugal 
 
665 See “Minutes of a Meeting in the Office of the Commissioner of Narcotics,” 17 March 1943, 
http://www.drugtext.org/library/legal/1943.htm (accessed 9 April 2005). Representative Brazilla Carroll Reece 
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McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 149-52.  
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would also make a formal pledge.668 By 1946 there were standing orders to close the 
monopolies in Hong Kong, Borneo, Singapore, the Union of Malaya, Macao, and French 
Indochina.669 
Singapore offered the first sign that U.S. influence would not only bring former 
outliers into the punitive regime, but also would introduce U.S.-style addiction prisons to 
Southeast Asia.  The Japanese invasion in 1942 had ended Singapore’s opium monopoly 
(established in 1929 and used by over sixteen thousand people).  Japanese authorities allowed 
unregulated opium sales.  At the war’s end, the British military administration in Singapore 
banned the non-medical use of opium, guiding the country into the punitive regime.  The 
penalty for illicit possession of opium or an opium pipe and for non-medical drug use 
reached one year in prison, with fines, by 1951.670 A law passed the next year extended the 
prison term for possession of opium prepared for smoking to up to five years and the prison 
term imposed for use of morphine or heroin reached two years.671 Officials in Singapore 
duly reported their application of penalties upon drug users to the United Nations.  For 
example, in 1955 the government reported 2,683 people prosecuted for offenses involving 
possession or use of controlled drugs (most were sent to prison).672 
668 See OAC, “Press Communiqué on the Abolition of Opium Smoking in the Far Eastern Territories Under 
French Control,” 20 July 1945, LONA, R.5006, 12/42357/31213; and Helen Howell Moorhead, “International 
Narcotics Control: 1939-1946,” Foreign Policy Reports 22 (1 July 1946): 94-103.  
 
669 George A. Morlock, “Accomplishments of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs,” Department of State 
Bulletin 16 (19 January 1947): 1-14. 
 
670 See Dr. Leong Hon Koon, “Narcotics Problem in Singapore,” copy in NA, RG 170, Acc #170-74-12, box 
162(old #30), file: 0660 Singapore, 1956-1958, 8-9.   
 
671 Federation of Malaya, Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, No. 30, 1952, Federation of Malaya Government 
Gazette 5 (1 October 1952): 554-556.   
 
672 “Singapore Annual Report for 1946,” “Singapore Annual Report for 1950,” and “Singapore Annual Report 
for 1955,” all in UNDCPA, item 16, file 109/03: Annual Reports, Singapore.  Also see “Singapore Annual 
Report for 1960,” UNDCPA, item 57, file 22949: Annual Reports, Singapore, 3. 
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Colonial administrators also turned to the United States for advice about enforcement.  
In 1954, when they enacted legislation to open an addiction detention center, they queried 
Washington about the best treatment methods for “narcotic addicts.”673 The Lexington farm 
enjoyed considerable prestige both from the scientific studies produced there and from the 
efforts of U.S. officials to promote long-term detention as the best addiction treatment.  The 
American suggestions about the Lexington farm shaped the Singapore Opium Treatment 
Center that opened in 1955.674 The program adopted Lexington’s “farm” approach, detaining 
prisoners for long periods and subjecting them to manual labor as addiction therapy.  Major 
W.L.P. Suchon, the Commissioner of Prisons, told the press with pride that there were “only 
two other Government Opium Treatment Centres in the world – both in the United States of 
America.”675 
The administration of Singapore’s detention center mirrored the Lexington program.  
The first prisoners arrived in February 1955 via a transfer from Outram Road Prison.  The 
superintendent, Major R.W. Heal (whose prior experience was, in an American observer’s 
words, “rehabilitating captured Communist terrorists in Johore”) imposed a strict regimen of 
labor.676 The detainees raised chickens, tended gardens, and worked as carpenters and 
 
673 See Philip Clock, “Despatch No. 259,” 24 November 1954, NA, RG 170, Acc #170-74-12, box 162(old 
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tailors.  They also received diminishing amounts of codeine for ten days to a few weeks until 
their opiate withdrawal was complete.677 (Officials had placed the center on St. John’s 
Island, two miles south of the capital in the Singapore Strait, to keep contraband drugs away 
from the detainees.)  The standard term of detention lasted one year.  There were only six 
“huts” to house prisoners but the center still managed to detain 680 people in its first year of 
operation.678 The number of admissions remained relatively constant in the following 
years.679 From August 1955 to December 1963 a total of 3,553 prisoners landed on the 
island.680 As was the case with Lexington, there was no reliable method to assess the results 
of the detention program.681 
The British Crown Colony in Hong Kong also built an addiction prison based on the 
U.S. model.  As had been the case in the United States, prison overcrowding following a ban 
inspired construction of a special prison for addicts.  (By 1960 addicts comprised 68 percent 
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of Hong Kong’s prisoners.682) In 1958 prison officials selected a remote site in a steep-sided 
valley for the addiction prison named Tai Lam.  They filled fifteen buildings to their capacity 
with 680 male prisoners (the majority of whom had been convicted of illicit possession of 
heroin).  All of the prisoners who were addicted to opiates were withdrawn from their habits 
in Victoria Prison in Hong Kong before transfer to the isolated detention facility.  The 
Lexington approach of “rehabilitation” through manual labor kept new arrivals busy.  They 
worked on reforestation projects, built dykes for rice fields, and constructed roads (among 
other tasks), all while working “stripped to the waist” to “get maximum benefit from the sun 
and fresh air.”683 The sentences at Tai Lam ranged from a few months to three years, with 
the average initial sentence lasting about eight months (with the possibility of a one-third 
reduction).684 The results were as inconclusive as the U.S. program.  Officials at Tai Lam 
were encouraged by a 1963 study that found that “only” 32 percent of the eight thousand 
prisoners discharged (October 1958 to April 1963) were re-convicted.685 
Thailand also built a special addiction prison modeled after Lexington.  Whereas 
Singapore and Hong Kong had allowed years to pass between the criminalization of 
 
682 For a list of the drug offenses in 1956 see Spear to Anslinger, 21 February 1958, NA, RG 170, Acc #170-74-
12, box 162(old #30), file: 0660 Singapore, 1956-1958.  Also see Secretary of Chinese Affairs, Hong Kong 
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“traditional” opium use and the construction of specialized addiction prisons, Thailand 
moved on both fronts simultaneously.  From January to June 1959, the Thai government 
urged an estimated seventy-two thousand opium addicts to quit the habit or to voluntarily 
enter treatment.  After July, opium consumers risked prison terms served in regular jails or in 
the newly constructed Rangsit Center.  Located near Bangkok it included the Lexington-style 
rehabilitation program of vocational training and therapy through agricultural labor [see 
Figure 13].   
Poor results inspired stiffer penalties.  In the first year, only 9 percent of the almost 
seven thousand people admitted had progressed satisfactorily at the end of the three month 
term, and 37 percent had escaped.  The director of the center blamed the addicts for the poor 
results, calling them “morally irresponsible, uncooperative and maladjusted.”686 Subsequent 
legislation tried to improve results through more punishment.  The length of detention at the 
Rangsit Center was extended to one year with recalcitrant users risking a ten-year prison 
term.  Illicit opium possession carried a twenty-year term.687 
686 See Malai Huvanandana, “The Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Opium Addicts, Rangsit, 
Thailand,” Bulletin on Narcotics 14 (April-June 1962): 1-10; Malai Huvanandana, “The Centre for Treatment 
and Rehabilitation of Opium Addicts, Rangsit, Thailand (continued),” Bulletin on Narcotics 14 (October-
December 1962): 17-23; and Commission on Narcotic Drugs, “Incidence of Drug Addiction, 24 February 
1960,” United Nations Document, E/CN.7/380, 12. For documentation of American officials’ efforts to 
convince Thailand to ban drug use see NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 162 (old box 30), file: 0660: Siam. 
 
687 Division of Narcotic Drugs, “Memorandum on Penal Sanctions for Narcotic Offenses: A Comparative Study 
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Regulations, General, 10, 33.    
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Figure 13: A View of the Rangsit Center in Thailand.   
 
Source: Malai Huvanandana, “The Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Opium Addicts, 
Rangsit, Thailand (continued),” Bulletin on Narcotics 14 (October-December 1962): 18. 
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Portuguese Macao offers a final example of a Southeast Asian territory that built a 
U.S.-style addiction prison.  From 1947 to 1960 officials had provided drug addiction 
treatment in hospitals (on a voluntary basis) to 2,326 people and “treated” 3,749 people in 
prison.688 In 1961 the government added a third option for drug treatment: the “Island of 
New Life.”  Macao Police Chief, Major Sigismundo Reves, oversaw the transformation of a 
collection of shacks on Taipa Island that had served as a place to quarantine homeless people 
(nicknamed “Beggars’ Shelter”) into a Lexington-style narcotic farm.689 The police 
administered the four square kilometer island, while medical advisers oversaw the 
withdrawal process of the prisoners.  The majority of the prisoners served six-month terms.  
As soon as the male and female prisoners had recovered from withdrawal sickness, wardens 
set them to work.  Therapeutic labor included construction, stone quarrying, farming, 
leatherwork, basket weaving, and shoemaking.  In the first year of operation the number of 
inmates increased from two hundred to four hundred.  Also in the first year, five prisoners 
escaped and one died.  Like the other U.S.-style narcotic farms we have considered, there 
was no way to track recidivism, but the staff claimed to recognize few returning prisoners.690 
688 Sigismundo Reves and A. Cotta Guerra, “The Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Addicts 
in Macau,” Bulletin on Narcotics 15 (January-March 1963): 1-10.  
 
689 “Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts in Macao” 27 August 1962, clipping in UNDCPA, item 130, file: 30919: 
Drug Addiction, Macao. Also see Sigismundo Reves and A. Cotta Guerra, “The Centre for Treatment and 
Rehabilitation of Narcotic Addicts in Macau,” Bulletin on Narcotics 15 (January-March 1963): 1-10. 
 
690 For more about addiction prisons in Macao see “Village For Cured Drug Addicts in Macao,” 15 April 1965; 
“Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts in Macao” 27 August 1962, both clippings in UNDCPA, item 130, file: 30919: 
Drug Addiction, Macao. Also see Division of Narcotic Drugs, “Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug-
Dependent Persons (Addicts) in South-East Asia,” UNODCA, item 137, file: 33937 Technical Assistance, 
United Nations Study Tour of Treatment and Rehabilitation Centers for Drug Addicts in Asia, 20.  
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Part III. The U.S. Push for a Tougher Treaty   
 
Commissioner Anslinger successfully closed two loopholes within the international 
drug control treaties during the postwar period.  The first loophole dated back to the 1912 
Hague Opium Convention when delegates agreed to ban non-medical use of manufactured 
drugs but not “traditional” types of consumption.  The second had opened with Anslinger’s 
failure in the late 1930s to win League endorsement of “closed” institutions as the best 
format for addiction treatment. 
 
Treaty Triumph 
 
In 1948 Anslinger called for a single convention to unify the numerous earlier anti-
drug treaties.  He envisioned an ironclad agreement that would finally eliminate legal 
“traditional” drug use.  He wanted moreover a United Nations endorsement of long-term 
detention as the preferred addiction treatment.  Through proposals and careful management 
of United Nations staffers, Anslinger shaped the development of a promising document.  By 
1959, a master draft aimed to fulfill what a Division of Narcotic Drugs staffer described as 
“the basic principle” of the international control movement: the elimination of legal non-
medical drug use, including the major “traditional” types of drug consumption.691 
The single convention’s progress was bogged down in a competing proposal.  Leon 
Steinig, Director of the United Nation’s Division of Narcotic Drugs, wanted to form an 
international monopoly of the production and distribution of licit opium.692 After contention 
and delay, an International Opium Protocol eventually incorporated parts of his plan in 
 
691 See Division of Narcotic Drugs, Information Service, “International Control of Drugs: The Beginning to 
1959,” copy in Anslinger Papers, box 10, file 11.  
 
692 The Division of Narcotic Drugs served as a permanent staff to support the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
comprised of appointed national representatives. 
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1953.693 The protocol’s promise to squeeze profits from producing nations made it 
unpopular; it would barely enter into force in 1963 only to be superseded by the more 
comprehensive single convention.694 
Finally, seventy-three delegations arrived in New York to attend the single 
convention conference in 1961.  Anslinger’s hopes would be realized.  The major 
“traditional” types of drug consumption (opium smoking, raw opium eating, coca-leaf 
chewing, and cannabis use) would be banned.  Further, the final text of the convention 
asserted that signatory countries had to limit the possession—as well as the use—of 
controlled drugs to authorized medical purposes.695 They also had to adopt penal provisions 
for offenses (including possession) and imprison “serious” offenders.696 
International law thus made criminal habits that were widespread globally.  Most 
notably, reports on opiate addiction from the few countries that still allowed “traditional” 
opium use amassed estimates of consumers running into the millions.697 Cannabis use had 
remained legal prior to the 1961 treaty in a just a few places, such as parts of Morocco and 
 
693 See McAllister, Drug Control in the Twentieth Century; 172-182; and Kettil Bruun, Lynn Pan, Ingemar 
Rexed, The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1975), 16-17. Also see “Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the 
Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium,” June 23, 1953. United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 456, 3; and the memorandum dated 20 August 1954, UNDCPA, item 62, file: Code and 
Commentary on the Opium Protocol of 1953, 5. 
 
694 Bewley-Taylor, United States and International Drug Control, 92-95, 148-59. 
 
695 Parties were also required to adopt measures to prevent the “misuse” of cannabis and to ensure that only 
authorized persons possessed drugs.  See “Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs, 1961,” March 30, 1961. 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 520, 151.   
 
696 I only discuss the aspects of the convention dealing with drug consumption and addiction treatment.  For 
comprehensive coverage of the entire sprawling agreement see McAlister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth 
Century, 185-211; and Bewley-Taylor, The United States and International Drug Control, 136-64. Chatterjee 
offers a detailed legal disposition in Legal Aspects of International Drug Control, 343-79. Also see “Single 
Convention of Narcotic Drugs, 1961,” March 30, 1961. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 520, 151. 
 
697 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, “Incidence of Drug Addiction,” 24 February 1960, E/CN.7/380. 
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the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.698 Coca chewing was limited to the regions around the 
Andean plateau.  An unofficial 1957 estimate of coca-chewers based on the high plateau and 
sub-Andean regions suggested that there were two hundred and fifty thousand coca-
chewers.699 
While the treaty criminalized “traditional” drug use, it also gave states time to prepare 
for the ban.  The “transitional reservations” included the right to allow quasi-medical use of 
opium (eating and smoking) for another fifteen years.  Coca-leaf chewing and non-medical 
cannabis use each received a twenty-five year lease on life.  The clock began when the 
convention came into force (as it did in 1964).700 These were expressly “temporary” 
extensions and available only for countries that were already allowing “traditional” drug use.  
They also required special reporting about the “progress made in the preceding year towards 
the abolition of use.”701 
Anslinger had also worked to have the Single Convention endorse long-term 
detention as the only proper addiction treatment.  He hoped to consolidate the method of 
 
698 Division of Narcotic Drugs, Information Service, “International Control of Drugs: The Beginning to 1959,” 
copy in Anslinger Papers, box 10, file 11. 
 
699 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, “Incidence of Drug Addiction,” 24 February 1960, E/CN.7/380, 6. Also see 
Harry J. Anslinger, “Report of the United States Delegation to the Eighteenth Session of the United Nations 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs,” 28 June 1963, copy in Truman Library, Papers of Harry J. Anslinger, box 1, 
file: International Narcotics Controls, 12-13. 
 
700 Bolivian officials objected to the criminalization of coca chewing, but the United Nations’ bodies endorsed 
the ban in a series of statements and seminars.  See Commission on Narcotic Drugs, “Incidence of Drug 
Addiction,” 24 February 1960, E/CN.7/380, 6; and Harry J. Anslinger, “Report of the United States Delegation 
to the Eighteenth Session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs,” 28 June 1963, copy in 
Truman Library, Papers of Harry J. Anlsinger, box 1, file: International Narcotics Controls, 12-13.  
 
701 See article 49 in “Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs, 1961,” March 30, 1961, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 520, 151.  
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treatment within the punitive regime.702 Anslinger lobbied public interest groups, such as the 
International Federation of Women Lawyers (the group had non-governmental organization 
observer status at the conference).703 He also tapped experts who supported the American 
approach.  Pablo Osvaldo Wolff, who served as chief of the World Health Organization’s 
Addiction Producing Drugs Section until 1954, advocated Anslinger’s ideas.  He even served 
as an unofficial spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.704 After Wolff’s departure, 
the organization’s Study Group on the Treatment and Care of Drug Addicts continued to 
favor the coerced treatment of addiction though compulsory confinement.705 The United 
Nations’ Division of Narcotics Drugs also endorsed provisions for drug treatment based on 
 
702 See the U.S. resolution in “United States of America: Draft Resolution Relating to Article 47 of the Third 
Draft of the Single Convention,” 13 March 1961, United Nations Document E/CONF.34/L.17, copy in NA, RG 
170, Acc#170-94-004, box 170 (old box 38), file: 1230 Single Convention # 4. 
 
703 Anslinger to Rothenberg, 11 April 1961, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-94-004, box 170 (old box 38), file: 1230 
Single Convention # 4.  
 
704 See the evidence of a mutually beneficial relationship in the correspondence between Wolff and Anslinger in 
NA, RG 170, Acc# 170-75-17, box 74 (Old box #11), file: 1690-10W #1, Wolff, Dr. Pablo Osvaldo (Thru 
1948); and Wolff to Anslinger, 23 July 1951; all in NA, RG 170, Acc# 170-75-17, box 74 (Old box #11), file: 
1690-10W #2, Wolff, Dr. Pablo Osvaldo (1949 thru 1957). Also see Wolf to Anslinger, 24 March 1949, NA, 
RG 170, Acc# 170-73-1, box 39, file: 0120-1 #4, Addiction, Narcotic Clinics, 1943 thru December, 1953; 
Wolff to Anslinger, 20 July 1954, NA, RG 170, Acc# 170-73-1, box 39, file: 0120-1 #5, Addiction Narcotic 
Clinics 1954-5; and Pablo Osvaldo Wolff, “The Activities of the World Health Organization in Drug 
Addiction,” British Journal of Addiction 50 (April 1953): 12-28.  
 
705 Dr. Nathan B. Eddy, of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, was a member of the World Health 
Organization’s Study Group on the Treatment and Care of Drug Addicts (often the chairman) until 1973. For 
evidence of his support see Eddy to Anslinger, 27 April 1960; Anslinger to Eddy, 29 April 1960; both in NA, 
RG 170, Acc#170-73-1, box 42, file: 0120-16, Addiction: Committee on Drug Addiction, National Research 
Council, 1960-1963. Also see World Health Organization, Technical Report Series No. 131, Treatment and 
Care of Drug Addicts: Report of a Study Group (World Health Organization: Geneva, 1957), 6-7, 10, 16-18; 
World Health Organization, “Drug Addiction and its Treatment,” 26 November 1957, UNDCPA, item 5, file: 
82/5/02, WHO, Commissions and Committees, Expert Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs, 2; World Health 
Organization, Technical Report Series No. 160, Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs, Ninth Report 
(World Health Organization: Geneva, 1961), 12; World Health Organization, Technical Report Series No. 211, 
Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs, Eleventh Report (World Health Organization: Geneva, 
1961), 11; World Health Organization, Technical Report Series No. 229, Expert Committee on Addiction-
Producing Drugs, Twelfth Report (World Health Organization: Geneva, 1962), 11; S.K. Chattergee, “The WHO 
Expert Committee on Drug Dependence,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 28 (1979): 27-51; and 
Kettil Bruun, Lynn Pan, Ingemar Rexed, The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 66-74, 124, 139-40. 
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detention.706 Further, the sessions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United 
Nations’ Economic and Social Council leading up the 1961 conference produced resolutions 
endorsing compulsory institutional treatment of drug addicts.707 Such widespread support 
helped to shape the drafts of the convention to Anslinger’s liking.  These included provisions 
for “isolation” and treatment in “closed” institutions and provisions for penalties for 
“recidivist addicts.”708 
Anslinger’s success was all but assured until opposition from an unlikely source 
forced a weakening in the commitment clause.  The Vatican’s representative, Monsignor 
Timothy Flynn, called on the many predominately Catholic countries in attendance to oppose 
the clause.  He was concerned that the Soviet states would use the compulsory commitment 
clause to justify human rights violations (particularly those perpetrated against Catholics 
living in the Soviet bloc).709 The Catholics’ unease produced a watered-down clause that 
disappointed Anslinger.  Ultimately, the Single Convention urged parties to give “special 
attention” to institutional treatment of addicts in a “drugfree atmosphere.”710 Anslinger 
might have been partly to blame for the weaker language because he was often absent due to 
his wife’s declining health, although he sent instructions to his representatives to “see that the 
 
706 Memorandum by López-Rey, 22 November 1959, UNDCPA, item 61, file: 323/4/01, Part A, Draft Single 
Convention, 5-6.   
 
707 See Commission on Narcotic Drugs, “Tenth Session,” United Nations Document, E/CN.7/L.93/Add.21; and 
United Nations, Economic and Social Council, “Resolution 548I on Drug Addiction,” 12 July 1954, United 
Nations Document, E/RES/1954/548.  
 
708 Memorandum on “Drug Addiction,” 26 January 1954, UNODCA, item 45, file: 109/10/01, 6, 7. 
 
709 The Vatican, though not a member of the United Nations, participated in the conference as a sovereign state. 
Memorandum by López-Rey, 22 November 1959, UNDCPA, item 61, file: 323/4/01, Part A, Draft Single 
Convention, 1. Also see McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 210.   
 
710 See article 38 in “Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs, 1961,” March 30, 1961, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 520, 151.  
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words ‘closed institution’ are kept in the convention.”711 He expressed his disappointment 
with the Single Convention for replacing “compulsory treatment for drug addiction in a 
closed institution” with a “meaningless” recommendation.712 
Anslinger had little actual reason to complain about the treatment clause.  Regardless 
of the weakened language in the 1961 Single Convention, there remained widespread support 
for compulsory confinement.  For example, a guide intended to help governments create 
polices to adhere to the convention endorsed “treatment in a closed institution.”713 A 1961 
study by the World Health Organization noted that compulsory commitment was advancing 
in many countries around the world.714 Further, by 1963 Anslinger could confidently assert 
on television that the United Nations supported compulsory commitment of drug addicts.  
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the World Health Organization, the Permanent Central 
Opium Board (which customarily confined its statements to the production and distribution 
of drugs), and the International Criminal Police Organization, all had recommended 
commitment as the best method of treatment.715 
711 Anslinger to Giordano, 8 February 1961, NA, RG 170, Acc #170-74-12, box 170 (Old box 38), file: 1230 - 
Single Convention #3. 
 
712 Canada’s Sharman found it “astonishing” that the “Holy See” had opposed the clause and lambasted the 
Vatican’s representatives as the “Holy See-nots.” See Anslinger, “The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 
1961, Criticism,” 28 March 1961, Anslinger Papers, box 10, file 6; “Report of the United States Delegation,” 19 
April 1961, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-94-004, box 170 (old box 38), file: 1230 Single Convention # 4, 18, 19; 
“Says Vatican Protests Killed Narcotic Reform,” St. Louis Review, March 1961, clipping in Anslinger Papers, 
box 6, file 8; Anslinger to Vaille, 16 March 1961, NA, RG 170, Acc #170-74-12, box 170 (Old box 38), file: 
1230 - Single Convention #3; and Sharman to Anslinger, 7 April 1961, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-94-004, box 170 
(old box 38), file: 1230 Single Convention # 4. 
 
713 “Draft Administrative Guide to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,” 26 February 1963, United 
Nations Document, E/CN.7/438, 49. 
 
714 See Commission on Narcotic Drugs, “Summary Record of the Seventeenth Session, 488th Meeting,” United 
Nations Document, E/CN.7/SR.488, 7; and Commission on Narcotic Drugs, “Summary Record of the 
Seventeenth Session, 490th Meeting,” United Nations Document, E/CN.7/SR.490, 4-5. 
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Conclusion 
 
The years following the Second World War were extraordinarily kind to American 
anti-drug bureaucrats.  Anslinger enjoyed warm support from state and federal leaders.  
Together they amplified the U.S. application of the punitive regime.  Advocacy abroad was 
also rewarding.  Governments who had continued to allow drug use mended their ways and 
looked to the United States for enforcement strategies.  Finally, a new comprehensive 
international treaty affirmed the U.S. approach.  Thus it was with some disbelief that drug 
control officials watched as a new generation of drug consumers in the late 1960s presented a 
final and quite unexpected challenge to the punitive regime.  Chapter Seven examines the 
regime’s ultimate survival even in the face of the new vogue of drug consumerism among 
youth.  
 
715 Lande to Anslinger, 3 December 1963, Anslinger Papers, box 2, file 3. Also see Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, “Review of the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drug During 1965,” 18 October 1966, United Nations 
Document, E/CN.7/495, Annex 5, 1.  
CHAPTER 7 
 
Withstanding Drug Consumerism in the Late 1960s and Early 1970s 
A Filipino sociologist wrote in the mid-1970s, the “problem of drug abuse today is 
almost exclusively an all-adolescent activity.”  Philippine teen-agers have “taken up in the 
search of new sensations and thrills—a pattern common to Western youth subcultures.”  
Indeed he saw these youths copying Americans in the way they used and talked about 
drugs.716 
Social commentators and drug control officials lodged similar complaints in capital 
cities around the world in the late 1960s and 1970s.  What had been counter-culture seemed 
to merge into the mainstream in many countries, especially amongst middle-class youth.  
American drug users often got the blame for spreading their habits.717 An Italian newspaper 
complained in the mid-1970s about the “scourge” of drugs used in an American “fashion” by 
Italy’s youth.718 German youth developed new subcultures that included recreational drug 
use as a part of a hip lifestyle.719 Citizens in the developing world joined Western Europeans 
 
716 The comments were based on self-reporting by a sampling of 2,048 high school and college students in five 
cities. See Ricardo M. Zarco and associates, Two Research Monographs on Drug Abuse in the Philippines 
(Manila: Government Printing Office, 1975), 5, 67.  
 
717 For lively social histories that place drug use in the cultural context of the 1960s see Mark Lytle, America’s 
Uncivil Wars: The Sixties from Elvis to the Fall of Richard Nixon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
and Jay Stevens, Storming Heaven: LSD and the American Dream (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987). 
 
718 Cited in Courtwright, Forces of Habit, 172.  
 
719 Robert P. Stephens, “Drugs, Consumption, and Internationalization in Hamburg, 1960-1968” in Consuming 
Germany in the Cold War, ed. David F. Crew (New York: Berg, 2003), 179-206.   
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and Americans, creating by 1972 what the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs called 
the “internationalization of the drug abuse problem.”720 Such statements are stronger 
evidence of the perceptions of officials than of the reality of drug consumption across the 
globe. 
 However—as we have seen throughout this study—the perceptions of officials 
mattered more than the actual rate of drug use when it came to crafting policy.  It would be 
up to officials in national governments to raise a response to what they viewed as a 
threatening wave of drug consumerism among youth.  The final challenge to the punitive 
regime had arrived.  Would governments shift gears and create an alternative policy norm? 
 The fear about drug consumerism (and its likely reality) did not subvert the punitive 
regime.  In 1972 the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs studied the laws of twenty-
four nations (in North and South America, Europe, Africa, and the Near, Middle, and Far 
East).  The study concluded that “many of the legal systems” examined “penalize the user or 
possessor (for personal use) very severely.”  In fact, every country in the study—from 
Afghanistan to Yugoslavia—had laws that punished illicit drug possession with 
imprisonment, often lasting a number of years.  The report wondered if such “severe 
penalties” indicated frustration about the upsurge of drug use.721 An American professor of 
psychiatry warned the “young traveler in search of himself” of the dire legal consequences 
 
720 For descriptions of the “rapidly increasing population of youthful drug users during the late 1960s and the 
1970s” see Spencer and Navaratnam, Drug Abuse in East Asia, 28. McAllister provides a multi-national survey 
of policy oriented statements in Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 218n8. Also see Division of 
Narcotic Drugs, “Memorandum on Penal Sanctions for Narcotic Offenses: A Comparative Study of Selected 
Countries,” 10 February 1972, UNDCPA, item 64, file: 23000, Narcotic Drugs, Laws and Regulations, General, 
12; and J. F. Kramer and D.C. Cameron, A Manual on Drug Dependence (Geneva: World Health Organization, 
1975). 
 
721 Division of Narcotic Drugs, “Memorandum on Penal Sanctions for Narcotic Offenses: A Comparative Study 
of Selected Countries,” 10 February 1972, UNDCPA, Item 64, file: 23000, Narcotic Drugs, Laws and 
Regulations, General, 11. 
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that attended an arrest for cannabis use or possession in sixty-five countries likely to be 
tourist destinations.722 The U.S. State Department, which had been so central to the creation 
and consolidation of the punitive regime, had the unwelcome task of trying to get out from 
foreign prisons tourists who had ignored the department’s warning that “foreign governments 
are not more tolerant of drug use, nor are they more permissive in their drug laws and law 
enforcement, than is the United States.”723 
This chapter presents three cases to demonstrate how the punitive regime withstood 
the issue of drug consumerism.  Rather than attempting a global survey I have selected cases 
that have special significance within my narrative.  In the United States, where drug use 
became widespread, the federal government tempered punishment, but hardly abandoned its 
application.  In the United Kingdom—where ambulatory maintenance had been a small but 
notable option for some addicts—British officials reacted to what they saw as a new vogue of 
drug consumerism by stiffening penalties and constraining the authority of physicians.  
Finally, Filipino lawmakers had a similar response and tried to force abstinence with stiff 
penalties and detention as “treatment,” much like the American approach forged in Manila 
sixty years earlier. 
 
Part I.  The United States: Punishment Tempered but Preserved 
 
Drug consumerism became a formidable force in American social history in the late 
1960s.  Rampant drug use, along with stiff penalties, combined to produce unprecedented 
 
722 Werner Koenig, Trip Tips; Or, Useful Information for Youthful Travelers (Los Angeles: Anderson, Ritchie 
& Simon, 1971), 6, 7. Koenig tried unsuccessfully to convince United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs to 
distribute his pamphlet. See correspondence in UNCPA, item 64, file: 23000, Narcotic Drugs, Laws and 
Regulations, General. 
 
723 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, GIST, “The Drug Problem: Americans Abroad,” March 
1975, copy in Truman Library, Papers of S. Walter Washington, Reference Files, 1945-1977, Narcotics-Drug 
Traffic.  
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levels of drug convictions.  The federal government was forced to draw down the mandatory 
penalties that had been raised in the 1950s.  Still, the punitive approach remained central to 
U.S. drug policy, and enforcement continued apace.   
 
New Trends and Continuing Punishment  
 
Around 1967 the rising popularity of non-medical drug use became an undeniable 
explosion.  Social historian H. Wayne Morgan notes that by then cannabis use had “swept 
through American society.”724 By the mid-1970s an estimated thirty million Americans had 
tried cannabis and twelve million (almost eight percent of the adult population) used the drug 
regularly.725 Middle-class youth were especially drawn to cannabis because of its association 
with counter-culture consumerism [See Figure 14].726 Historians David Courtwright, 
Herman Joseph, and Don Des Jarlais note that non-medical drug use carried broader 
significance in the late 1960s: “to light up a joint was to oppose the war, to question the 
system, to reject the square virtues.”727 Heroin use also increased to such a degree that 
Courtwright labels it the “great epidemic.”728 
The increased drug use and the stiff anti-drug laws meant that unprecedented numbers 
of drug offenders would serve time in prison.  From 1960 to 1971 the number of people 
 
724 Morgan, Drugs in America, 161.  
 
725 Thomas E. Bryant, testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics of the Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 19 November 1974, cited in Richard C. Schroeder, The Politics of Drugs: Marijuana 
to Mainlining (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1975), 17.  
 
726 The concept of counter-culture consumerism is drawn from Thomas Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business 
Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). Also 
see Musto and Korsmeyer, Quest for Drug Control, 3.  
 
727 David Courtwright, Herman Joseph, and Don Des Jarlais, Addicts Who Survived: An Oral History of 
Narcotic Use in America, 1923-1965 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 27. 
 
728 Courtwright, Dark Paradise, 165-70.  
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prosecuted for a non-federal drug violation who were under eighteen years of age increased 
by over 3,000 percent (reaching a total of 54,206 in 1971 and climbing to 83,000 in 1972).729 
In 1970 over 10 percent of all prisoners sent to state and federal prisons were convicted of 
drug offenses.730 By 1973 the number of arrests had jumped even higher.  That year state 
and local police arrested at least 628,900 people for drug offenses (88,000 for opium, 
cocaine, or their derivatives; 420,700 for cannabis; 33,400 for synthetic narcotics; and 86,800 
for other controlled drugs).  Of those arrested, 89 percent were white and 82,340 were under 
eighteen years of age [see Tables 9-11].731 
729 See U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports, for the United States and Its Possessions, 1971 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 122; and U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform 
Crime Reports, for the United States and Its Possessions, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1972), 123. 
 
730 Margaret Werner Cahalan, Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Justice, 1986), table 3-17, 45.  
 
731 United States Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports, for the United States and Its Possessions, 1973 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 121, 124, 134.  
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Figure 14: A University of Missouri Student Smoking Cannabis. 
 
Photographer Vernon Merritt III took this photo displaying consumerist trends to illustrate a 
symposium titled “Drugs: Mounting Menace of Abuse,” 31 Look Magazine (8 August 1967): 11-28.  
 
Source: Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, file: Look Job-67-3297. 
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Table 9: State and Local Narcotic Law Prosecutions in Thousands, 1960-1975 
The offenses related to unlawful possession, sale, or use of controlled drugs.  The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation compiled these figures from data provided by police departments across the 
country and in U.S. territories sent on a voluntarily basis. For this reason the figures should not be 
considered to be exact. The actual number of prosecutions for drug offenses was likely higher.  
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports, for the United States and Its 
Possessions, 1960-1975 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960-1975). 
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Table 10: State and Local Narcotic Law Prosecutions Per One Hundred Thousand of the 
Total Population, 1960-1975 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports, for the United States and Its 
Possessions, 1960-1975 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960-1975). 
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Table 11: State and Local Cannabis Arrests Reported to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
1965-1973 
 
Source: Tabulated in Richard C. Schroeder, The Politics of Drugs: Marijuana to Mainlining 
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1975), 21. 
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The trend of escalating drug use and incarceration of offenders forced a tempering of 
the penalties imposed.  The 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
lowered—for the first time—the penalties for drug possession.  President Richard Nixon, 
along with the Justice Department, had pushed for the bill.  They had multiple motives.  The 
scale of convictions raised daunting capacity challenges for the criminal justice system.  
There was also a growing public outcry for a larger public commitment to drug treatment.  
The act removed the mandatory minimum prison sentences and authorized increased funding 
for the treatment of “drug abuse” broadly defined.  But the punitive approach remained 
central.  Illicit consumers faced up to a year in prison, a $5,000 fine or both upon a first 
conviction.732 (Although judges could substitute probation for prison sentences in favorable 
cases.) 
 The new attention to addiction treatment did not alter the popular support for 
incarceration as the best route to abstinence.  According to a 1969 survey, 42 percent of 
American parents would have reported “their own children to the police for using illicit 
 
732 In 1968 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics transferred to the Department of Justice where it became the Bureau 
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. The name was again changed in 1973 to the Drug Enforcement 
Administration. The 1970 act, which remains (with amendments) the basis of federal drug laws, followed the 
example of the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965 in shifting the constitutional basis for federal drug 
control from taxing powers to interstate commerce. The 1965 act dealt with depressants and stimulants, though 
it sought to protect the interests of pharmaceutical manufacturers, rather than impose limits on personal 
consumption.  A Bureau of Drug Abuse Control in the Food and Drug Administration administered the 
regulations from 1966 to 1968, rather than the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. A 1968 amendment for LSD and 
other depressant and stimulant drugs increased the restrictions and penalties regarding controlled depressants 
and stimulants, but still allowed probation instead of prison for first some first offenses.  U.S. Statutes at Large 
82 (1968): 1361-1362. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, U.S. Statutes at Large 79 (1965): 226-236;
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, U.S. Statutes at Large 84 (1970): 1236-1296. 
Also see Musto and Korsmeyer, Quest for Drug Control, 56-71. For more about psychotropic pharmaceuticals, 
relegated to medicinal, e.g. legal, status, see Mickey C. Smith, A Social History of the Minor Tranquilizers: The 
Quest for Small Comfort in the Age of Anxiety (New York: Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1991).   
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drugs.”733 A 1970 Gallup Poll helped to explain the continued resistance to a medical 
approach.  Asked about the best way to handle heroin users, 13 percent favored a prison 
sentence lasting up to a year in prison.  Twenty-seven percent wanted a sentence of two to 
five years.  And 23 percent called for a prison term of ten or more years.  Only 6 percent 
desired no penalty and just 12 percent recommended some sort of “medical help.”  The death 
penalty seemed justified for heroin use or illicit possession of the drug to 4 percent of 
respondents.  Opinions on cannabis use or possession were more tolerant, but still leaned 
toward long prison terms.  Fifteen percent recommended no penalty, whereas 23 percent 
selected up to a year in prison, 24 percent backed two to five years in prison, and 14 percent 
suggested prison terms of ten years or more.734 
The repeal of mandatory minimum prison sentences did not significantly alter the 
sentencing trend.  In 1970, 12 percent of convicts sent to federal prisons were there on drug 
charges.  The rate increased by 1975 to 26 percent.735 That year drug violators accounted for 
almost a third of the total federal prison population of 21,949.736 The average sentence 
length for a drug offense in 1960 was fifty-one months; by 1970 the average fell, but only by 
three months (to forty-eight months).737 The average time served in federal prison for a drug 
 
733 Morgan, Drugs in America, 161. 
 
734 The Gallup Organization, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1997, CD-ROM (Wilmington: Scholarly 
Resources, 2000), 1970: 2246.  
 
735 Margaret Werner Cahalan, Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Justice, 1986), table 6-10, 155.  
 
736 They comprised 27 percent of the persons present in federal facilities. See Margaret Werner Cahalan, 
Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 
1986), table 6-13, 158.  
 
737 Margaret Werner Cahalan, Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Justice, 1986), table 6-16, 162.  
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violation decreased, but still remained over two years throughout the 1970s (thirty-five 
months in 1960, thirty-three months in 1970, and twenty-six months in 1979).738 
Advocates of medical treatment did succeed in making some headway.  Most notable 
were methadone maintenance programs for opiate addicts begun on a small scale in the 
1960s and expanded during the 1970s.  But even these were constrained by the punitive 
approach.739 Used properly, methadone (a synthetic opiate usually administered orally) can 
alleviate the symptoms of opiate withdrawal without producing a euphoric effect.  However, 
the impulse to control and confine drug users hobbled the effort.  As historian David 
Courtwright notes, distaste for addiction maintenance kept the methadone rationale from 
developing into a “coherent national response to heroin addiction[;] instead it became a 
hodgepodge of bureaucratized programs, imposing numerous requirements on clients and 
reaching, at most, a fourth of the nation’s heroin addicts.”740 This hesitance confirmed the 
wariness felt by Dr. Lawrence Kolb, who had served as first medical director of the 
Lexington narcotic farm.  He wrote to Dr. Marie Nyswander, who developed a methadone 
pilot program with her husband Dr. Vincent Dole in 1964, that the stabilization of addicts on 
methadone doses would not keep the federal enforcement officials from remaining 
“penitentiary minded.”741 Historian William White argues that the Nixon administration 
 
738 Margaret Werner Cahalan, Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Justice, 1986), table 6-17, 163. 
 
739 A new Division of Narcotic Addiction and Drug Abuse within the National Institute of Mental Health shifted 
the two federal facilities away from their role as extra prison space in favor of research to advise state programs. 
The Ft. Worth center closed in 1971. The Lexington center, renamed the “Clinical Research Center” closed in 
1974.  Thereafter the Bureau of Prisons gained full control of the grounds.  See White, Slaying the Dragon, 
260-1.   
 
740 See Courtwright, Dark Paradise, 173; and Courtwright, Joseph, and Des Jarlais, Addicts Who Survived, 319-
43. 
 
741 See Kolb to Nyswander, 22 February 1964, Kolb Papers, box 4, file: Nel-NY. 
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allowed limited methadone maintenance not because of an aversion to the program of 
incarceration but in hopes that it would reduce inner city crime and bolster Nixon’s “law and 
order” platform.742 
Part II. Augmenting the Regime in the United Kingdom     
In 1967 a British psychologist described the heroin addicts that he had met in the 
previous two years.  “These young men come from lower or upper middle class families.  
They have rarely committed offences apart from ‘being found in possession’ or having 
tampered with prescriptions.”  He added that they were “mostly of above average to very 
superior intellectual capacity and the picture is rather one of wasted opportunity.”743 These 
young drug consumers, along with their counterparts who settled upon cannabis use, inspired 
a tougher law enforcement approach.  Hoping to quash what they feared was an epidemic of 
drug consumerism in the 1960s, British drug officials and legislators escalated the level of 
punishment and eliminated the famous, but minor, doctor-directed maintenance program.  In 
short, they re-affirmed Britain’s commitment to the punitive regime.  
 
New Types of British Drug Users Face Tougher Penalties 
Officials watched with trepidation as signs of the British incarnation of drug 
consumerism seemed to appear in the 1960s.  They had two main benchmarks for gauging a 
new drug problem.  There was the small number of “official” addicts (maintained by 
physicians under the Rolleston committee’s authorization).  The number remained in the 
 
742 White, Slaying the Dragon, 255.  
 
743 Cited in Davenport-Hines, Pursuit of Oblivion, 303.   
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hundreds up to 1965.744 There was also the pattern of arrests dating to the outset of punitive 
prohibition.  Most drug convicts had been foreigners or racial minorities up until the 
1950s.745 The pattern shifted in the early 1960s [see Table 12].  By then heroin and cannabis 
use had spread outside London and had become increasingly widespread among non-
immigrants and especially young people.746 The Home Office understood these changes to 
represent the emergence of a “sub-culture” of deviant drug consumers.  The press played up 
the social changes underway.  For example, Joseph Cerutti’s article titled “10,000 London 
Teens Seen as Drug Addicts, Some Estimates Put Users at 50,000,” made the hundreds of 
“official” addicts seem like a different problem altogether.747 
744 The number of official addicts was just 927 in 1965. See “United Kingdom Annual Report 1965,” 
UNDCPA, item 60, file 22971, Annual Reports, United Kingdom.  
 
745 See M.L. Harney’s commentary about Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani prepared opium offenders noted to 
Anslinger on 12 September 1961, NA, Subject Files of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 1916-
1970 (hereafter RG 170), Acc #170-74-12, box 157 (old box #25), file: 0660 British System, 1948-Dec. 1961. 
See the descriptions of African, Indian, and West Indian cannabis offenders in Munch to Anslinger, 2 
November 1961, NA, RG 59, ACC # 170-74-12, box 157 (Old box 25), file: 0660 Great Britain #4.  Also see 
Davenport-Hines, Pursuit of Oblivion, 298-303. 
 
746 See “Narcotics Trade Vexes the British,” New York Times, 17 April 1966; Kenneth Leech, “The Junkies’ 
Doctors and the London Drug Scene in the 1960s: Some Remembered Fragments,” in Policing and 
Prescribing: The British System of Drug Control, ed. David K. Whynes and Philip T. Bean (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), 35-59; and Klaus Weinhauer, “Drug Consumption in London and Western Berlin During the 
1960s and 1970s: Local and Transnational Perspectives,” Social History of Alcohol and Drugs 20 (Spring 
2006): 187-224.     
 
747 See Chicago Tribune, 12 January 1966, clipping in NA, RG 59, Acc #170-74-12, box 157 (old box #25), 
file: 0660 British System, 1962-1967. Also see Flora Lewis’1964 report for the Washington Post entitled, 
“British Attitudes Changing on the Use of Narcotics,” copy in NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 157 (old box 
#25), folder 0660 Great Britain #7. For Anslinger’s complaints about the low estimates, see Sharman to 
Anslinger, 5 August 1949, Anslinger Papers, box 2, file 16.  
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Table 12: Drug Possession and Use Convictions in the United Kingdom, 1945-1965 
These convictions resulted in fines, probation, and prison terms.  By 1966 the total offenses reached 
1,174, with 978 cannabis infractions (a 50 percent increase in one year).748 The trend continued 
through 1970 when Britain reported 8,800 drug convictions to the United Nations.749 
Source: “United Kingdom Annual Reports for 1945, 1949, 1953, 1955,” all in UNDCPA, item 
17, file 109/03, Annual Reports, United Kingdom; and “United Kingdom Annual Reports for 1960, 
1965,” both in UNDCPA, item 60, file 22971, Annual Reports, United Kingdom. 
 
748 Davenport-Hines, Pursuit of Oblivion, 312.  
 
749 Philip Bean, The Social Control of Drugs (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 108. 
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The seeming popularity of drug use prompted British officials to toughen the 
penalties for violations and rein in the exception for maintenance of manufactured-drug 
addicts by private physicians.  The key policy statement came in 1965.  The 
Interdepartmental Commission on Drug Addiction appointed by the Minster of Health and 
led by Lord Walter Russell Brain, a former President of the Royal College of Physicians, 
moved away from the maintenance of manufactured-drug addicts and toward increased 
coercion to induce opiate addicts into detoxification.750 The commission sought the 
mandatory reporting of addicts by doctors, the elimination of private physicians’ right to 
prescribe heroin and cocaine, and the establishment of government-run treatment centers that 
could provide outpatient services, as well as detention of addicts through civil 
commitment.751 
In Washington, Federal Bureau of Narcotics officials were pleased about Britain’s 
affirmation of the punitive regime and worked to publicize the British trend.  George 
Gaffney, Deputy Commissioner, ordered that his staff assemble reports to inform 
Congress.752 Anslinger had long correctly held that the main aim of British policy was 
similar to U.S. policy (with the sole divergence of Britain’s maintenance of a few hundred 
 
750 The Commission’s first report was issued in 1960 and largely affirmed the regulations established following 
the 1926 Rolleston Committee. See Interdepartmental Committee, Drug Addiction (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1961); and Interdepartmental Committee, Drug Addiction (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 1965). Also see Stein, International Diplomacy, 160-171; Berridge and Edwards, Opium and the 
People, 254-56; and “Britain Considers New Control on Narcotics; Permissive Attitude Under Scrutiny as Dope 
Addiction Shows Increase,” Los Angles Times, 23 May 1965, clipping in NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 157 
(old box #25), folder 0660 Great Britain #7.  
 
751 See Ministry of Health, Scottish Home and Health Department, Drug Addiction, Second Report of the 
Interdepartmental Committee (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1965), 9, 14; and Tom Cullen, 
“Clampdown Proposed: British Addicts Fear End of Legal Drugs,” Stockton Record, 13 December 1965; and 
King, The Drug Hang-up, 204-205. 
 
752 Gaffney to Giordano, 25 October 1965, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 157 (old box #25), folder 0660 
Great Britain #7. 
 
255
manufactured-drug addicts).753 Bureau officials publicized the heroin overdose of Oxford 
student Joshua Macmillan (grandson of the former Prime Minister Harold Macmillan) and 
the arrest of the daughter of the Under Secretary of the Home Office for a cannabis 
violation.754 Gaffney noted that the Brain Committee’s conclusion that “satisfactory 
treatment of addiction was possible only in suitable institutions” was “of course the same 
position to which this Bureau has adhered since its inception.”  He added, “It is further 
evident that the English are also finding it necessary to reshape their own Policies and to 
fashion it more in accord with the policies of the United States.”755 With some tongue in 
cheek, an official in the Permanent Central Opium Control Board wrote to Anslinger in 1965 
that the British “now clamour for the introduction of the ‘American’ system.”756 
The British parliament incorporated the tougher, more punitive approach 
recommended by the Brain Committee.  A 1967 update of the Dangerous Drugs Act signaled 
a general shift from treating manufactured-drug addicts as individual patients and toward 
governmental prevention and control efforts.  The law restricted physicians’ prescription 
rights, ordered mandatory reporting of addicts, and authorized the creation of treatment 
centers in hospitals.  The penalties for illicit possession were also carried forward in a series 
 
753 Anslinger, “British Narcotic System,” n.d., NA, RG 59, Acc #170-74-12, box 157 (old box #25), file: 0660 
British System, 1948-Dec. 1961.  
 
754 Henry Giordano, “Commissioner Giordano Gives Some Facts About Narcotics,” clipping of Congressional 
Record, 22 October 1965, in Truman Library, Papers of Harry J. Anslinger, box 3, file: Post-Retirement File 
and Data on Drug Addiction and Traffic.”  Also see “Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Nineteenth Session of 
the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 4 to 8 May 1964, to the Secretary of State,” 8 June 1964, 
copy in Anslinger Papers, box 10, file 11, 7. 
 
755 Gaffney to Harrell, 24 August 1966, NA, RG 170, Acc#170-74-12, box 157 (old box #25), folder 0660 Great 
Britain #8.   
 
756 Adolph Lande anticipated that the United Kingdom would adopt the “Anslinger” approach, due to the 
increased use. See Lande to Anslinger, 28 May 1965 and 23 June 1965, both in Truman Library, Papers of 
Harry J. Anslinger, box 2, file: U.N. Economic and Social Council Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
Correspondence, file 5.  
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of laws, culminating in the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act.  The 1971 law allowed a seven-year 
maximum prison term for illicit possession of manufactured drugs and raw opium.  Illicit 
possession of cannabis carried as much as a five-year prison sentence.757 
Part III. Coming Full Circle: Stiffening the Penalties in the Philippines   
 
Philippine officials reacted during the 1960s to what they understood to be an 
unprecedented, alarming increase of drug use by Filipinos.  They had carefully watched for 
telltale signs of drug consumerism through the 1950s only to find their fears seemingly 
realized.  There was nothing new about their reaction.  Legislators strengthened the 
government’s commitment to the punitive regime, first by building an addiction detention 
center and then by escalating the penalties for drug consumption. 
 
“American Remedies for Philippine Problems” 
 
From 1945 through the 1950s, Philippine officials oversaw a long-standing pattern of 
drug enforcement.  Most of the people arrested for illicit drug use were Philippine-Chinese 
[see Figure 15].  The courts generally heard fewer than a hundred cases a year.758 
Accordingly, the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs typically received reports from 
the Philippines such as the one for 1950 that noted twenty-seven prosecutions of people like 
 
757 In 1964 another Dangerous Drugs Act passed along with the Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act, both 
upholding the fines and prison terms for illicit possession.  The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1965 incorporated the 
earlier legislation.  The distinction in penalties for cannabis and other drugs such as heroin came in the wake of 
a report suggesting some flexibility in sentencing. See the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, Cannabis 
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1968). Also see King, The Drug Hang-up, 204-206, 370; Arnold S. 
Trebach, The Heroin Solution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 181; Division of Narcotic Drugs, 
“Memorandum on Penal Sanctions for Narcotic Offenses: A Comparative Study of Selected Countries,” 10 
February 1972, UNDCPA, item, file: 23000, Narcotic Drugs, Laws and Regulations, General, 6, 35; and Dennis 
Howitt, “Britain’s ‘Substance Abuse Policy’: Realities and Regulation in the United Kingdom,” International 
Journal of the Addictions 25, no. 3 (1990): 353-76. 
 
758 Arrest rates from 1950 to 1964 were included in the Philippine Constabulary’s “Report for the Third Annual 
Japanese Seminar on Narcotic Offenses, March to April 1965,” 14 June 1965, NA, RG 170, Acc# 170-74-12, 
box 162 (old box 30), file: Philippines #2, 1935-1967. 
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Lee Ko, a forty-seven year old Philippine-Chinese man who worked as a cook in Baguio 
City.  The police found Lee’s opium pipe, personal supply of opium, and some ash from 
smoking, and the court sentenced him to four months in prison and a fine.759 
Press reports, new patterns of convictions, and surveys all seemed to confirm 
Philippine officials’ belief that an entirely new drug problem dawned during the 1960s.  
Initial reports in 1957 of morphine-addicted school children proved to be false, but 
nonetheless the national press continued to harp about drug use by Filipino youth in the 
following months.760 An “actual case” was discovered in 1961, and the Manila Times 
announced: “There’s no doubt about it.  Drug addiction among school students, from college 
down to the grade schools is a real menace.”761 After 1965, the Philippine government itself 
was reporting to the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs about a number of young 
men, including a sixteen-year-old and a seventeen-year-old, who were arrested for using 
morphine.  In 1965, for the first time the number of Filipino drug offenders surpassed the 
number of ethnic Chinese drug offenders: ninety-six Filipinos versus six Philippine-Chinese.  
 
759 Drug legislation also remained in the U.S.-style after independence in 1946. A Philippine Constabulary 
report described the Republic of the Philippines Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 953 of 1953 as 
“basically patterned that of the United States Narcotic Law.” See Philippine Constabulary’s “Report for the 
Third Annual Japanese Seminar on Narcotic Offenses, March to April 1965,” 14 June 1965, NA, RG 170, Acc# 
170-74-12, box 162 (old box 30), file: Philippines #2, 1935-1967. Also see “Philippine Islands Annual Report 
for 1950,” UNDCPA, item 109/3, Annual Reports, Philippines; “Questionnaire on Addiction, (Philippines), 
1947,” UNDCPA, item 4, file: SOA25/01, Part A, Drug Addiction Questionnaire to Governments; and 
“Additional Information on Drug Addiction,” 18 February 1958, UNDCPA, item 45, file: 23370, Drug 
Addiction, General, 1-2. For examples related in the press see “3 Sinos Admit Opium Use, Get Jail Terms,” 
Daily Mirror, 20 May 1952; “Deport of Sino Opium Addicts Set,” Daily Mirror, 30 June 1961, both in Lopez 
Memorial Museum, Eugenio Lopez Foundation, Filipiniana Collection (hereafter Lopez Collection).  
 
760 See “Two Nabbed in Truck Near School,” Manila Times, 3 October 1957; “Find School Tots Are Not 
Doped,” Daily Mirror, 7 October 1957; and “Dare Squad to Produce Child Opium Addict,” Daily Mirror, 8
October 1957, all in Lopez Collection.  
 
761 See “Dope Pushers Victimize The Kids In Schools, Too,” Manila Times, 16 February 1961; and “Dope 
Pushers Active in Manila Schools,” Daily Mirror, 14 March 1961; both in Lopez Collection.  
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Ninety-three of those convicted were “verified to be drug addicts.”762 Surveys taken in 1972 
estimated that half of the secondary, vocational, and college students had used marijuana or 
another drug in the past two years.  And the government’s estimates of opiate “addicts” 
ranged between eight and ten thousand and there were possibly “over 100,000 marijuana and 
other dangerous drug users,” who were mostly young people.763 
762 At least sixteen of the ninety-three were accused of smuggling or selling drugs rather than possession or use.  
See the case of Domingo Dimas Serrano in “Philippine Islands Annual Report for 1965,” UNDCPA, item 54, 
file: Annual Reports, Philippines, 7; and the case of Reynaldo Lacanilao, in the “Philippines Islands 
Supplementary Report for 1965,” in same folder. There were also many press reports including “More Filipino 
Addicts Listed Over Aliens,” Manila Times, 7 May 1966, copy in Lopez Collection.  
 
763 A survey conducted at the University of the Philippines, College of Arts and Sciences at Diliman, Quezon 
City in 1971 found that almost 30 percent (of a small self-reporting group) had used marijuana. See Ricardo M. 
Zarco, “A Study of Drug Use Among College Students,” reported as a part of training sessions on drug abuse 
held 20 December 1971 to 24 March 1972, transcript available in “Reference, History, Background” section of 
the collection of the Division of Preventive Education, Training, and Information Services, Dangerous Drugs 
Board, Manila, 127-39. Also see Pio A. Abarro, “Drug Abuse: Judicial and Legal Measures for Its Prevention 
and Control,” in Facing the Drug Abuse Problem, ed. Fausto Gomez (Manila: UST Publications, 1972), 45-47.  
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Figure 15: A Philippine Health Official Inspects for Injection Marks, 1964. 
 
In the following years anti-drug enforcement faced a new challenge as youth culture adopted 
drug use, particularly cannabis.   
 
Source: photo with material from the Philippine Free Press, 18 July 1964, in Philippine 
National Library, Special Collections of the Filipiniana Division, Photo Collection, box 76, file: Drug 
Abuse. 
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Philippine officials struggled to understand the youth movement of the late 1960s that 
appeared to be rapidly popularizing illicit drug use.  Young people seemed “revolutionary” in 
their desire for “new experiences” and in their emulation of the fashion and lifestyle of the 
Western youth.764 Manuel Redrico of the Manila Metropolitan Police Narcotics Division 
complained that youth sought every chance to “rebel against our standard of conventional 
society” with their long hair, dirty clothes, extra-marital sex, and drug use.765 A government 
memorandum described “groups composed mostly of teenagers [that] organized themselves 
into ‘hippie families’ to propagate the drug culture.”766 The characterization of the young 
“hippies” as outside mainstream Philippine culture fit a longstanding tendency to blame 
foreigners for local drug use.767 Accordingly, officials faulted the overall increase in drug 
consumption on Western youth culture in general and the popularity of cannabis on 
American servicemen, in particular.768 (Allegedly servicemen first introduced cannabis seeds 
and the habit of smoking cannabis cigarettes into the islands.) 
 
764 Cesarea Goduco-Auglar lamented the “alarming across-the-board increase in the abuse of all principal illicit 
drugs,” in “A Note on Drug Abuse in the Philippines,” Bulletin of Narcotics 24 (April-June 1972): 43. 
 
765 Speech given by Manuel Redrico titled “The Role of the MDP in Drug Abuse,” as a part of training sessions 
on drug abuse held 20 December 1971 to 24 March 1972, transcript available in “Reference, History, 
Background” section of the collection of the Division of Preventive Education, Training, and Information 
Services, Dangerous Drugs Board, Manila, 33. 
 
766 Undated memorandum titled “Magnitude of the Drug Abuse Problem in the Philippines,” in “Reference, 
History, Background” section of the collection of the Division of Preventive Education, Training, and 
Information Services, Dangerous Drugs Board, Manila, 2. 
 
767 Mae Unite, an official with the Philippine Dangerous Drugs Board, informed me that “hippies” and 
“Chinese” were the agents of the drug problems in the Philippines.  Interview with Mae A. Unite, Dangerous 
Drugs Regulation Officer, Control Regulations and Intelligence Division, Dangerous Drugs Board, Manila, 
May 2003. Use of the word “hippies” was common in press coverage of drug use. See, for example, “Addiction 
Is Getting To Be Nat’l Problem Much Like Other Crimes,” Daily Mirror, 7 October 1968, copy in Lopez 
Collection.  
 
768 Cannabis cultivation, possession, and use were all banned by Republic Act 2060 of 1958. See “Cops Open 
War On Marijuana,” Daily Mirror, 11 January 1955; and “U.S. GI’s Tagged Marijuana Source,” Daily Mirror,
9 March 1971; both in Lopez Collection; and Ricardo M. Zarco, “A Short History of Narcotic Drug Addiction 
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Philippine officials responded to the increase in drug use by strengthening their 
adherence to the punitive regime, first by creating a special detention center for drug 
“addicts.”  Patrick O’Carroll, director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics Training 
School, helped to spur the idea.  He arrived in Manila in 1965 for the United Nations 
Seminar on Narcotics Control and urged the need for compulsory confinement of drug 
users.769 That same year Jose G. Lukban, director of the Philippine National Bureau of 
Investigation, embraced the idea and created a “closed” treatment and rehabilitation center 
for addicts south of metro Manila in Tagaytay City.770 The center was designed to hold fifty 
people.  It accepted voluntary admissions but mostly served as a place to isolate youthful 
drug offenders rather than put them in a normal prison.   
The facility conditions were lamentable and the results were poor.  Pio Abarro, 
Assistant Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and (graduate of the U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics Training School), conceded that the building did not look like a 
“treatment center according to medical standards” and that a foreign visitor to the center had 
compared it to a “pighouse.”771 The facility provided little by way of rehabilitation.  Escapes 
 
in the Philippines, 1521-1959,” Historical Bulletin of the Philippine Historical Association 3 (December 1959): 
98-99.   
 
769 American officials had also endorsed a special prison for drug addicts during a 1963 conference in Manila. 
See “Report of the United Nations Seminar on Narcotics Control for Enforcement Officers From Asia and the 
Far East, Manila 1965,” 28 June 1965, copy in UNDCPA, item 137, file: 33457, Technical Assistance, Training 
Seminar, Manila 1965. Also see O’Carroll’s report on the 18-30 January 1965 Manila Seminar in NA, RG 170, 
Acc# 170-74-12, box 162 (old box 30), file: 0660 Philippines #2, 1935-1967; and “Dope Addicts’ ‘Prison’ 
Urged To Check Vice,” Daily Mirror, 26 March 1963, copy in Lopez Collection.  
 
770 Pio A. Abarro noted the influence of the United Nations seminar on the creation of the center in “Drug 
Abuse: Judicial and Legal Measures for Its Prevention and Control,” in Facing the Drug Abuse Problem, ed. 
Fausto Gomez (Manila: UST Publications, 1972), 48. Also see Lukban to Chapman, 19 October 1965, 
UNDCPA, item 137, file: 33457, Technical Assistance, Training Seminar, Manila 1965.   
 
771 Speech given by Pio Abarro titled “The Role of the N.B.I. in the Drug Abuse Problem,” as a part of training 
sessions on drug abuse held 20 December 1971 to 24 March 1972, transcript available in “Reference, History, 
Background” section of the collection of the Division of Preventive Education, Training, and Information 
Services, Dangerous Drugs Board, Manila, 22. 
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and the smuggling of drugs into the building were constant problems.  The Philippine 
government duly reported the dismal rate of long-term abstinence (ranging between 1 and 5 
percent) to the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs.772 Most of those detained 
eventually returned for another term.  An estimated 90 percent those released were arrested 
again for using drugs.773 Abarro was frank about the outcome of the program: “we have not 
treated them [drug users], but by confining them for 6 months, at least we are proud that we 
have prevented 60 people monthly from using narcotics.”774 Corporal Manuel Redrico of the 
Manila Police Department placed part of the blame for the poor results on the lack of local 
studies, conceding “we merely rely on whatever results of experimentation that are 
transmitted to us by progressing countries, particularly the United States.”775 Despite the 
limitations of the program, judges continued to consider the addiction detention center a 
positive option (at least in comparison with regular prisons).  They sentenced 947 people to 
the center in 1971.776 The center remained overcrowded.  Designed to hold fifty people, 
there were ninety-two confined there in 1972 with only one physician in attendance.777 
772 See, for example the case of Delfin Eugenio in “Philippine Islands Annual Report for 1965, Supplementary 
Report,” UNDCPA, item 54, file: Annual Reports, Philippines, 4. Also see, “Philippine Islands Annual Report 
for 1970,” UNDCPA, item 54, file: Annual Reports, Philippines, 6; “Two Dope Addicts Nabbed by NBI 
Agents,” Manila Times, 14 March 1966; and “Congress Acts on Opium Peril,” Manila Times, 15 February 
1969; both in Lopez Collection.  
 
773 Abarro, “The Role of the N.B.I. in the Drug Abuse Problem,” 25. Also see Col. Cenon M. Balza “An 
Investigation of the Procedures and Actions Taken Against Drug Abuse,” (thesis, National Defense College of 
the Philippines, 1972-1973), 79. 
 
774 Abarro, “The Role of the N.B.I. in the Drug Abuse Problem,” 22.   
 
775 “No Total Cure for RP Drug Addicts Yet Made,” Daily Mirror, 23 March 1972, copy in Lopez Collection. 
 
776 Pio A. Abarro, “Drug Abuse: Judicial and Legal Measures for Its Prevention and Control,” Facing the Drug 
Abuse Problem, ed. Fausto Gomez (Manila: UST Publications, 1972), 45.   
 
777 See “3 Students Convicted in Drug Case,” Manila Times, 22 April 1972, copy in Lopez Collection.  
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The second official response to the seeming increase in drug use was to spike the 
penalties, again augmenting the punitive regime.  A series of bills over the 1960s sought to 
lengthen the prison terms imposed on offenders.778 Years of effort culminated in the passage 
of a new Dangerous Drugs Bill in 1972.  The law raised the penalty for illicit possession or 
use of prohibited drugs to a prison term of six to twelve years and a fine of six thousand to 
twelve thousand pesos.  The penalty for cannabis use or possession increased to six months 
to six years in prison and six hundred to six thousand pesos in fines.  The penalty for 
possessing an opium pipe or other drug paraphernalia reached six months to four years in 
prison and fines from six hundred to four thousand pesos.  A visit to a “drug den” risked a 
prison term lasting two to six years.779 In a swipe at the so-called “hippie families,” the law 
stipulated that people caught using or holding banned drugs while at a party or in a group of 
at least five individuals were to receive the maximum sentence.780 People could avoid 
prosecution if they voluntarily entered the National Bureau of Investigation’s center, and 
judges could commit offenders to the center instead of prison (although a second escape 
attempt would result in prosecution on the original charges).781 These options reflected the 
concerns of some legislators who wanted more effort spent on the rehabilitation of drug users 
 
778 See “Opium Raps Filed Today; Hiked Penalties Urged,” Manila Times 13 February 1961; and numerous 
others including “Stiffer Penalty for Dope Urged,” Daily Mirror, 6 February 1961; “War on Dope Addicts 
Urged,” Daily Mirror, 18 February 1961; all in Lopez Collection. U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agent 
Jayme R. Licuanan discussed the trends in a 23 June 1961 letter to Howard W. Chappell, Agent in Charge, NA, 
RG 170, Acc# 170-74-12, box 162 (old box 30), file: Philippines #2, 1935-1967. 
 
779 All also had fines.  See the Philippine Republic Act 6425, The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, United 
Nations Document, E/NL.1976/50. A typical press report, stressing the death penalty for selling drugs to a 
minor, was, “Senate: Death for Drug Fiends,” Daily Mirror, 25 January 1972, copy in Lopez Collection.  
 
780 See section 27 of the Philippine Republic Act 6425, The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, United Nations 
Document, E/NL.1976/50. 
 
781 Judges could also submit offenders who were under twenty-one years of age to probation from six months to 
a year before pronouncing a sentence.  See sections 30 to 32 in the Philippine Republic Act 6425, The 
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, United Nations Document, E/NL.1976/50.  
264
rather than what Senator Leonardo B. Perez called a “blind adoption of American remedies 
for Philippine problems.”782 
The new law meant that judges would dole out stiff sentences.  The first case of illicit 
drug possession prosecuted under the new law set the pattern.  A twenty-one year old female 
student named Roslinda Legayada-Callao received a sentence of one year in prison and a one 
thousand peso fine for illegal possession of two tablets of “mandrax,” a pharmaceutical 
sedative known as sleeping pills or Quaaludes in the United States [see Figure 16].  Other 
violators faced even stiffer penalties.  The prisons held people serving lengthy terms for 
minor offenses.  For example, a twelve-year term was the price for having “packet of opium 
powder,” a six-year term for possession of a syringe for injecting morphine, and a six month 
term for possession of a “marijuana-treated cigaret butt.”783 A commentator in the press 
complained: “hundreds of young persons have already been arrested and jailed for mere 
possession of prohibited or regulated drugs.  They are now languishing in jail like ordinary 
criminals, although many of them are minors and students.”784 
782 “Death Penalty: Solons Hedge on Dope Bill,” Manila Times, 28 January 1972, copy from Lopez Collection. 
 
783 See Col. Cenon M. Balza “An Investigation of the Procedures and Actions Taken Against Drug Abuse,” 
(thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, 1972-1973), 85; “Marijuana Case: Man Convicted,” 
Manila Times, 26 April 1972; “Three Sentenced for Drug Act Violations,” Manila Times, 11 August 1972, both 
in Lopez Collection.  Also see “Magnitude of the Drug Abuse Problem in the Philippines,” n.d., copy in  
“Reference, History, Background” section of the collection of the Division of Preventive Education, Training, 
and Information Services, Dangerous Drugs Board, Manila, 2.  
 
784 See Cesario L. Del Rosario, “Dangerous Drugs Act: Loopholes Snag Drive,” Daily Mirror, 21 June 1972; 
and Cesario L. Del Rosario, “Dangerous Drugs Act: No Experts So Far On New Law,” Daily Mirror, 19 June 
1972, both in Lopez Collection.  
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Figure 16: Roslinda Legayada-Callao Hides Her Face During Her Sentencing. 
 
Source: “Penalty Too Severe? Clemency for Coed in Drug Case Urged,” Manila Times, 14 April 
1972, copy from Lopez Collection. 
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Conclusion 
 
By the 1970s the punitive regime had withstood its second major challenge.  No more 
than medical critics of punishment in the 1930s, young drug consumers in the 1960s and 
early 1970s could not force governments to adopt a new approach.  Governments chose to 
cling to the punitive regime, increase its rigor, and penalize citizens in unprecedented 
numbers.  The punishment solution would become increasingly controversial, but it would 
remain popular.  More to the point it would remain in place as the global standard.   
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
Conclusion: A Sturdy Regime Remains 
 
By the 1970s the punitive regime was fully established and well tested.  After forging 
the policy that would become the American model in the colonial Philippines, U.S. officials 
successfully exported it as a modern and progressive approach.  By organizing international 
conferences, pushing for ironclad treaties, and denouncing non-medical drug use, U.S. efforts 
spurred the global harmonization of punitive policies regarding drug consumption.  States 
joined the regime, prompted by international treaties and guided by national motives, and 
sent reports to demonstrate their compliance.  The regime was tested, and ultimately 
strengthened, by two major challenges.  Medical oversight—especially in the form of large-
scale ambulatory maintenance of drug addicts—represented a serious, but correctable 
aberration near the end of the interwar period.  American officials successfully countered it 
by advancing specialized incarceration as a cutting-edge form of treatment internationally.  
The second challenge came in the late 1960s.  Drug consumerism among youth forced 
governments to revaluate their commitment to the regime.  In 1970 the U.S. Congress 
moderated the federal penalties imposed on drug consumers.  This lowered the ceiling 
without remodeling the house.  Most national governments also weathered the surge of drug 
consumerism and unlike the United States reacted by escalating punishment.   
 In the United States the punitive approach rebounded from its low point in 1970.  By 
1986 the mandatory minimum penalties had returned.  The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
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sought to deter recreational drug use (especially of cocaine prepared for smoking known as 
“crack”) with incarceration.  Possession of five grams of “crack” triggered a five-year 
mandatory prison sentence.785 A 1988 amendment expounded the concept of “user 
accountability,” which added innovations of civil penalties for first time violators and 
minors.  These expanded the toolbox of sanctions.  The Drug Enforcement Agency noted that 
“it is important to remember that these penalties are in addition to the criminal penalties drug 
abusers are already given, and do not replace those criminal penalties.”786 Such views 
remained in tune with public opinion.  A 1995 Gallup Poll found that 84 percent favored 
making the criminal penalties more severe for the possession and sale of drugs (49 percent 
strongly favored more severity), while just 13 percent opposed (3 percent strongly so).787 
The tough approach led to almost half a million drug prisoners by 2000, a disproportionate 
share of whom were young and black.788 Those convicted of all types of drug offenses 
comprised 20 percent of state prisoners and 54 percent of federal prisoners in 2003.789 
785 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, U.S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986): 3207. For a sample of the tougher “new” 
ideas see Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1989). For a critical account see Craig Reinarmann and Harry G. Levine, eds., 
Crack in America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
 
786 Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, U.S. Statutes at Large 102 (1988): 4181. Quotation from Drug 
Enforcement Agency, “Drugs of Abuse Publication,” http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/abuse/1-
csa.htm#penalties2 (accessed 31 March 2007).  
 
787 The Gallup Organization, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1997, CD-ROM (Wilmington: Scholarly 
Resources, 2000), 1995: 187.   
 
788 Courtwright, Dark Paradise, 178. Also see Bureau of Justice, “Federal Drug Offenders, 1999 with Trends 
1984-99,” August 2001, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/fdo99.htm (accessed 31 March 2007).  
 
789 Bureau of Justice, “Prisoners in 2005,” November 2006, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/p05.htm 
(accessed 13 April 2007).  
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Forced detoxification of opiate addicts in prison still occurs and can claim lives.790 The 
options are limited for those who need treatment, due to the under funding of rehabilitation 
programs.  According to a 2005 survey there were around twenty million people in the 
United States who needed specialized medical treatment for drug or alcohol misuse and did 
not receive it.791 Historian Caroline Acker writes, “We now have in the United States a two-
tier system of response to drug dependence: treatment for the middle and upper classes and 
incarceration for most others, including the poor, the uninsured, ethnic minorities, and 
immigrants.”792 
The international drug control treaties that followed the 1961 Single Convention also 
reinforced the regime.  A 1988 convention confirmed the punitive approach, stipulating that 
every party “establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances for personal consumption.”793 Drug treatment received only lip service.  Three 
new agreements (reached in 1971, 1972, and 1988) included statements to encourage efforts 
at treatment and rehabilitation, including non-punitive tactics labeled “demand reduction.”794 
790 For an example see the description of Candy Brown’s death in a Rochester, New York jail cell in Paul von 
Zielbauer, “As Health Care in Jails Goes Private, 10 Days Can Be a Death Sentence,” New York Times, 27 
February 2005.  
 
791 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “2005 National Survey on Drug Use & Health: National 
Results,” http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k5NSDUH/2k5results.htm#Ch2 (accessed 31 March 2007). 
 
792 Acker, Creating the American Junkie, 9. 
 
793 See Article 3, section 2 of the 1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug_and_crime_conventions.html (accessed 31 March 
2007). 
 
794 The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1972 Amendments to the 1961 Single Convention, 
and the 1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, are available 
at, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug_and_crime_conventions.html (accessed 31 March 2007). For an 
example of the exhortation for “demand reduction” see Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to 
Countering the World Drug Problem Together, 8-10 July 1998, “Political Declaration Guiding Principles of 
270
But, as William McAllister writes in his history of the treaties, a more balanced approach 
existed only “on paper.”  He concludes that the “focus of international control efforts did not 
change as much as the altered rhetoric might suggest.”795 International relations expert Paul 
Stares writes that “the global prohibition regime has become overwhelmingly biased toward 
the application of sanction-based or ‘negative control’ measures to deter or deny participation 
in the global drug market.”796 
With few exceptions, national governments have remained committed to the punitive 
regime.  Twenty-first century tourists seeking to “find themselves” through chemical mind 
alteration would do well to not to stray from Western Europe where the penalties for the 
personal use of controlled drugs (especially cannabis) are slight.  Heavy penalties are far 
more common elsewhere.  Many developing nations have pushed the penalties beyond the 
strict U.S. laws of the 1950s.  In 1986, two years prior to the return of mandatory 
incarceration in the United States, Nigeria imposed death by firing squad for illegal drug use 
or possession.797 A 2002 law in the Philippines provides for a prison sentence of twelve 
years to life for illicit possession (depending on the weight and purity of the drugs 
confiscated).  An arrest for possession of any amount of any illegal drug when at a “party” or 
“social gathering” of two or more people triggers a mandatory life sentence.798 China 
 
Drug Demand Reduction and Measures to Enhance International Cooperation to Counter the World Drug 
Problem,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug_demand_reduction.html (accessed 31 March 2007). 
795 McAllister offers an overview in Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 230-46.   
 
796 Paul B. Stares, Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Washington, D.C., Brookings 
Institution, 1996), 12.  
 
797 See T. Asuni and O. A. Pela. “Drug Abuse in Africa.” Bulletin of Narcotics 38 (January-June 1986): 55-64. 
 
798 People found under the influence of illegal drugs receive a six-month term in a detoxification center and face 
six to twelve years in prison if caught again. “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,” Rep. Act No. 
9165 (2002).  
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routinely executes drug offenders and sends hundreds of thousands of users into forced 
detoxification detention annually.799 
The punitive regime has become all the more relevant due to the trend of drug 
consumerism that continued from the late 1960s.  Consumers of illicit drugs provide the 
funds for a massive illegal retail market, spending an estimated $300 to $500 billion 
annually.800 In 2005 a national survey in the United States estimated that almost twenty 
million Americans aged twelve or older (8.1 percent of that part of the population) were 
“current” non-medical drug users (defined as having consumed an illegal drug in the last 
month).801 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that around 5 percent 
of the world’s population, or two hundred million people, used an illegal drug in 2004.802 
Researcher Mitchell Earleywine notes the same number of people reporting cannabis use 
alone.803 
The punishment of users, matched with the rise of illicit drug consumption, has 
spurred some popular controversy.  A suggestive example was the first case of illicit drug 
possession prosecuted under the tough 1972 Philippine law.  The law aimed to crack down 
on the rising anti-establishment drug culture, but Rosalinda Legayada-Callao hardly fit the 
bill.  Public clamor for clemency began as the details of Legayada-Callao’s life emerged in 
 
799 For examples, see “China Reports More Drug Users Despite Zero-Tolerance Policy and Executions,” Agence 
France Presse (9 February 2004); and Cindy Sui, “China Goes On Execution Spree to Send Tough Message on 
Anti-Drugs Day,” Agence France Presse (26 June 2003). Also see Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-
Century China, 1, 131-48.  
 
800 Stares, Global Habit, 2n5.  
 
801 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “2005 National Survey on Drug Use & Health:  National 
Results,” http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k5NSDUH/2k5results.htm#Ch2 (accessed 31 March 2007). 
 
802 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “2006 World Drug Report, Vol. 1 Analysis,” 8, 34, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/world_drug_report.html (accessed 31 March 2007).  
 
803 Earleywine, Understanding Marijuana, 29. 
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the press.  She was married to an American sailor who was stationed in San Diego and the 
couple had a one-year-old son.  She had epilepsy and had used mandrax just three times to 
cope with the pain of her seizures.  Legayada-Callao had an epileptic seizure while being 
transferred from sentencing in the courtroom to the jail.  In her second month in prison, 
President Ferdinand Edralín Marcos released Legayada-Callao by executive clemency.  The 
clamor and the extra-judicial act revealed conflicting emotions—the desire to castigate drug 
offenders and the discomfort with punishing drug users from the mainstream of society.804 
Legayada-Callao’s case is also a fitting end to this study, because it is suggestive of 
the punitive regimes’ strength and ability to withstand challenges.  Public complaints about 
stiff penalties imposed on users have certainly not been limited to the Philippines, but they 
have not inspired a dismantling of the regime.  Mass incarceration, HIV/AIDs, the explosion 
of designer pharmaceuticals, and the trend toward the recreational use of legal drugs have yet 
to prompt a tidal shift in policy, and have perhaps made one less likely.  Activists are right to 
emphasize the importance of the United States in shaping current international drug control 
policies, but other states also made major investments in policy as well as criminal justice 
and medical apparatuses.  This study demonstrates that the regime’s sturdy foundation rests 
on both U.S. advocacy and international acceptance.   
 A scientific breakthrough—the cliché that haunts the history of drug control—might 
offer the strongest challenge.  For example, a 2007 study linked a part of the brain to nicotine 
 
804 The press reports indicated that Legayada-Callao was the first person convicted under the new law, but she 
shared a detention cell with six other women who were also charged with illicit drug possession. See Calixto S. 
Fernadez Jr., “Coed To Jail: 1st Drug Case,” Daily Mirror, 12 April 1972; Vicente M. Tanedo, “Coed’s Case To 
Senate,” Daily Mirror, 13 April 1972; “Coed Convicted for Having Prohibited Drug,” Manila Times, 13 April 
1972; “Callao’s Penalty Reduced,” Manila Times, 25 April 1972; Cesario Del Rosario, “2 Women Guilty of 
Dope Pushing” Manila Times, 18 June 1972; “Penalty Too Severe? Clemency for Coed in Drug Case Urged,” 
Manila Times 14 April 1972; “Drug Series on ‘5,’” Manila Times, 19 June 1972; and Cesario L. Del Rosario, 
“Dangerous Drugs Act: Victims, Folks, Confused,” Daily Mirror, 17 July 1972, all in Lopez Collection.  
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addiction, finding that damage to that region of the brain eliminated the urge to smoke.  A 
clear connection between neuroscience and addictive behavior might recast the punishment 
of users as unseemly.  Skepticism is prudent.  The press report noted, “no one is suggesting 
brain injury as a solution for addiction.”805 This might be considered progress.  In the 1950s, 
U.S. federal researchers considered (and applied) lobotomy as a treatment option for 
addiction.806 
805 Benedict Carey, “In Clue to Addiction, Brain Injury Halts Smoking,” New York Times, 26 January 2007.  
 
806 See for example, Harris Isbell, “Meeting a Growing Menace—Drug Addiction,” Merck Report, July 1951, 4-
9.  
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